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ABSTRACT
In this thesis I set out WB Yeats' s conception of Irish national identity as
a non-essentialist, inclusive, and imaginative construct. I do so against the
backdrop of Edward Said's construction of Yeats, within the field of
postcolonial theory, as a poet of decolonization who stops short of
imagining Ireland's full political liberation from colonial rule. I propound
that, on the contrary, Yeats does imagine full liberation in proposing his
Doctrine of the Mask as a method for the creation of what, I argue, is an
emphatically 'postcolonial' national identity. What this identity entails is
elucidated by an examination of key issues of 'nation-ness' explored by
various theorists, particularly Benedict Anderson; the historical
contextualization of Yeats in the Ireland of his times; and a close reading
of particularly Yeats's two major 'occult' works: Per Amica Si/entia
Lunae and A Vision.
Overall, I make several important contributions to 'postcolonial' Yeats
scholarship - a far from exhausted field of study. Firstly, I demonstrate
that the incorporation of the modernist Yeats's 'occult' dimension - a
dimension disparaged and dismissed by Said - into Said's construction of
Yeats as a 'postcolonial' figure serves to bolster rather than undermine
this construction. Secondly, I demonstrate that, while Said claims Frantz
Fanon goes further than Yeats in imagining full liberation in the colonial
context, there are in fact striking parallels between Fanon's narrative of
liberation in particularly The Wretched a/the Earth and Yeats's 'occult'
works, particularly A Vision. The comparison with Fanon, I show,
underlines that Yeats does indeed imagine full liberation, especially at the
level of Irish national identity. Thirdly, I demonstrate the link, heretofore
unnoted by Yeats critics, between Matthew Amold' s defining of the Irish
as racially inferior and Yeats's liberationist discourse in Per Amica
Silentia Lunae and A Vision. I show that Yeats subversively mobilises
Arnold's terms to debunk Amold and buttress a distinctly Yeatsian
conception of Irish national identity.
Lastly, I highlight the 'Yeatsian' complexion of the contemporary South
African context, arguing that the consideration ofYeats's conception of
Irish national identity may assist South Africans in forging a non-
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Chapter One: Yeats and Key Issues of 'Nation-ness' and 'National Identity'
Roy Foster has described WB Yeats "as 'a poet, playwright, political agitator,
journalist, theatre-manager, lover, committee-man, who was capable of writing
magnificent letters" (The Economist 2006:82). Of course, as Foster's two-volume
biography on Yeats attests to in considerable depth, the Nobel Prize-winning Irish
writer was a number of other'Yeatses' as well, not least an exponent of the occult.
And very much at the heart of all these roles and activities was Yeats's preoccupation
with the Ireland of his lifetime (1865-1939): a country long colonized, and which
emerged as what Lloyd calls "one of the earliest postcolonial nations" (1993: 7) with
the founding of the Irish Free State in 1922. It is the central concern of this thesis that
to the list of roles and activities generally associated with Yeats, should be added the
largely unrecognized and unexplored notion that he was a 'postcolonial visionary'. I
shall demonstrate that, as Ireland's (controversially so) national poet, Yeats was a
great deal more than a "political agitator" - that he in fact devised and proposed a
method for the creation and espousal of a postcolonial national identity in Ireland in
the face and wake of colonial oppression; and he speculated that his method might be
adopted by other postcolonial nations.
Indeed, Yeats's 'postcolonial' credentials have been largely overlooked by literary
critics in the decades since his death; in fact, these were barely even considered until
the 1990s, by which time the term 'postcolonial' was widely in use in academic
discourse. Where these credentials have been somewhat belatedly recognized, they
have been only partially explored and explained. In the next chapter, I will seek to
contextualize my argument that Yeats should be granted full recognition as a
'postcolonial' figure despite aspects of his biography and thinking which on the
surface appear to suggest otherwise. In order to bring the fully 'postcolonial' Yeats to
light, an understanding of how Yeats has been constructed as two seemingly different
Yeatses by the theoretical fields of 'modernism' (long the dominant critical
perspective) and more recently 'postcolonialism', must be established. Taking a cue
from Yeats's character Michael Robartes - famed for his 'double vision' - I will
demonstrate in the next chapter that something of a doubleness of scholarly vision,
embracing rather than rigidly dividing several critical perspectives within modernism
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and postcolonialism, is required to clear away certain limiting arguments masking the
emphatically 'postcolonial' Yeats.
Immediately, however, a number of key questions and issues regarding 'nation-ness'
and 'national identity' require foregrounding in order to bring this fully 'postcolonial'
Yeats to light. Chief among these questions is: What does a 'postcolonial national
identity' entail? In considering this question, a basic working definition of 'identity' is
necessary. While 'identity' has a wider range of possible meanings and explanations,
it will be taken to refer, according to Renault's definition, to who or "what we are
individually, as well as what we aspire to be, what detennines or specifies us, as well
as how we present our particularities to ourselves, how we refer to ourselves
individually, and how we identify ourselves with groups and with the general nonn"
(Tazi 2004: 101). Identity therefore encompasses both individual and collective
dimensions, involving what Renault calls "the self-presentation of an individual or a
group's specificity, and the presentation of its personal worth" (2004: 103). A
'national identity', then, would by definition span both individual and collective
facets of self-representation. However, a 'national identity' clearly requires a 'nation'
to which 'identity' attaches - and in this respect the inquiry becomes altogether more
problematic.
What, exactly, is a 'nation'? Given the proliferation ofthe tenn in contemporary
media and political discourse, infonning and informed by the obvious importance of
nations in "human affairs" (Hobsbawm 1990:viii), what constitutes a 'nation' would
appear to be self-evident to users of the tenn, whether in reference to their own nation
or other nations. As Anderson puts it, the "nation" is globally a "taken-for-granted"
(1991: 12) frame of reference, and "nation-ness is the most universally legitimate
value in the political life of our time" (1991 :3). This self-evidence seems to be
unequivocally and reassuringly confinned by official endorsement, bestowed from on
high by the state apparatus, in the fonn of the identity document or card and passport.
But, as Hobsbawm explains, the question of what a nation is presents a "mystery" and
"is a notoriously controversial subject" (1 990:viii). Describing what a nation actually
is, he points out, is fraught with difficulty, encapsulated in Bagehot's remark that "We
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know what it (the 'nation') is when you do not ask us, but we cannot very quickly
explain or define it" (1990: 1).
Certainly, as Hobsbawm argues, the "chief characteristic" of "classifying groups of
human beings" as nations is that "no satisfactory criterion can be discovered for
deciding which of the many human collectivities should be labelled in this way"
(1990:5). This is despite "the claims ofthose who belong" to a nation that it is "in
some ways primary and fundamental for the social existence, or even the individual
identification, of its members" (1990:5). Efforts "to establish objective criteria for
nationhood," Hobsbawm explains, have been based on a "single" criterion "such as
language or ethnicity" or a "combination of criteria such as language, common
territory, cultural traits, or whatever else" (1990:5). Rather than replicate
Hobsbawm's in-depth analysis of the shortcomings of essentialist criteria such as
ethnicity and language, it suffices to state that such criteria "are themselves fuzzy,
shifting and ambiguous" (1990:6) and that, ultimately, all "such objective definitions"
of what a nation is "have failed" (1990:5). This failure stems largely from the fact that
"since only some members of the large class of entities which fit such definitions can
at any time be described as 'nations', exceptions can always be found" (1990:5).
The notion of an objective definition of 'nation' is also undermined by the fact that an
individual may change or choose his or her nationality. As Anderson points out, "even
the most insular nations accept the principle of naturalization (wonderful word!) no
matter how difficult they make it" (1991: 145). However, while this suggests that a
'nation' may be defined in subjective rather than objective terms, subjective
definitions of 'nation', too, have failed. Hobsbawm argues that "defining a nation by
its members' consciousness of belonging to it is tautological and provides only an a
posteriori guide to what a nation is" (1990:8). This presents a slippery slope that may
"lead the incautious into extremes of voluntarism" (1990:8). The idea of voluntarism
defining a 'nation' is, in Hobsbawm's estimation, overly simplistic. To claim
"consciousness or choice as the criterion of nationhood" is, he argues, "insensibly to
subordinate the complex and multiple ways in which human beings define and
redefine themselves as members of groups, to a single option: the choice of belonging
to a 'nation' or 'nationality'" (1990:8).
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Thus, Hobsbawm concludes, there is "no way of telling the observer how to
distinguish a nation from other entities a priori" (1990:5), for both objective and
subjective criteria or definitions of 'nation' are in themselves inadequate and
"misleading" (1990:8). As Seton-Watson puts it, there is "no 'scientific definition' of
the nation that can be devised; yet the phenomenon has existed and exists" (Anderson
1991 :3). It emerges from this, then, that nations are to be defined in a manner that is
case-specific rather than general, and defined through various combinations of
objective and subjective criteria, rather than one or the other. Hobsbawm suggests
that, owing to this lack of a clear-cut definition of what a 'nation' is, the "best initial
posture" towards the existence of nations is "agnosticism" (1990:8). It is "more
profitable", he argues, "to begin with the concept of 'the nation' (i.e. with
'nationalism') than with the reality it represents," because the nation that is
"conceived by nationalism, can be recognized prospectively" while "the real 'nation'
can only be recognized a posteriori" (1990:9). This means that, in terms of "analysis",
nationalism "comes before nations", for nations "do not make states and nationalisms
but the other way round" (1990:10).
Defining 'nationalism' according to Gellner's description that it is '''primarily a
principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent'"
(1990:9), Hobsbawm argues that the 'nation' presented by nationalists as "a natural,
God-given way of classifying men" and "as an inherent. .. political destiny" (1990: 10)
is a fallacy. Emphasizing, like Gellner, the "element of artefact, invention and social
engineering which enters into the making of nations," Hobsbawm holds that
nationalism "sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations,
sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures" (1990: 10). This is
also the basic position of Anderson, but Anderson' s approach is to align nationalism
with '''kinship' and 'religion'" (1991 :5). He rejects Gellner's assimilation of
'''invention' to 'fabrication' and 'falsity', rather than to 'imagining' and 'creation'"
(1991 :6), and highlights that the "cultural products of nationalism" such as "poetry,
prose fiction, music, plastic arts" reflect nationalists' "often profoundly self-
sacrificing love" (1991: 141) for their nation. Anderson therefore situates nationalism,
as the 'maker' of nations, more positively in terms of imaginative construction, rather
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than in the negative light often cast by theorists who "insist on the near pathological
character of nationalism... and its affinities with racism" (1991 :141). A key
difference here, Anderson argues, is that nationalism "thinks in terms of historical
destinies, while racism dreams of eternal contaminations" (1991: 149).
This more positive perspective informs Anderson's famous definition, which
sidesteps the impasse of 'objective' and 'subjective' criteria, of the 'nation' as "an
imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and
sovereign" (1991 :6). All communities "larger than primordial villages of face-to-face
contact (and perhaps even these) are," Anderson argues, "imagined" (1991 :6). The
"nation" is "imagined", Anderson explains, in that "the members of even the smallest
nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of
them," and "yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" (1991 :6). It
is "imagined as a community," he adds, in that "regardless of the actual inequality and
exploitation that may prevail" the nation "is always conceived of as a deep, horizontal
comradeship" (1991 :7). This "fraternity", he argues, is what has made it "possible ...
for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die" (1991 :7) for
their nation.
Anderson also explains that the nation is "imagined as limited" (1991:7) owing to the
existence of 'national borders' - both physical and intellectual. Even "the largest" of
nations, he points out, has "finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other
nations" (1991 :7). And even the "most messianic nationalists," he adds, "do not
dream of a day when all the members of the human race will join their nation"
(1991 :7). Lastly, the nation is "imagined as sovereign" because, with the concept of
the 'nation' maturing "at a stage of human history" marked by "the allomorphism"
between the "ontological claims" of religions and "the territorial stretch," people
dreamed "of being free and, if under God, directly so" (1991:7). The "gage and
emblem of this freedom," Anderson argues, "is the sovereign state" (1991 :7).
It is precisely by tracing the rise of "nation-ness" and "nationalism" as "particular
cultural artefacts" that "command... profound emotional legitimacy" and arouse
"deep attachments" (1991 :4) that Anderson underlines the constructedness and
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imaginative dimension of the 'nation'. The case-specific combination of objective and
subjective criteria in defining nations, Anderson indicates, is achieved through
individuals imagining themselves to be part of collectivities. It is just such imagining
.... in Anderson's positive sense of "creation" rather than "fabrication" - that, as I will
elucidate in chapter three, the nationalist Yeats advocated and sought to encourage in
Ireland. In this regard, Yeats is a particularly interesting 'national poet', for as I will
explain in the next chapter, he himself fell foul of objective and subjective criteria
taken by many of his countrymen to define' Ireland' and 'Irish-ness'. Debunking the
"subjective antiquity" of the nation "in the eyes of nationalists" (1991 :5), Anderson
explains that the concept of the 'nation' emerged primarily during the eighteenth
century, and he sets out an historical process whereby people's capacity to imagine
themselves as part of collectivities increased dramatically and, ultimately, resulted in
the formation of modem nations as political and territorial states, referred to as nation-
states. Again, Yeats presents a particularly absorbing case study, with his lifetime
spanning the emergence of the modem Irish nation-state, and his biography
intersecting with certain historical and specifically colonial conditions described by
Anderson and Hobsbawm.
If nation-states are historically novel, Anderson notes, it remains that "the nations to
which they give political expression always loom out of an immemorial past, and, still
more important, glide into a limitless future" (1991:11/12). Such creation of "nation-
ness" and "nationalism" as socio-political realities, Anderson argues, was "the
spontaneous distillation of a complex 'crossing' of discrete historical forces" that
"once created" became "modular, capable of being transplanted with varying degrees
of self-consciousness, to a great variety of social terrains, to merge and be merged
with a correspondingly wide variety of political and ideological constellations"
(1991 :4). Anderson identifies a range of conditions linked to this "spontaneous
distillation," including the secularisation of religion, the demise of the dynastic realm,
and a change in the apprehension of time whereby the "idea of 'homogeneous, empty
time...measured by clock and calendar" supplanted the "mediaeval conception of
simultaneity-along-time" (1991:24). In regard to the latter condition, Anderson
stresses the novel and newspaper as "two forms of imagining" (1991:25) that enabled
people to '''think' the nation" (1991 :22). In the next chapter I will situate Yeats as
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both heir to and role-player in Irish nationalism. The point I wish to emphasize here is
that Yeats cannot be divorced from the historical process set out by Anderson,
including these "forms of imagining". Such factors both influenced and enabled
Yeats, as a product of his increasingly 'modem' times, to "'think' the nation" and,
anticipating Irish independence, to advocate that Irish individuals imagine themselves
to be part of a postcolonial collectivity. Yeats's proposed method for such imagining,
and the distinctly Yeatsian dimensions of this imagining, will come into view in
chapter three.
The novel and newspaper, Anderson argues, presented the "idea of a sociological
organism moving calendrically through homogeneous, empty time," and this was "the
precise analogue of the idea of the nation... conceived as a solid community moving
steadily down (or up) history" (1991 :26). This apprehension oftime, in which
"simultaneity is, as it were, transverse, cross-time" and is "marked... by temporal
coincidence," displaced "Messianic time, a simultaneity of past and future in an
instantaneous present" (1991 :24). History, then, could be envisaged "as an endless
chain of cause and effect," in terms of distinct time frames: past, present and future.
This change contributed to "the birth of the imagined community of the nation" in that
the novel and newspaper "provided the technical means for 're-presenting' the kind of
imagined community that is a nation" (1991 :25). As Anderson explains, the seeming
temporal concordance of the "world outside" and the portrayed "world inside"
(1991 :30) the novel and newspaper created in readers' minds a fictional or imaginary
relation between themselves and writers, characters, places, and content.
In addition, because the newspaper, in particular, was read on a mass scale daily, its
visible ubiquity not only rooted its portrayals of the "world of mankind" (1998:33) in
"everyday life" but continually reinforced readers' awareness of "simultaneous
consumption" (1991 :36). Thus there emerged a sense of a shared world experience
within the "steady onward clocking of homogeneous, empty time" (1991 :33), among
individuals who would "never meet, or even know the names of more than a handful"
(1991 :26) of their thousands of fellow readers. This sense, exacerbated by the
unbound seriality generated by "homogenized" (1998:33) news coverage and
"exemplified" by "open-to-world plurals" like "nationalists, anarchists, bureaucrats,
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and workers" (1998:29), instilled "that remarkable confidence of community in
anonymity which is the hallmark of modem nations" (1991 :36). Thus news of Yeats' s
Nobel Prize in 1923, as being won by a specifically Irish writer, could be reported in
The Irish Times and world press in the symbolic and historical context of the newly
independent Irish nation; and Yeats could in late life request of his wife George that
should he die abroad (he of course died in Roquebrune, France, on 28 January 1939),
he be buried near his place of death and then" ... in a year's time when the
newspapers have forgotten me" (Foster 2001 :80), in Sligo.
Mass print-literacy "made possible the imagined community floating in
homogeneous, empty time" (Anderson 1991: 116), and this was compounded by print-
capitalism in the form of mass book-publishing. Capitalism's targeting of consumer
markets, Anderson explains, created mass "reading publics" (1991 :43). Readers
became "connected through print" and "formed, in their secular, particular, visible
invisibility, the embryo ofthe nationally imagined community" (1991 :44). Print-
capitalism, Anderson adds, "gave a new fixity to language" (1991 :44) and in fact
created fixed "print-languages" (1991:45), the existence of which marked a rupture of
the 'modem' present from the past and helped "to build that image of antiquity so
central to the subjective idea of the nation" (1991 :44). The "printed book" also "kept
a permanent form, capable of virtually infinite reproduction, temporally and
spatially," and thus "the words of our seventeenth-century forebears" became
"accessible to us in a way that to Villon his twelfth-century ancestors were not"
(1991:45). 'History' therefore became possible, along with the notion of 'traditions',
including in fields of study such as history, philosophy and poetry which came to
assume 'national' dimensions.
This "explosive interaction between capitalism, technology and human linguistic
diversity" (1991 :45) and the dislocation of time through the fixity of print-languages
resulted, as Anderson explains, in the "new nationalisms" of Europe imagining
themselves as "awakening" from "an epochal sleep" (1991: 195). This "awakening"
took "into account the sense of parallelism out of which the American nationalisms
had been born" and "which the success of the American nationalist revolutions had
greatly reinforced in Europe" (1991: 195). The "trope of sleep" also provided "a
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crucial metaphorica11ink" between nationalisms and language, so that vernaculars
began "to function politically" even though the "vanguard" of nationalist movements
comprised mostly "literate people unaccustomed to using these vernaculars"
(1991: 195). The resultant delving by intelligentsias, who were "becoming conscious
of themselves as Czechs, Hungarians or Finns," into 'native' languages and folklore
was equated with "rediscovering something deep-down always known" (1991: 196)
about their nation. Yeats's role as Irish folklorist and literary critic, which will be
examined in the next chapter and chapter three, and his access through print to Wait
Whitman as a model of a 'national poet', which will be touched on in chapter four,
can to a large extent be viewed in these terms. That Yeats, among the "vanguard" of
Ireland's anti-colonial cause, spoke only English and not Gaelic/Irish, can also be
viewed in this context and will be examined in the next chapter.
The new imagined communities produced by print-capitalism could, as Anderson
describes it, "regard themselves as somehow ancient" because "once one starts
thinking about nationality in terms of continuity few things seem as historically deep-
rooted as languages, for which no dated origins can ever be given" (1991: 196). In
addition, nationalist "lexicographers, philologists, grammarians, folklorists, publicists
and composers" were also "producers for the print-market" and thus "linked, via that
silent bazaar, to consuming publics" (1991 :75) imagining themselves in terms of
communities. Again, Yeats cannot be divorced from this historical process, being not
only as a folklorist, but as a nationalist poet and playwright, a producer for the print-
market. For such producers, Anderson explains, the idea of 'their' nation could
through print-capitalism emerge as an "unproblematic, primordial given" (1991 :89)
always-already advancing through time: looming "out of an immemorial past" and
gliding "into a limitless future" (1991: 11).
Crucially, Anderson emphasizes that it is "essential to bear in mind the conditions of
the colonial era" when looking "comparatively at the rise of nationalism" (1998:323).
Certainly in Ireland, as I will outline in the next chapter, nationalism arose and
intensified in the context of centuries of colonial oppression read by Irish nationalists
in terms of History, and Yeats was by the 1880s heir to a well developed, anti-
colonial nationalist discourse and tradition in Ireland. Counted among these
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conditions are the "colonial school-systems," which Anderson explains had a "unique
role ... in promoting colonial nationalisms" (1991:120). As Anderson points out, "the
paradox of imperial official nationalism was that it inevitably brought what were
inyreasingly thought of and written about as European 'national histories'" into the
"consciousness of the colonized" (1991: 118). This was achieved largely "through
reading-rooms and classrooms" (1991: 118) which made it possible, Anderson argues,
for the colonized to imagine themselves as communities.
Anderson explains that through schooling in the "European language-of-state," the
colonized intelligentsias gained access to "modem Western culture in the broadest
sense" (1991 :116). Certainly, in a range of ways, Yeats's formal English(-language)
schooling and less formal 'home education' via his artist-father JB Yeats facilitated
and fuelled this lifelong access in his case, particularly to poetry, art, mythology,
philosophy and the occult. Notably, being bullied at the Godolphin School in
Hammersmith for being Irish also awakened him to 'national' issues. Inseparable
from the wider context of print-literacy and 'production' for print-markets, Yeats's
'colonial-era schooling' and probing intellect may in large part be credited for the fact
that he proved an enduring autodidact, becoming "the polymath's polymath" (The
Economist 2006:82). Specifically, Anderson argues, the intelligentsias gained "access,
inside the classroom and outside, to models of nation, nation-ness, and nationalism
distilled from the turbulent, chaotic experiences of more than a century of American
and European history" (1991: 140). Again, the influence of English-language literature
(including translated texts) on Yeats, through print-literacy in the colonial context,
must be noted, reflected by his familiarity and engaging with the likes of Whitman,
Blake, and Nietzsche, as well as Amold and Irish nationalist writings (to list a very
few). Anderson writes that, with groups "reading nationalism genealogically as the
expression of an historical tradition of serial continuity" (1991: 195), the models of
"nationalism, nation-ness, and nation-state produced elsewhere in the course of the
nineteenth century" (1991: 116) became "a replicable ideal capable of being
consciously aspired to from early on" (1991 :67) by colonized peoples. The 'nation'
therefore "proved an invention on which it was impossible to secure a patent"
(1991 :67). This "invention", too, was aspired to in Ireland, including and especially
by its national poet Yeats.
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Indeed, as Hobsbawm points out, "debate on such questions as the theoretical criteria
of nationhood became passionate" from the 1880s because "any particular answer was
now believed to imply a particular form of political strategy, struggle or programme"
(1990:44). This, he says, was "a matter of importance not only for governments
confronted with various kinds of national agitation or demand" but "for political
parties seeking to mobilize constituencies on the basis of national, non-national or
alternative national appeals" (1990:44). The debating of 'nationhood', as Anderson
underlines, also took root in the colonies. Yeats's exposure to and participation in
such debates in Ireland from the 1880s is well documented, and will be touched on in
the next chapter. At this stage, it suffices to emphasize Anderson' s general argument
that it was "the colonial experience" which "profoundly shaped nationalism"
(1998:323) in "the colonized worlds" (1991:164), including Asia and Africa, where
'colonial education' effectively backfired in helping subjected peoples to imagine
themselves as 'national' communities. As I have indicated, this was certainly the case
in regard to Irish nationalism, and specifically in regard to the nationalist Yeats.
Anderson explains that the "immediate genealogy" of "official nationalism" among
the colonized "should be traced to the imaginings of the colonial state" (1991: 164),
which "dialectically engendered the grammar of the nationalisms that eventually rose
to combat it" (1991 :xiv). Colonialism was, he argues, "nightmare-haunted" in that "it
dreamed of incipient nationalisms before nationalists came into historical existence"
(1998:65).
Anderson's in-depth analysis of some of these "imaginings of the colonial state"
points to what a definition of 'postcolonial national identity' might entail, by
foregrounding its predecessor - implicit in the (as shall become clear) problematic
prefix "post". Anderson's analysis dovetails with Fanon's in regard to 'colonial
identity', and these will be considered together in this chapter. I will proceed to draw,
in some detail, on the extensive portrayals of the colonial context and identity by
Anderson and Fanon (which are complemented by those of Said and an array of other
writers); against this general backdrop, I will demonstrate in chapters two and three
that Yeats's 'postcolonial' stance, and Yeats himself as a 'postcolonial' figure,
emerge emphatically in specific regard to national identity in the Ireland of his
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lifetime. Fanon's arguments regarding (post)colonial identity will be especially
referred to in chapter three in relation to the 'postcolonial' Yeats. The colonial state's
imaginings, Anderson indicates, had major ramifications for the colonized at the level
of identity. He lists three "interlinked" institutions in particular that illuminate "the
colonial state's style of thinking" (1991: 184), namely the map, museum and census.
These "institutions of power," he argues, "changed their form and function as the
colonized zones entered the age of mechanical production," and "profoundly shaped
the way in which the colonial state imagined its domain" (1991:164). These
institutions, as "imaginings of the colonial state," encompassed "the nature of the
human beings it ruled, the geography of its domain, and the legitimacy of its ancestry"
(1991: 164).
Anderson explains that the "warp" of the thinking informing these institutions "was a
totalizing classificatory grid" that "could be applied with endless flexibility to
anything under the state's real or contemplated control," including "peoples, regions,
religions, languages, products, monuments, and so forth" (1991: 184). This
psychological or imagined "grid", enforced by technological and military might,
enabled the colonizer to "always" be "able to say of anything that it was this, not
that," and to assign anything under the state's power to 'its place' so that "it belonged
here, not there" (1991: 184). Everything within the domain was seen as "bounded,
determinate, and... countable" (1991: 184). The "weft" of the colonizer's thinking was
"serialization", or "the assumption that the world was made up of replicable plurals"
(1991: 184). According to this view, the "particular always stood as a provisional
representative of a series," and - to the detriment ofthe colonized in a range of
material, physical and psychological ways - "was to be handled in this light"
(1991:184).
The detailed charting of the colonized territory and landscape in the form of the map,
Anderson argues, reflected the "total surveyability" (1991 :184) assumed by the
colonial mindset. The map was based on the notion of complete categorization,
aligning "map and power" (1991: 173). As Said describes it, the "alien and occupying"
authority "dominates, classifies, and universally commodifies all space under the
aegis of the metropolitan centre" (1993 :272), and Said's delineation of the Irish
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colonial context in these terms, in relation to Yeats's poetry 'of deco10nization', will
be examined in chapter two. Anderson explains that, entering into "an infinitely
reproducible series," the map was utilised for state insignia and transferred "to
posters, official seals, letterheads" and even incorporated into public spaces like
"hotel walls" (1991: 175). This "logo-map penetrated deep into the popular
imagination," becoming "a powerful emblem for the anticolonial nationalisms being
born" (1991: 175). As Anderson notes, there is a striking "isomorphism" between each
colonial nationalism's "territorial stretch" and that of the "imperial administrative
unit" (1991: 114).
In addition, the colonizer's museums and "archaeology, increasingly linked to
tourism" enabled the state "to appear as the guardian of a generalized, but also local,
Tradition" (1991: 181). Its "museumizing imagination" (1991: 178) ensured that "old
sacred sites" were "incorporated into the map of the colony," and their "ancient
prestige" vaunted as "regalia for a secular colonial state" (1991: 182). Again, items
and places of archaeological interest entered the replicating series, through
"mechanical reproduction" (1991: 183) such as photography and printing. Anderson
argues that this museumizing "was political at such a deep level that almost everyone,
including the personnel of the colonial state... was unconscious of the fact"
(1991: 183). This 'state of affairs' had "all become normal and everyday," such that it
was "precisely the infinite quotidian reproducibility of its regalia that revealed the real
power of the state" (1991 :183). Anderson also notes that the archaeological series
"created a historical depth of field which was easily inherited by the state's
postcolonial successor," which could also view the series "up historical time" as a
photo "album of its ancestors" (1991: 184).
In such exercising of power, the colonial state imagined the individual and collective
'identity' of the colonized, and imposed it in various ways - a number of which, in the
Irish colonial context, will be covered in chapters two and three. A key tool of this
imagining, and an indicator of the enforced representation of the colonized by the
colonizer, was the census - the application of which, in Ireland, will come into focus
in chapter two. This pencilled in politically the inhabitants ofthe mapped territory,
applying the same classifying mindset. In this way, the map and census "shaped the
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grammar" of colonial nationalisms, making it possible, for instance, for "Indonesia"
and "Indonesians" (1991: 184) to exist. Anderson adds elsewhere that "as the old
republican-American model had originally implied, mapped Mali would have to find
its Malians" (1998:65). Anderson notes that such labels or "concretizations" have "a
powerful life today, long after the colonial state has disappeared" (1991: 184), thanks
largely to the historical "album" inherited by the postcolonial state. Highlighting its
relevance at the level of identity, Anderson argues that this "life" is exemplified by
"the classificatory ID card" which is "isomorphic with the census" (1991: 185).
Like the map and museum, the census was the product of a categorizing "style of
imagining" shaped by "the technologies of navigation, astronomy, horology,
surveying, photography and print, to say nothing of the deep driving power of
capitalism" (1991: 184). It was part ofthe colonial state's drive "to create, under its
control, a human landscape of perfect visibility," with "the condition of this
'visibility'" being that "everyone, everything, had (as it were) a serial number"
(1991: 184). Anderson stresses the "passion" of those who devised the census, "for
completeness and unambiguity" (1991: 166). The bound seriality of the census meant
"the impermissibility of fractions," which created "a mirage-like integrity 0 f the
body" (1998 :36). Each countee was represented as "an indivisible whole" (1998:37),
so that the "fiction of the census" was not only that "everyone" was "in it" but also
that "everyone" had "one - and only one - extremely clear place" (1991: 166).
Categories and subcategories were created so that any "mixedness, or fractionality"
could "resume integral status" (1998:36), with "complex fractionality" in effect
"inscribed in invisible ink" and the countee all but erased as the "site of a maze of
intersecting series" (1998:37).
As the census so clearly illustrates, the colonized were denied self-representation, and
were constructed as a 'fixed' entity whose representation "concealed all real-life
anomalies" (1991: 184). This "passion" for "completeness and unambiguity," and the
"one... extremely clear place" to which the colonized countee was consigned,
bespeak the conception of stable, unified identity informing and informed by the
colonial context itself. As Fanon describes it, the "colonial world is a Manichaean
world" (2001 :31) of irreconcilable opposites: the colonizer and colonized. "It is not
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enough" for the colonizer, he writes, "to delimit physically, that is to say with the help
of the army and the police force, the place ofthe native" (2001 :31/32). Rather,
rigorous control is especially carried out at the level of identity. Fanon explains that,
as if "to show the totalitarian character of colonial explo~tation," the colonizer
"paints" the colonized as "a sort of quintessence of evil" (2001 :32). The colonized are
"declared insensible to ethics" and are seen to be deficient in "reason" (2001:33); they
are deemed "the enemy of values, and in this sense... the absolute evil" (2001:32).
The colonized are also seen to be "the deforming element, disfiguring all that has to
do with beauty or morality" (2001 :32). They are, individually and collectively,
perceived as "the depository of maleficent powers, the unconscious and irretrievable
instrument of blind forces" (2001 :32).
This Manichaeism, Fanon argues, "dehumanizes the native" and "to speak plainly it
turns him into an animal" (2001:32). Said's account of the reduction of the colonized,
in the Irish context, to the level of a supposedly 'bestial' or 'savage' life form fit for
extermination, will be outlined in chapter two. Fanon also argues that such colonial
dehumanization serves to emphasize that the "governing race is first and foremost
those who come from elsewhere," those who are "unlike the original inhabitants, 'the
others'" (2001 :32). The colonizer affirms that "values have disappeared from, or still
better never existed" (2001 :32) among the colonized. The "customs of the colonized
people, their traditions, their myths - above all, their myths" are seen to be "the very
sign of that poverty of spirit and of their constitutional depravity" (2001 :32). Fanon
adds that, in the eyes of the colonizer, railway lines "across the bush, the draining of
swamps and a native population... are in fact one and the same thing": a hostile
"nature, obstinate and fundamentally rebellious" (2001 :201). Colonization "is a
success," Fanon argues, when "indocile nature has finally been tamed" (2001:201).
The colonized are therefore constructed by the colonizer, at the level of identity, as
having in essence or on "the unconscious plane" a 'wild' and "fundamentally
perverse" (2001 :169) nature, 'justifying' intensive domination by the colonizer.
Grossly reductive 'colonial identity', then, consists of the dual opposites of' superior'
and 'good' colonizer/'inferior' and 'evil' colonized. This binary comprises seemingly
stable and unified identities established and promoted by the colonizer, wherein the
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'inferior' term is seemingly negated by the 'superior' one. In accordance with "the
rules of Aristotlean logic," Fanon writes, each pole follows "the principle of
reciprocal exclusivity," with the negative term in fact "superfluous" (2001 :30). This
mutual exclusivity is of course based on Aristotlean essentialism, whereby "a person
or object possesses an essence which determines its identity" but "identity, rather than
operating as a substitute for essence, functions as its effect" (Fuss 1990:140). Such
biological essentialism is what Moi calls the "belief in a given... nature"
(Jefferson/Robey 1992:209). The dichotomy at the level of identity is therefore related
to an underlying distinction between the 'superior' and 'good' essence supposedly
embodied by the coIonizer, and 'inferior' and 'evil' essence said to be embodied by
the colonized. This is also, clearly, a reformulation of Aristotle's view, underlined in
regard to the colonial context by Karskens, that "Everything in relation to every other
thing is either 'the same' or 'other'" (Corbey/Leerssen 1991 :82). With the particular
standing in for the series, it can be seen that, from the colonizer's perspective, all
colonized subjects are individually and collectively "other", and the colonizer(s) "the
same".
Colonial discourse is therefore, as Voestermans argues, one of alterity in constructing
and emphasizing "the othemess of people, particularly people outside one's domestic
ken" (Corbey/Leerssen 1991:219). Simultaneously, it is one of identity in constructing
and affirming "who we are by contrasting nearly every element of our way of life
with that of others" (1991 :219). In this light, the binary can be seen to operate as a
self-other, Hegelian dialectic in which the apparently negated 'inferior' pole (other) in
fact shores up the 'superior' pole (self). Each pole invests "each other with meaning,"
Voestermans argues, and "one does not go without the other" (1991 :219). The
construction of the Other in terms of a basically deviant, evil and inferior' essence' ,
unconscious or 'nature' provides the Manichaean foundation of colonial rule; and this
informs and is informed by the logocentric discourse of that rule. In addition, while
the colonized are constructed in terms of "the colonizer's own self-image," as "the
self-consolidating other," the colonial centre also simultaneously consolidates itself
"as sovereign" by defining its colonies as '"Others''' (Young 1990: 17). The assigning
of the Irish, and of the Irish colony, in this way to "one - and only one - extremely
clear place" (1991 :166) of inferiority at the level of identity will be outlined in the
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next chapter, in bringing Yeats into view as a postcolonial figure who actively sought
to destabilize the very notion of stable, fixed identities and implode this essentialist
Othering.
In light of Anderson and Fanon's analyses, the key elements of "self-representation"
and "personal worth", listed among the basic meanings of 'identity' submitted earlier
in this chapter, do not apply in the case of the colonized - from the colonizer's
perspective. Seemingly stable, unified identity, constructed and imposed by the
colonizer, serves to present the colonized in a negative light, as essentially inferior.
The colonized are therefore actively discouraged from constructing their own identity
in positive terms, from deciding and declaring, in Renault's words, "what we are
individually, as well as what we aspire to be, what determines or specifies us, as well
as how we present our particularities to ourselves, how we refer to ourselves
individually, and how we identify ourselves with groups and with the general norm"
(Tazi 2004:101). Of course, the colonizer's efforts to devalue and even deny self-
representation by the colonized often led not to passive victimhood, but to creative,
positive and strident claims to national identity by the colonized, including in Ireland.
As Fanon points out, the colonized individual "knows that he is not an animal; and it
is precisely at the moment he realizes his humanity that he begins to sharpen the
weapons with which he will secure its victory" (2001 :33). In this process of
decolonizing, "it is a whole material and moral universe" of the colonizer "which is
breaking up" (2001 :34). Yeats's participation in this "breaking up", particularly by
devising a method for and advocating the creation of a postcolonial Irish national
identity, will be examined in this context in chapter three.
Against this broad backdrop, what a 'postcolonial national identity' entails can be
extrapolated. A self-determined or 'postcolonial' national identity would,
fundamentally, represent the fulfilment of these meanings of 'identity' as the
expression of an imagined, and by implication, linked or united community to which
its individual members 'belong'. Ideally, the 'post-' would signify a clean or positive
break by the 'imagined community' from colonial essentialism and negation at the
level of identity. The'post-', clearly, would not necessarily indicate prior political
liberation of the imagined community in the linear sense of a time-line, occurring only
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'after' territorial and state withdrawal of the colonizer. Rather, as I will argue was the
case in regard to Yeats's conception of Irish national identity, the 'postcolonial' may
in fact, at the level of identity, inform nationalism's aim of achieving self-
determination, and precede political liberation. This clean or positive break implies
the espousal of an identity that is free of Othering and regulation in terms of the
Manichaean binary, recognizing and upholding "personal worth". As During
indicates, the "postcolonial identity" sought by formerly colonized "nations or
groups" is one "uncontaminated" by denigrating "Eurocentric concepts and images"
(Docherty 1993 :449).
However, as I have been alluding to in outlining the historical process posited by
Anderson, the question arises as to whether the achievement of such an
"uncontaminated" identity is at all possible. Anderson demonstrates that the legacy of
the map, museum and census has "a powerful life today, long after the colonial state
has disappeared" (1991: 184). This "powerful life" intersects with narratives of
formerly colonized peoples, including 'retrospective' claims of pre-colonial
nationhood, and manifests in a range of ways which militate against the espousal of a
genuinely 'postcolonial national identity', i.e. the self-representation of the specificity
and aspirations of an imagined community in a manner free of colonial conditioning
and, in particular, exclusionary negation. Not least of these ways is the "degree to
which census definitions of categories have hardened into essentialized political
realities through their role in organizing the allocation of economic and other benefits
and the expectations of such benefits" (Anderson 1998:43). Essentialism, which
implies Othering, therefore underpins and perpetuates social divisions created by the
'census-thinking' of the colonial state, splintering idealistically imagined
communities into, in reality, 'colonially conditioned' or categorised, in large part
mutually exclusive sub-communities.
Indeed, a legacy of the census is the existence of "serial, aggregable, counterposed
majorities and minorities" (1998:38). Anderson explains that these groupings,
"starting as formal entities, were positioned in due course to assume political reality"
(1998:38), with often disastrous implications for national 'comradeship' or unity. In
addition, colonial imaginings of stable, fixed identity continue to shape 'postcolonial'
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imaginings of selfuood and collective belonging. Anderson argues that "searches" for
"roots" and "identities", while they "rhetorically move inward towards the site that
once housed the soul" in fact "proceed towards real and imagined censuses, where,
thanks to capitalism, state machineries, and mathematics, integral bodies become
identical" and "thus serially aggregable as phantom communities" (1998:44). Of
course, rather than passively yielding to colonial conditioning, there have been and
continue to be creative, positive and strident responses among formerly colonized
peoples to the divisive legacy of 'census-thinking'. Yeats's attempt to synthesize an
inclusive and united 'new' Ireland, and his war as a minority Anglo-Irish Protestant
on domination by the majority Irish Catholic establishment in the Free State, may be
considered in this context and will be examined in the remaining three chapters in
terms of his conception of a non-essentialist Irish national identity. Certainly, the
problems of census-like, essentialist Othering and self-representation in the
Manichaean colonial world of the Ireland of his times, are refracted through Yeats. As
I will elucidate in the next chapter, being an Anglo-Irish and therefore 'hyphenated'
figure meant Yeats was subjected to not only the colonizer's denigrating construction
ofIrishness, but also to many of his countrymen's census-like "passion" for
"completeness and unambiguity" and insistence on "the impermissibility of fractions"
at the level of Irish national identity.
Clearly, as the inheritances of map, museum and census indicate, the 'post-' in
'postcolonial' is misleading insofar as it implies a clean, or even necessarily positive,
break from the colonial past. The deceptiveness of the 'post-', of course, extends
beyond the issue of 'identity' to encompass such factors as the prevailing socio-
economic conditions and exercise of political power within postcolonial nation-states.
As Said points out, in reference to Fanon, "national bourgeoisies and their specialized
elites ... tended to replace the colonial force with a new class-based and ultimately
exploitative one, which replicated the old colonial structures in new terms"
(1993 :269). There are, he adds, "states all across the formerly colonized world that
have bred pathologies of power" (1993 :269). Therefore, while 'postcoloniality' or
'decolonization' has been achieved globally in strictly political terms, this has not
been accompanied by the realisation of its full promise of liberation from colonial
thinking and material conditions in any sudden or sweeping sense.
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Rather, 'postcoloniality' is, like "decolonization", "an awkward and inelegant word"
and "therefore, in a way, appropriate to the subject it attempts to describe" (Betts
1998:1). Politically, socio-economically, and at the level of identity, the achievement
of postcoloniality or decolonization is still, at best, a "work-a-day" (Betts 1998: 1)
goal for the foreseeable future. This is especially so considering that postcoloniality,
or decolonization, is a "historically loose-ended" term and ideal. As Betts puts it,
"there is no end to discussion of it" (1998: 1). This open-endedness is of course not
just discursive, but material too. Certainly, that the 'post-' in 'postcolonial' does not
automatically mean a clean break with the colonial past is well known to South
Africans in the work-a-day context of post-1994 nation-building, and the legacy of
Othering as it pertains to national identity in contemporary South Africa will be
examined - in relation to Yeats' s conception of Irish national identity - in the
concluding chapter. As Betts' s "Political Chronology of Decolonization" (1998 :98)
indicates, 1961 marked the entrance of the "Republic of South Africa" (1998 :99),
officially, into 'postcoloniality'. However, at the level of identity alone, the legacy of
colonialism - exacerbated by the apartheid regime - continues to undermine nation-
building in the postcolonial, postapartheid, democratic South Africa. I will argue that
the concerns of the 'postcolonial' Yeats resonate deeply with, and merit study in
relation to, the project of forging an inclusive, non-essentialist national identity and
national unity in South Africa.
As I have already set out, I will argue and elucidate in the next two chapters that
Yeats, in being a 'postcolonial visionary' and Ireland's national poet, devised a
method for the creation and espousal of an inclusive, non-essentialist and therefore
emphatically postcolonial Irish national identity in the face and wake of colonial
oppression. In doing so, he clearly sought to avoid replicating "the colonial state's
style of thinking" (Anderson 1991: 184) at the level of identity, directly addressing the
potential 'postcolonial' pitfall of reinforcing the Manichaean binary in his
positivisation of Irishness. This meant finding an alternative to the negation inherent
in the Self-Other dialectic - the very opposition that allows the colonial "constitution
of the other as 'other'" to be set "alongside racism and sexism" (Young 1990:4). I will
show that, in advocating psychological decolonization and liberation at the level of
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identity, Yeats places the Irish "outside the sphere" of colonial "mastery" rather than
in "a relation of negation" (Young 1990: 17). Ultimately, I will demonstrate, Yeats
envisions postcolonial Ireland as an imagined community.
* * * * *
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Chapter Two: A Tale of Two Yeatses
In the first annual Yeats Lecture delivered to the Friends of the Irish Academy at the
Abbey Theatre in Dublin in 1940, TS Eliot situates Yeats as "born into the end of a
literary movement, and an English movement at that" (Unterecker 1963 :61). Taking
"account of historical conditions" (1963:61), Eliot writes, Yeats was born into a world
"in which the doctrine of 'Art for Art's sake' was generally accepted" and lived on
"into one in which art has been asked to be instrumental to social purposes"
(1963 :62). Yeats, he argues, "held firmly to the right view which is between these,
though not in any way a compromise between them," and demonstrated "that an artist,
by serving his art with entire integrity, is at the same time rendering the greatest
service he can to his own nation and to the whole world" (1963:62/63). Eliot adds that
Yeats's poetry, though "giving equally experience and delight" in isolation, has "a
larger historical importance," for Yeats was "one of those few whose history is the
history of their own time, who are part of the consciousness of an age which cannot
be understood without them" (1963:63). "This is a very high position to assign to
him," Eliot states, "but I believe that it is one which is secure" (1963:63).
In demarcating "an age" and positing these conclusions, Eliot portrays Yeats as
speaking "for man" in speaking as "a particular man" (1963:57), and argues that "in
becoming more Irish, not in subject-matter but in expression" Yeats "became at the
same time universal" (1963:58). Yeats's presentation of myth inAt the Hawk's Well
(1916) and The Only Jealousy ofEmer (1919), for instance, is not for its own sake but
"as a vehicle for a situation of universal meaning" (1963 :61). In "later plays", Eliot
argues, the "legendary heroes and heroines" are "universal men and women"
(1963 :61). And as a lyric poet "even when dramatic", Eliot declares, Yeats could
"speak for every man, or for men very different from himself," for the lyric poet has
only to momentarily "identify himself with every man or other men" (1963 :59) to
achieve this status of representative. It is only Yeats's "imaginative power of
becoming this" 'every man' that "deceives some readers into thinking that he is
speaking for and of himself alone" (1963 :59).
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Deeply informing Eliot's high praise and construction of Yeats as a 'universal artist'
are two factors which must immediately be highlighted. Firstly, as the historical
process outlined by Anderson indicates, a prerequisite of entering History is
emergence into the national; and secondly, "the emergence of the 'nation state'" is top
of Pippin's list of characteristics taken to identify "the modern social and intellectual
tradition" (1991 :4). Clearly, given Eliot's reference to "larger historical importance"
in his construction of Yeats as artistic servant of "his own nation" and as poetical
spokesman for "every man", the "age" to which Eliot refers is the 'modern' age. In
I
short, Eliot as American (or rather, in light of his becoming a naturalized British
subject in 1927, 'English') modern poet, albeit 23 years Yeats's junior, confirms and
praises the modernist credentials of the recently deceased Irish national poet, whose
wider historical significance or universality is achieved on a specifically national
platform.
In making the case for 'Yeats as universal spokesman,' Eliot's lecture is a window on
the conventional critical construction and general, decades-long reception of Yeats as
a (high) modernist by literary critics and fellow poets. A number of Eliot's
observations and arguments about Yeats, too, can be viewed in terms ofthe general
construction of 'modernism' as a field of study by literary critics. Indeed, Eliot's
assertion that in the modern world "art has been asked to be instrumental to social
purposes" encapsulates Pippin's description of modernism as being, among the "many
things denoted by the term," also "understood to propose (or to threaten) a great shift
in European high culture" or "at least an implicit insistence on a shift in authority" to
"art as the leading or 'legislating' force" in a "genuinely modern culture"
(1991 :29/30). This shift of authority, Pippin explains, was part of an attempt at an
autonomy or "genuine self-determination" in society and daily life in a "sweeping
historical and an individual sense" (1991 :30). This demanded "a tremendously
heightened role for the artist" as "the figure whose imagination supposedly creates or
shapes the sensibilities of civilization" (1991 :41). It is in this consciously "heightened
role" that Yeats is cast, in their various ways, by Eliot and the constellation of Yeats
critics, including Ellmann (whose "luminous works ... still hold the critical field" -
Foster 1998:xxvi), Jeffares, and Unterecker, and more recently Kiberd and Foster.
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As Ellmann, acutely aware of the demarcation of the modern "age", writes in 1960,
Yeats has "since his death just before the recent war... come to be ranked by many
critics as the dominant poet of our time" (1960: 1). Echoing Eliot, he adds: "It is not
easy to assign him a lower place" (1960: 1). Ellmann argues that by "constant advance
and change in subject-matter and style, by his devotion to his craft and his refusal to
accept the placidity to which his years entitled him," Yeats "lived several lifetimes in
one and made his development inseparable from that of modern verse and, to some
extent, of modern man" (1960:1). Ellmann concludes that "The man who emerges
from his (Yeats's) poetry is a modern man..." (1960:298). Ellmann later argues, in
1964, that "In modern poetry Yeats and TS Eliot stand at opposite poles": Yeats
presents a faith in "sense and spirit" with "such power and richness that Eliot's
religion, in spite of its honesty and loftiness, is pale and infertile in comparison"
(1964:246). Yeats's heightened role and reputation as a poet of immense imaginative
power is such that Ellmann predicts it "seems likely his works will resist time"
because "in all his shape-changing he remains at the centre tenacious, solid, a 'marble
triton among the streams", (1964:247).
Pippin explains, in general terms, that the modern artist's heightened role and what he
calls the "modernist aesthetic" arose "to a large degree in reaction" to "a complex
crisis mentality" or "experience of dissatisfaction and even revulsion" (1991 :40) at
the "commercialization and mass culture" (1991 :32) of "bourgeois civilization"
(1991 :41). This dissatisfaction also arose from, and was directed at, the failure to
inaugurate "a genuinely new, progressive, fundamentally better epoch" (1991 :30).
There arose, Pippin explains, "a sense that modernity's official self-understanding-
Enlightened, liberal, progressive, humanistic - had been a misunderstanding, a far too
smug and unwarranted self-satisfaction" (1991 :32). The modernist aesthetic thus
comprised "a new sense ofthe nature and significance of art-making" (1991 :40) in a
bid to create "in a radical and unprecedented way a form of life, indeed a sensibility,
finally consistent with the full implications of the modern revolution" (1991 :29). In
this sense, the poet or artist became "the 'antennae ofthe race,' especially the
'unacknowledged legislator' for mankind" (1991 :30), a heightened modernist role
which illuminates Eliot's contention that Yeats "in becoming more Irish... became at
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the same time universal" and could "speak for every man, or for men very different
from himself."
As Pippin also explains, the artistic imagination is "no longer viewed as a vehicle or
medium" but is in modernism "sui generis, and by being sui generis, or difficult,
opaque, strange, elitist, uncommercial, self-defining," artistic activity "alone
demonstrates a kind of integrity and autonomy foreclosed in bourgeois life"
(1991 :32). This demands, Pippin adds, "an intensely self-conscious, historical, even
philosophical art, however purely 'aesthetic' its goals," as well as "a finally modem
'honesty,' a recognition of the contingency and mutability of human ideals"
(1991 :32). This emphasis on integrity and honesty in modernist art illuminates Eliot's
assessment that Yeats "held firmly to the right view which is between" Art for Art's
sake (purely aesthetic) and art "asked to be instrumental to social purposes," not
compromising either and showing "that an artist, by serving his art with entire
integrity, is at the same time rendering the greatest service he can to his own nation
and to the whole world." It is the "figure ofthe poet himself... the integrity of his
passion for his art and his craft," Eliot also argues, "which provided such an impulse"
for Yeats's "extraordinary development" (1963:55). Again, the modernist Eliot's take
on Yeats-as-modernist is underlined.
At the same time, Pippin points out, the "primacy" of the "artistic imagination"
became "quite typical in modernism," with the modernist poet or artist "obliged to
find the 'heroism' and beauty of modem life" and the "intensity of passion" ofthat
life (1991:33). As York highlights, pointing to "clear analogies" between the work of
Blake and Yeats, modem poetry "can be seen as arising from the Romantic and post-
Romantic cult of the imagination, of the visionary and the sensual" and "of a type of
language which communicates through the suggestions of image and rhythm rather
than through the presentation of ideas and emotions which allow themselves to be - at
least approximately - paraphrased" (Bradford 1996:482). Eliot's emphasis on Yeats's
"imaginative power" is indicative ofthis primacy of the imagination, a feature which
informs Yeats's reference to himself as "one of. .. 'the last romantics'" (Ellmann
1964:3) and his bemoaning Romantic Ireland's demise in the poem "September
1913". As Ellmann puts it, Yeats like Blake "conceives of the imagination as the
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shaping power which transforms the world; but coming a century later, he has a
tough-minded appreciation of the world's intransigence" (1964:245). "More than
Keats or Coleridge, more perhaps even than Blake," Ellmann argues, "he defends the
imagination with the defiance of a man who sees himself as preventing the incursions
of chaos" (1964:245). Eliot's foregrounding ofYeats's "imaginative power" in effect
elevates Yeats to the status of imaginative, modernist hero-poet "serving art" and
artistic tradition, and thereby "his own nation and the whole world."
Indeed, this overall sense of the heightened, authoritative, sensibility-shaping, avant-
garde role ofYeats as 'representative of men' (that is, Yeats as modernist) motivates
assertions like those of Heaney who, in his introduction to his selection of Yeats' s
poems, writes that Yeats "managed to create a heroic role for the poet in the modern
world" - to the extent that Eliot's "evocation of 'the shade of some dead master' in
'Little Gidding' (1943) is commonly taken to be a tribute to the recently dead
Irishman" (2000:xii). Whether thought of as "a national bard or a world poet,"
Heaney writes, Yeats "figures in the mind as a translated force, an energy released
and a destiny fulfilled" (2000:xii). Again, it is Yeats's imaginative power - his
integral "force" and "energy" as a poet - that is portrayed as the spearhead of his
heroism. As Heaney puts it, Yeats sought to "launch upon the world a vision of reality
that possessed no surer basis than the ground of his own imagining" (2000:xviii).
Recalling Anderson's definition of a nation as an "imagined community" and
anticipating my own arguments in the next chapter, I wish to stress the importance of
Yeats's imaginative power and imagining which, as I shall demonstrate, are key to his
conception ofIrish national identity.
Yeats has, of course, been constructed as a modernist by virtue of not only these but
other important aspects of his biography, theorising and works. Again following
Eliot's cue, a sense of "historical conditions" or 'literary' contextualization must
inevitably be invoked, in emphasizing that Yeats's lifetime (1865-1939) encompasses
the "cultural phase called modernism" (Wheale 1995: 15) in Europe. This phase,
Wheale explains, is "usually thought to have taken place between 1880 and 1930"
(1995: 15). Certainly, this linear and "conventional timespan" (1995: 16) taken to
frame modernism presents "problems" regarding developments "obscured by the cut-
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off date at 1930" and regarding "long-range continuities extending from late
eighteenth century romanticism... effaced by the boundary at 1880" (1995: 15). It also
presents "profound contradictions in definitions that attempt to map a single
modernist movement or cultural fonnation" (1995:23). However, an analysis of the
assignation of "the time-scale" (1995: 15) and the "reductive use of the tenn
modernism" as the "monolithic" categorization of "a single phenomenon" (1995:27)
is beyond the scope ofthis thesis. It suffices, rather, to view Yeats as being
constructed by literary critics in tenns of this "phenomenon". Accordingly, it also
suffices to view Yeats in historical tenns as produced by and inhabiting his own
times, and to be unsurprised that as a leading, increasingly famous artist and
personality (a word that gains special significance in the context ofYeats's work) he
should be affected by and become part of this transfonnative cultural phase described
by Wheale as the "modernist revolution in the arts" (1995: 16).
York argues that Yeats was "much influenced" by "the new movement" (Bradford
1996:482). Echoing Eliot's comments, he writes that Yeats started his career "in what
some would consider a self-indulgently Romantic manner" but matured "to become
one of the most powerful and imaginative writers of the (20th) century" (1996:482).
While Hamburger argues that "at least after The Green Helmet" (1910) Yeats "was a
modem poet in diction and in imagery" (1969:79), York pinpoints Yeats's "discovery
of a modernist style" after "his post-Romantic Celtic beginnings" (Bradford
1996:483) in Responsibilities (1914). York argues that this "new kind of verse"
reached maturity "in several volumes of Yeats, especially perhaps The Tower (1928)"
(1996:483). Indeed, it is this generally noted 'change' in Yeats's work around this
time that prompts Eliot to describe Yeats, without divorcing him entirely from the
early "Yeats ofthe Celtic" or "Pre-Raphaelite" Twilight, as "pre-eminently the poet
of middle age" (Unterecker 1963:58).
Pointing out that a poet's development "in middle age" has "always something
miraculous about it," but not wanting "to give the impression" that he regards Yeats's
"earlier and his later work almost as if they had been written by two different men"
(1963 :56), Eliot nonetheless offers as "reason for the superiority of Yeats's later
work" what he calls "the greater expression of personality in it" (1963 :57). Eliot urges
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"poets-to-come" to "study with reverence" the "great and permanent example" of
Yeats's accomplishment - "what" Yeats "did in the middle and later years," his
"capacity of adaptation to the years" and "exceptional honesty and courage to face the
change" (1963:58). Bolstering Yeats's exemplary and heroic status, Eliot puts Yeats's
achievement down to what he calls the "Character of the Artist: a kind of moral, as
well as intellectual, excellence" (1963:58). As I will explicate in the next chapter,
Yeats would have preferred Eliot's first reference to his "personality" rather than to
"character," for both words have specific meanings in Yeats's conception ofIrish
national identity.
Eliot argues that Yeats "had to wait for a later maturity to find expression of early
experience," adding that "something" ofYeats "coming through" and "beginning" to
speak "for man" as "a particular man" is evident in "the volume of 1904" (1963:57),
namely In the Seven Woods, and "clearer still in the poem 'Peace' in the 1910
volume" (1963:57), namely The Green Helmet and Other Poems. However, Eliot
argues, it is "not fully evinced until the volume of 1914, in the violent and terrible
epistle dedicatory of Responsibilities," in which Yeats's "naming of his age" ("close
on forty-nine" - Collected Poems 1971: 113) is "significant" as a "triumphant" arrival
at "freedom of speech" after "half a lifetime" (Unterecker 1963 :57). On this basis,
Eliot confides, his own "enthusiasm" was "won by the poetry of the older Yeats ...
from 1919 on," and that he could "share the feelings of younger men who came to
know and admire" Yeats "by that work from 1919 on" (1963 :54). In this light, I wish
to stress the' quantum leap' around this time in the quality of Yeats's verse, and his
seeming 'maturation' as a modernist poet. I wish also to stress that the critical
reception of Yeats as a modernist, as Eliot underlines, rests largely with the works
produced by him from about 1914 and more emphatically from 1919. Certain of these
works shall come into focus in this and particularly the next chapter in examining
Yeats's conception of Irish national identity.
Of course, the influence of Pound on 'making' Yeats more emphatically 'modem'
cannot go unnoted, with Yeats significantly placing Pound in early versions of A
Vision alongside Nietzsche in the heroic lunar Phase 12 (representing 'the
Forerunner'). As Wheale points out, many of the artistic developments and practices
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"were initiated by relatively small coteries or groupings in the new European
metropolises" (1995:15/16), by "modernizing artist-activists" (1995:16). It is well
documented by critics that Yeats, himself involved in literary or occult "coteries"
most of his adult life, including as a leading figure in the (Anglo-)Irish Literary
Revival, was assisted in becoming 'modem' through Pound's influence as "unofficial
secretary, reader, amanuensis" (Foster 1998:475). Ellmann explains that Pound-
"very much the man of the new movement" -felt Yeats' s "manner was out of date"
and insisted "The poet must be a modem man... he must be clear and precise, he must
eliminate all abstractions and all words which sense did not justify as well as sound"
(1960:214). Indeed, as "a conveyor of ideas and information" to a range of famous
modem writers, Pound rapidly became "a vehicle for the age's most significant
concerns" (Ackroyd 1980:33) and "set himself the task of converting Yeats to the
modem movement" (Ellmann 1960:215).
Ellmann also explains that, during their winters at Stone Cottage in Sussex from 1913
to 1916, Pound stimulated Yeats's interest in Japanese Noh drama as the basis for
"the development of a new form of drama" that was "suited to European conventions"
(1960:217) but 'aristocratic' in its 'secret' or occult, imaginative, ritualistic and
symbolic aspects and emphases. As Ellmann notes, Yeats's "first play in this new
form" (1960:218) was "another in his series on Cuchulain" and "purely symbolic"
(1960:218), namely At the Hawk's Well. The "improvement" helped along by Pound
"is readily noticeable," Ellmann writes; the "new verse is more spare" and "the
images are exactly delimited by the words, every shadow is removed" (1960:215). Its
"terse, vivid diction," Ellmann points out, "stamped him as a modem poet even in the
mind of such a fastidious critic as TS Eliot, who attended its performance in a
drawing-room" (1960:218).
Earlier than At the Hawk's Well (1916), however, Pound's 'concretising' influence on
Yeats's thought and writing can be seen as having contributed to what York identifies
as Yeats's "discovery of a modernist style, after his post-Romantic Celtic beginnings,
with Responsibilities (1914)" (Bradford 1996:483). York argues that the "period after
1914" saw, amid a "general atmosphere among writers ... of doubt and readiness for
change," what he calls "the establishment of a new kind of verse" reaching "maturity
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with Eliot's The Waste Land (1922), Pound's Mauberley (1920) and several volumes
of Yeats, especially perhaps The Tower (1928)" (1996:483). This 'newness' occurred
not only in poetic content, with "the cultural complexities" emerging in a poem like
Yeats's "Leda and the Swan" making it "unmistakenly modernist" (1996: 483), but
also in style.
Foster points out that, for a while from 1912, Pound in fact "exercised a variable
degree of influence on the final versions ofWBY's poems" (1998:475/6). As Yeats
attests in a letter to Lady Gregory in January 1913, Pound "helps me get back to the
definite and the concrete away from modern abstractions. To talk over a poem with
him is like getting you to put a sentence into dialect. All becomes clear and natural"
(Foster 1998:476). It is the "definite and concrete" that Eliot notes in Yeats's later
plays. Indeed, Eliot highlights a "cause" of this "improvement" to be "the gradual
purging out of poetical ornament," and he argues, acutely conscious that he and Yeats
belong to the modern age ("our age" - Unterecker 1963:54), that this purging "is the
most painful part ofthe labour, so far as the versification goes, ofthe modern poet
who tries to write a play in verse" (1963 :61). The "course of improvement" for Yeats,
Eliot argues, was "towards a greater and greater starkness" (1963 :61), with his
"purification" of verse "much more evident" in Four Plays for Dancers" (1921) and
"in the two in the posthumous volume" in which "he had found his right and final
dramatic form" (1963 :61).
Pound's influence, of course, encompassed not only the "definite and concrete" in
style but also in meaning. Foster highlights another major outcome, quoting the
recollections ofMrs George Yeats (nee Hyde Lees) that Pound "went through the
poems and W.B. accepted his suggestions," and that "certain words W.B. used no
longer had the same meaning" (1998:475). Significantly, Foster points out, among
"the key words whose sense changed under Pound's influence was 'reality'" and
"from this point WBY began to use it to mean not only Platonic perfection but
uncompromising actuality" (1998:475). This dual meaning illuminates the famous
lines from "The Fisherman": "All day I'd looked in the face/What I had hoped
'twould bel To write for my own race/And the reality" (Collected Poems 1971: 166). I
will demonstrate in the next chapter that this dual meaning of "reality" is particularly
36
significant in Yeats's conception of Irish national identity, articulated within the
specifically colonial context of the Ireland of his times.
All of this is to suggest, then, that the construction of Yeats as a modernist by literary
critics has been both thorough and widely accepted. In a sentence that encapsulates
this conventional construction, York writes that Yeats "develops from a Romantic
standpoint to a modernist one, bringing with him a cult of myth and of mystical vision
which he tempers with a harsh awareness of the bleakness of the modem world, with
an acute lucidity about his own feelings and a masterful sense of rhythm and
construction" (Bradford 1996:483). This is, in short, the canonical Yeats that readers
have come to know in the decades after his death in 1939. However, having made and
expounded, so to speak, a little on the critical construction of Yeats as a modernist,
and wishing to avoid over-examining the field of modernism and 'Yeats as modernist'
(i.e. at the expense of bringing his 'postcolonial' credentials to the fore), I wish
merely to higWight three major, interrelated features generally taken to be among
those that distinguish modernist writers and writing. These are features which, to my
mind, require foregrounding in examining Yeats's conception of Irish national
identity. In higWighting these three features, I am in effect (re)constructing Yeats as a
modernist in specifically 'postcolonial' terms for the purpose of enhancing his status
as a 'postcolonial' figure. In doing so, I am underlining intersections of aspects of
Yeats's biography, thinking and works with certain critics' often very general
statements about modernism and modernists.
Firstly, as Wheale explains, modernist artists and writers "often rejected the socially-
endorsed forms of religion, such as Christianity" and many "explored substitutive
forms of belief, drawn eclectically from a wide range of sources - New Paganism,
anthropological texts, religions of the Far East, world mythology, the classical
religions of Greece and Rome" (1995:23/24). Informed by such sources and ideas, a
"large number of major modernist texts," Sheppard points out, "deal centrally with the
irruption of a 'meta-world' into the 'middle zone of experience,'" an irruption that
overturns the "apparently secure, common-sense, bourgeois world by powers which
are sub- or inhuman, cosmic, or, at the very least, non-commonsensical" (Giles
1993: 16). The over-riding notion, according to Sheppard, is that conventional 'reality'
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or the "world of objects and relationships" in which modem people thought
themselves "securely at home" is in fact "surrounded and permeated by a dynamic
'meta-world'" and "subject to elemental powers over which they have no final
control, but with which they have to come to terms or be destroyed" (1993: 17).
Thus modernist writers have "a developed sense that reality is not reality as perceived
and structured by the Western bourgeois consciousness" (1993 :17), and this
"modernist sense that reality is threatening to run out of control" produces texts which
"through both content and form, aim to shock their audience" out of
"conventionalized, 19th century modes of perception" and prompt the rethinking of
"epistemological" and "ontological categories" (1993: 18). Sheppard identifies a wide
range of such texts, from Hesse's Del' Steppenwolfto Conrad's Heart ofDarkness,
Lawrence's Women in Love, Forster's A Passage to India and Satre's La Nausee
(1993:16). To that list, of course, many ofYeats's works could be added, including
"To Ireland in the Coming Times" ("For the elemental creatures go/About my table to
andfro" - Collected Poems 1971 :57), "The Second Coming," with its troubling,
apocalyptic image emerging "out of Spiritus Mundi" (1971 :211), as well as the two
'occult' works that come sharply into focus in the next chapter, Per Amica Si/entia
Lunae and A Vision, the latter with its Epilogue "All Soul's Night" in which Yeats
invokes his spirit-friends "up... from the grave" (1971 :256/58).
As Foster explains, the "late 1880s saw a revival of interest in the supernatural and the
occult, not paralleled until the 1920s or the 1960s" (1998:50). Key magical and occult
texts returned "into circulation" and Madame Blavatsky's Theosophy, which "related
readily to esoteric links with the creative process," settled "on the bohemian scene"
(1998:50) in London. Theosophy, Foster writes, exposed its adherents to philosophy
drawn from "Neo-Platonism, the symbolism of the Cabbala, the mysticism of
Swedenborg, and, later, the insights of Indian religion" (1998:50). Around this time,
Thomas Taylor's translations of Plotinus and the Neo-Platonists were lent to "young
aspirants" by Yeats's Fenian mentor O'Leary, while seances and "spiritualist
experiments" were "the rage in Dublin from 1886 to 1887" (1998 :50). Thus the young
Yeats, Foster shows, "acquired a ready-made agenda for esoteric study" (1998:50).
By their early (and what proved to be lifelong) involvements in this esoteric milieu,
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Yeats - "increasingly drawn to the hierarchies, experiments and secret knowledge of
the magical tradition" - and his friend Russell - "set towards mysticism" (1998:49) -
were, Foster says, "representative of their times" (1998:50).
Furthermore, Foster speculates that Yeats and Russell could "be located in a particular
tradition of Irish Protestant interest in the occult" by writers (including Sheridan Le
Fanu, Charles Maturin, Bram Stoker, and Elizabeth Bowen) who were "from the
increasingly marginalized Irish Protestant middle class, from families with strong
clerical connections, declining fortunes and a tenuous hold on landed authority"
(1998 :50). He points out that the Irish Protestant "sense of displacement, their loss of
social and psychological integration towards the end of the nineteenth century, was
particularly acute" for the Yeats family, and speculates that Irish Protestant interest in
the occult could in general be "seen on one level as a strategy for coping with
contemporary threats" like Catholicism "and on another as a search for psychic
control" (1998:50). Foster also points out that Yeats was "prepared for belief' in the
occult by Sligo family lore, which accepted "second sight and familiar ghosts" and
was "rich in stories of hauntings" (1998:50).
Thus this admixture of the Irish Protestant decline, Yeats's Sligo childhood, and his
lifelong efforts to unify his nationalist, occult and literary pursuits illuminates Yeats's
concern with Irish mythology and folk tales (including his collaborations with Lady
Gregory). It exposes a particular modernist, but also nationalist, aspect ofYeats's
thinking: the imaginative fusing of the 'real' and spiritual worlds, and concerning the
latter a merging of the occult with Irish ("peasant") folklore. As Yeats put it in a letter
to his father in 1911, about his work with Gregory on "the big book on Fairy Belief
that we have been doing for years": "My part is to show that what we call Fairy Belief
is exactly the same thing as English and American spiritism except that fairy belief is
very much more charming" (Foster 1998:439).
Indeed, Larissy (with Foster his source) argues that since Yeats "clearly believed that
the magic and esoteric lore he knew" were "substantially the same as those known to
the Druids" he was "able to think of his Protestant inheritance as offering not only a
system to vie with Catholicism" but one that "had truer access to a perennial wisdom
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possessed by the ancient Celts" (1997:xxiv). This "synthesis of psychical research and
fairy lore" that was for Yeats "finnly established" (Foster 1998:439/40) by 1911 can
be seen as a motivating factor in Yeats's earlier documenting ofIrish "peasant" folk
tales and his lifelong use of Irish mythology in his poems. Furthennore, as I will
demonstrate particularly in the next chapter, this synthesis has profound implications
for Yeats's conception of national identity in tenns of his project to help shape and
define a new, independent and emphatically 'postcolonial' Irish nation.
Crucially, Foster also delineates Yeats's scepticism in occult matters, and explains
that because the "spiritual and real worlds, in WBY's mind, interpenetrated each
other," this fusion allowed "for belief as a metaphorical rather than a literal truth"
(1998:51). Foster explains that "Russell saw visions as actualizations; WBY
interpreted them as symbols, to be analysed further," an approach that "enabled him,
usefully, to come down on two sides ofthe visionary question at once" (1998:51). As
Larissy puts it, "while Yeats was talking about spirits he was, indeed, talking also
about images, and he often did so in a way which left it open to the reader to remain
agnostic about the spirits" (1997:xxv). Thus Yeats's immersion in the occult cannot
be taken to remove him from conventional 'reality,' a word which, as I've pointed
out, Foster indicates came also to encompass "uncompromising actuality" (1998:475);
it can rather be seen as part of his ambition to draw the reader into the power of the
imagination in confronting very material concerns. At this stage, however, it suffices
to again stress this modernist feature of Yeats: his mobilisation of eclectic occult ideas
(including that of a 'meta-world' populated by elemental powers), giving rise to what
Sheppard calls a "developed sense that reality is not reality as perceived and
structured by the Western bourgeois consciousness" (Giles 1993:17) - a
"consciousness," it must be noted in anticipation of examining the 'postcolonial'
Yeats, that infonned and was infonned by colonialism.
Inseparable from this destabilization of conventional 'reality' by recourse to a "meta-
world" and "elemental powers," the second major feature of modernist writers and
writing that I wish to emphasize is their radical destabilization ofthe notion of stable,
fixed identity. Sheppard writes that communicating "the strangeness" of the 'meta-
world' meant modernist painters and writers giving up "the fixed point of perspective
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inherited from the Renaissance" (1993: 17). The effect ofthere being "more to reality
and human nature than can be humanly determined, appropriated, named and
explained," Sheppard suggests, is not only to destabilize conventional 'reality' but
also to simultaneously "destabilize" the conventional notion of "identity" as well as
"the structures of genealogy and property with which this identity is bound up"
(1993:24). Sheppard underlines that "it was above all Nietzsche's philosophy" which,
making "its major initial impact during the high modernist period," comprised "the
most damaging polemic" (1993: 19) against nineteenth-century liberal humanist
assumptions about identity.
The influence ofNietzsche on Yeats is well documented by critics, who point to
Yeats's reading of works by the German philosopher "in 1902 and 1903" (Hamburger
1969:81). Ellmann writes that Nietzsche "delighted" Yeats and "proved to be almost
as enthralling for Yeats as unravelling Blake had been from 1889 to 1892," with the
German providing "European authority for many ideas which he had come upon
either by himself or in strange places" (1964:91), i.e. the occult. He adds that Yeats
"rightly perceived that there were few irreconcilable differences between the English
poet and the German," not least in their denunciation of dualistic or "conventional
morality" (1964:92) based on simplistic categories of good and evil. While Yeats's
"views of man and human psychology were not identical with those of Blake and
Nietzsche," Ellmann argues, they "may instructively be juxtaposed" (1964:93). He
highlights that while there are "limits of his debt to the German philosopher" and
Yeats "kept his independence" (1964:96), particularly in that "he held himself back
from an extremism that might subject his mind and verse" (1964:98), it remains that
"Nietzsche, closer in time to Yeats than Blake, often presented formulations with
which Yeats found himself astonishingly in sympathy" (1964:93).
The application of certain "views of man and human psychology" and extension of
the denunciation of dualistic or "good and evil" morality by Yeats to the Irish colonial
context in terms of his Doctrine of the Mask and System will be examined in the next
chapter. However, it must immediately be registered that, in regard to Yeats's concern
with 'identity' and his formulation of his Doctrine of the Mask, Nietzsche exerted a
degree of influence on Yeats's thinking. Ellmann argues that Yeats, "whom the term
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'mask' had already attracted," "followed Nietzsche" in "analysing the individual self'
by way of a "relation between the self and its 'mask'" (1964:93). The "advantage" for
Yeats "of the mask ofNietzsche over the 'pose' of Oscar Wilde was that the former
was virile and unconnected with estheticism" (1964:93), and Ellmann indicates that
some functions and effects of the Yeatsian mask match those of the Nietzschean one.
However, Ellmann points out, "Nietzsche had not much systematized his reflections
about the mask" although "his writings were full of suggestions" (1964:93). Yeats, he
argues, is "more methodical in his organization" (1964:94) of the process of adopting
a mask and becoming one's ideal self, with Nietzsche's "remarks on this process"
using "other terms than mask" (1964:94).
While the particularities of Yeats' s conception of the mask, specifically in terms of
'identity' in the Irish colonial context, will be dealt with in the next chapter,
Nietzsche's influence on modernist thought in broader terms in regard to 'identity'
must be registered in delineating the wider intellectual milieu in which Yeats was
operating. Pippin indicates that Nietzsche's philosophy dismisses "pretensions of
social independence" in characterizing "all the major institutions of modernity as
functions of ressentiment, or 'herd society,' all expressions of 'failed independence'"
(1991 :39). This of course has negative implications for claims of individual and
collective independence (and identity), with Nietzsche arguing that what
"independence there is, the independence of the artistic imagination" is "often
achieved at the price of a very costly social 'refusal' ... loneliness and isolation"
(1991 :40). This is a position that illuminates Yeats's reference to himself as one of the
last romantics (i.e. an isolated hero). As Sheppard suggests, most modernists "disliked
what they espied from their advanced position" (Giles 1993 :41) in this regard and,
unsurprisingly, these "avant-garde artists" were "out to shock" (1993 :26) their
audiences out of slavish bourgeois conformity, including out of humanist-Iogocentric
(single point of view) assumptions about identity. Such assumptions, as explicated in
chapter one, also informed and were informed by colonialism, and as I will
demonstrate in the next chapter, Yeats was also "out to shock" in this context.
This vaunted primacy of the "artistic imagination," Sheppard indicates, can be allied
with the recurring "attacks" within modernist literature "on the supremacy of human
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reason" (1993 :26). Such attacks or efforts "to shock" emphasize "other faculties of
human nature" such as "Dionysiac vitality" (Nietzsche's followers); "energy"
(Futurists); "spontaneity, intuition and the imagination" (Dadaists); "ecstasy"
(Expressionists); or dreams "and the unconscious" (Surrealists) (1993:26). Generally,
as Sheppard describes it, modernists claim that the "fluctuations of reality" and
"complexities of human nature" are "invisible to the eye of empirical reason" and can
"be approached, visualized and grasped only by those faculties in human nature,
which come from below or beyond rational faculties" (1993 :26). Eliot's emphasis on
Yeats's imaginative power, and Yeats's own emphasis on the imagination in his
occult philosophy and work (including, as I shall demonstrate in the next chapter, his
conception of Irish national identity), must therefore not merely be viewed in terms of
the Romantic legacy of the 'primacy of the imagination' but in terms ofa vitally
'modem' opposition to the notions of "reason" and "rationality" which were
subscribed to and upheld by Western culture (and, as I made clear in chapter one,
colonial rule). As Ellmann puts it, Yeats "wanted to show that the current faith in
reason and in logic ignored a far more important human faculty, the imagination"
(1964:3). Yeats, as I will demonstrate in the next chapter, was opposed to the fixed
point of perspective, the 'supremacy' of human reason, and therefore the notion of
stable, fixed identity as 'fact', emphasizing the power of the imagination in the
construction of identity.
Linked to this opposition to the hegemony of Reason is what Sheppard calls the
modernists' view that language is "equally limited" (Giles 1993 :27). The sentiment of
Nietzsche and De Saussure, for instance, was that "although language feels as though
it has some absolute and immutable (i.e. divinely legitimized) status to those who live
'inside' it" language is in fact "a relative and continuously evolving system of
arbitrary signs" and therefore "has no a priori connection with reality" (1993 :27). For
modernist language critics like Nietzsche, there "is no one-to-one correspondence
between immutable material objects and a noun-based syntax which names and orders
those objects," and furthermore "no substance exists to substantiate substantives (i.e.
to cement together the world of language and the world of material objects)"
(1993 :27). In view of the colonial discourse of identity outlined in chapter one, a
discourse reifying Reason and repudiated by Fanon, this modernist separation of
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language from 'reality' in itself destabilizes any negative identity imposition through
language as 'fact' by the colonizer, and opens the way for a challenge to such 'fact'
by the colonized. As I will show in the next chapter, this separation illuminates
Yeats's disdain for imposed or passively received 'fact' ordained by the colonizer's
discourse of identity, and informs his emphasis on the imagination and images in
identity-creation by the colonized.
Furthermore, as Sheppard also writes, Nietzsche's philosophy accordingly contains
"several penetrating remarks to the effect that the existence of the shifter 'Ich' ('1')
should not mislead us into thinking that there exists a unified substance or organic cell
which corresponds to it" (1993: 19). Indeed, Sheppard states that Nietzsche held
human nature to be "fundamentally Dionysiac, governed by the amoral god of
unreason and drunkenness," evoking a " ... 'sense of dark underground forces
mysteriously stirring, from Freud's Unconscious to Marx's masses, from Lawrence's
Dark Gods to the sleeping giant of Finnegan's Wake and Yeats's gods and Sidhe'"
(1993:41). Similar ideas, Sheppard adds, inform and mark the work of Freud, lung,
and Adler, "all of whom were more or less avowedly indebted to Nietzsche"
(1993 :41). It is well documented that Yeats was a voracious autodidact, and that by
1916 he was well "acquainted with the ideas of Freud and lung" (Foster 2003:66).
This pair's emphasis on the unconscious or subconscious, as will become evident in
this and the next chapter, also exerts a degree of influence on Yeats's conception of
Irish national identity.
I wish particularly to stress in regard to this move away from the 'single point of
view,' and the destabilization of the conventional conception of identity as stable and
fixed, the fundamental importance of the unconscious to modernist writers - Yeats in
particular. Again, Yeats should be seen as representative of his times. Sheppard writes
that it was during this "high modernist period, from the turn of the century onwards"
(Giles 1993: 19) that the notion "that human behaviour was impelled by unconscious
powers" (1993 :20) acquired "wide currency in intellectual circles, largely as a result
of the psychoanalytical school around Freud" (1993: 19/20). Sheppard adds that these
powers "were said to be irrational and amoral; controllable only in a limited way by
conscious reason and moral imperatives; knowable, like the sub-atomic world, only
44
indirectly, via dreams and neuroses" and "deeply offensive to and so ignored by
conventional wisdom" (1993:20). Western Man, Sheppard explains, "was seen to be
at the mercy of basic unconscious drives whose nature could be known only
imperfectly" (1993:20). As he puts it: "Far from being rational, Man was seen to be
innately irrational" and far "from being inherently moral, Man was seen to be
fundamentally animal" (1993 :20).
Freud's theory, Sheppard also explains, was that the human ego is "a bundle of
discrete structures without substantial unity" and that correspondingly "the structures
of human culture had been built over and at the cost of the repressed Unconscious,"
which Freud described as "analogous to ... 'an aboriginal population of the mind'"
(1993:20). The result ofthis, Freud believed, was "the Great War in particular and a
profound sense of unease in general" (1993 :20). In the Irish colonial context, as will
be reiterated later in this chapter (by reference to Fanon), the coIonizer deemed
exactly this perceived "aboriginal" (read primitive and inferior) mind of the colonized
as in dire need of colonial control. And as I shall demonstrate in the next chapter,
Yeats exploits the revolutionary potential of Freud's insight to show the so-called
"aboriginal" or unconscious mind to be, in fact, 'naturally' modem in the positive
sense (i.e. bent on liberation). In doing so, Yeats indicates that colonial (Western
bourgeois) repression of the unconscious is fundamentally 'unnatural', always-already
under threat, and in dire need of overthrowing psychologically (or psycho-spiritually
in terms of a passionate internalized violence) at the level of Irish national identity.
Unsurprisingly, in light of Freud and lung's views regarding the 'nature' of the
unconscious or subconscious, modernist writers produced a range of works in which,
Sheppard explains, protagonists "have acquired what initially looks like a secure and
stable identity by neglecting, repressing or doing violence to the shifting,
spontaneous, natural, unconscious side of their beings" (1993 :24). These protagonists
"have become over-cerebral, over-confident and/or over-conventionalized" and are as
a result "brought low and in some cases transformed by a series of encounters with
mythological beings or elemental powers - i.e. with objective correlatives of
unconscious drives" that are "more primitive and more powerful than what
Lawrence ... called the 'old stable ego - of the character'" (1993:24). Sheppard
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indicates that, given this "destabilized" and "highly confusing, irrational universe" in
which "the self is at best out of control and at worst non-existent" (1993 :25), there
arises before the modernist sensibility what I would call a kind of 'identity crisis': a
loss of a sense of selfhood and therefore of psychological security.
As Sheppard describes it: " ... the individual consciousness, painfully aware of the
relativity of its perspective and always on the point of being overwhelmed by the sub-
and supra-human powers ... is left either desperately asking what it is or emphatically
insisting that it is" (1993:25). In the face of such circumstances and uncertainty, as I
will demonstrate in the next chapter, Yeats refuses passive 'non-existence' and in
promoting the active claiming and fashioning of selfhood bears out Ellmann's
observation that he "defends the imagination with the defiance of a man who sees
himself as preventing the incursions of chaos" (1964:245). In particular, in the
colonial context, Yeats insists on the mobilization of the imagination and unconscious
for the purpose of constructing and upholding Irish national identity, and in doing so
envisions the Irish as an imagined community.
The modernist emphasis on an unconscious closely linked to and even inseparable
from the imagination illuminates what Sheppard lists as the sixth of his "nine fairly
well distinguished types of response" to the modem "crisis" of "Western humanist
and/or idealist culture" (Giles 1993:33): namely primitivism. The feeling informing
"much modernist writing and painting," he explains, is that so-called "primitive"
cultures, while "technologically less advanced than the modem West" (1993:31),
enjoy "a freedom and balance" which the "modernizing West" lacks (1993:32). These
cultures are seen as possibly "better equipped to deal with the totality of a universe in
which Man is not at home, of which he is not the centrepiece, and in the face of which
he inevitably experiences a profound sense of Angst" (1993 :31). Many modernist
intellectuals' "attraction" to "'primitive'" or "pseudo-primitive" art, "tribalistic
communities" and folk or "peasant culture" (1993 :31) is therefore indicative of their
feeling, "rightly or wrongly", that "pre-modern or non-Western cultures" have "not
abstracted the logos from the rest of the personality and co-exist with rather than seek
to dominate external Nature" (1993 :32).
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Thus non-European or pre-modern cultures "are used not just as sources of aesthetic
inspiration, but as a cultural model for emulation" (1993:37). This, I contend,
illuminates Yeats's concern with Irish mythology, folk tales and representations of the
Irish "peasant", associating the pre-modern peasant and "peasant culture" (including
Fairy Belief) with the unconscious (Nature) and occult spiritism. As Wheale suggests,
for many modernists "irrationalism and unconscious experience as pre-modern
resources in the psyche" are to be "called on as a form of resistance to the tyranny of
bureaucratic renovation in modernity" (1995:24). As I will argue in the next chapter,
these "pre-modern resources within the psyche" are also exactly what Yeats seeks to
mobilise to overcome colonial oppression in the process of Irish national identity-
creation.
What Sheppard calls an "esoteric hermeticism like that of Yeats" (Giles 1993:34),
pointed to in terms of "mysticism" (third on his list of modernist responses), can
therefore be seen to embrace the existence of "a firm spiritual substratum" (1993:35)
- the unconscious. Indeed, as Sheppard points out, for the modernist "Angst betokens
a very deep realization that the prevailing system which constructs what Lawrence
called the 'old stable ego' is at odds with the profoundest stratum of the personality"
(1993 :42). This substratum, whether "psychological or metaphysical," lies beyond "or
within what looks like entropic chaos or unresolvable conflict" and "permits what
lung termed 'integration'" (1993:35): an "interchange" in which both "conscious and
unconscious contents" are "shaped into a coherent psychic totality" (lacobi
1968: 105). By 'totality', lacobi notes, lung "means more than unity or wholeness,"
with the term implying "a creative synthesis, comprising an active force" (1968: 10)
and identified with the psyche as a "self-regulating system" (1968:53) in which there
"is no balance, no system of self-regulation, without opposition" (1968:53/54).
Indeed, according to lung, "opposition is a law inherent in human nature" and
"psychic life is governed by" this "necessary opposition" (1968:53). As I will
elucidate in the next chapter, the notion of a necessary psychic opposition is
compatible with Yeats's esoteric or occult views on human nature and 'becoming' at
the level of identity, and is incorporated into his Doctrine ofthe Mask and System. It
is incorporated in such a way that the unconscious, associated with Nature as a
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creative force, is portrayed as not only underlying and threatening stable, fixed
identity of the kind conventionally moulded and subscribed to by modern bourgeois
society, but as a substratum to be productively harnessed in overthrowing the
'prevailing system' of colonialism whereby Irish identity has been constructed and
imposed in negative terms. The aim of this harnessing, via a distinctly Yeatsian
method of imagining, is to achieve a form of 'integration' - what Yeats calls 'Unity of
Being' - at the level of Irish national identity.
Inseparable from the destabilization of stable, secure identity by recourse to the
unconscious, the third major feature of modernist writers and writing that I wish to
emphasize is their non-linear conception oftime and history. For the nineteenth-
century or "pre-modernist" thinker, Sheppard explains, time was "a progressive
process moving ever upwards in a dialectical or linear manner as Man brought even
more of the natural world under his rational, moral, economic or cultural control"
(Giles 1993:29). Again, the colonial mastering of nature and the colonized in terms of
these modes of control, underlined by Fanon's arguments as outlined in chapter one,
must be borne in mind and associated with both the notions of stable, fixed identity
and linear, progressive time. However, Freud had written that "the processes of the
Unconscious are timeless in the sense that they are not ordered temporally, not altered
by the passage of time, and have no relation at all with time as that is normally
understood" (1993 :29). Likewise, for the modernist writer, time "ceases to be a
regular and common-sense process in which a precise but fixed gap, the present,
separates the past from the future"; rather, "modernist experiences of flux, decentring
and apocalypse" challenge and "explode these ideas" (1993 :29) of progressive, linear
time.
Sheppard explains that time becomes "either elastic" (1993 :29), with the present
"expanding and contracting according to the situation of the observer"; or it becomes
"incipiently apocalyptic"; or "a kind of simultaneity in which past, present and future
merge into one" (1993 :30). Likewise, history "ceases to be a progressive movement
upwards" and becomes "something akin to an irregular series of surges in no
particular direction" (1993 :30). As he puts it: "Each surge may have its shape, but a
gap will separate it from the next, differently shaped and differently extended surge-
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which may well move in a different direction or, alternatively, prove to be a
recurrence ofthe same" (1993:30). Significantly, he adds, from "such an elastic,
decentred, multi-dimensional view oftime and history, it was only a short step to a
profound doubt in that assumed supremacy of Western civilization" - including, I
would add, colonial rule - "which had sustained so much nineteenth-century thinking
and political action" (1993:30).
Indeed, as I will demonstrate in the next chapter, Yeats subscribes to the view of the
unconscious as "timeless". His esoteric System (in which the gyres represent, among
other things, history as cyclical) is also a prime example of such decentring or
exploding of conventional, linear time. Ellmann points out that, for Yeats, "Nietzsche
was especially helpful on cyclical theory," and he "discovered in Nietzsche an attitude
towards the cycles which was akin to his own" (1964:92), that of 'tragic joy'. "Instead
of an eastern resignation towards' eternal recurrence, '" Ellmann writes, Nietzsche' s
"Zarathustra is full of western exultation" (1964:92). Ellmann points out (although he
does not quote from the poems in order) that in late life Yeats "wrote his two fine
poems 'The Gyres' and 'Lapis Lazuli'" and "framed the Nietzschean lines"
(1964:93): "All things fall, and are built again,lAnd those that build them again are
gay" (Collected Poems 1971 :339) and "We that look on but laugh in tragic joy"
(1971:337).
However, Ellmann points out elsewhere that Yeats did not simply set "himself up as
the poet of eternal recurrence, as Nietzsche was its philosopher" (1960:268). Rather,
he emphasized striving "towards the state of Unity of Being" (1960:268). As I will
demonstrate in the next chapter, this state - akin to 'integration' - is for Yeats to be a
'natural' product of identity-creation by individuals, including and especially by the
(ex)colonized Irish. Furthermore, Sheppard describes the fifth response on his list as
"the decision to turn one's back on the modem age," and argues that after "the Great
War, for instance, Rilke, Yeats and Ball expressed that decision in a 'flight out of
time' -the emigration to a 'still point' or fixed centre ofa 'gyre' which was
geographically as far removed as possible from the confusions of the modem age ... in
Yeats's case, the tower in Galway" (Giles 2003:36). However, Yeats's 'flight out of
time' to his tower cannot be seen only as an escape from "the confusions of the
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modem age," but has an emphatic and specific 'national' dimension. Yeats, as he
himself reminds his readers, took refuge at Thoor Ballylee during the Irish Civil War,
writing at the end of his esoteric treatise A Vision: "Finished at Thoor Ballylee, 1922,
in a time of Civil War" (Jeffares 1990:200). As I will explain in the next chapter, the
'timeless' unconscious permits for Yeats such a 'flight out of time' for the purpose of
'reorganising the personality' (symbolised by the tower), a process fundamental to
Yeats's conception ofIrish national identity.
* * * * *
What I have so far attempted, then, is to examine in some depth the canonical
construction of Yeats as a modernist, while along the way pointing to the existence,
implicit in but ultimately obscured by this 'modernist' construction, of 'another'
Yeats - that is, Yeats the anti-colonial, Irish national poet. The construction of Yeats,
explicitly and unequivocally, as an Irish national "poet of decolonization" (Said
1993:278) occurs in Edward Said's groundbreaking essay entitled "Yeats and
Decolonization" in Culture and Imperialism (1993), in which he firmly situates Yeats
within the field of postcolonial theory and in doing so radically and irrevocably alters
the established, canonical landscape of Yeats criticism.
The importance of Said's contribution to Yeats criticism, revitalizing as it does an
area of study that prior to his essay appeared well-worn and largely exhausted, should
not be underestimated. Indeed, while Yeats's 'national' dimension has by no means
been overlooked by critics like Ellmann and Unterecker, and while Kiberd and Foster
have in the last decade examined the national and political dimensions of Yeats' s life
and works in considerable depth, it is Said's essay that radically breaks from what
could now be called 'traditional', even staid Yeats criticism by consciously
foregrounding and presenting, for the first time, a Yeats who is more than just a
greatly admired modernist with a strong 'national' leaning but a Yeats who is rather,
more specifically, Ireland's great decolonizing "national poet". The immediate effect
of Said's construction of Yeats is to leave one literally (a bit like Yeats's visionary
character Robartes) seeing double. Indeed, whereas Eliot finds himself initially
wondering, in momentary disbelief, whether Yeats's earlier and later work "had been
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written by two different men" (Unterecker 1963:56), one is similarly confronted by
"two different" men among the number of Yeatses alluded to in chapter one: on the
one hand, the 'modernist' Yeats, and on the other, the 'postcolonial' Yeats.
Such disjointedness is symptomatic ofYeats criticism in general. Ellmann observes as
early as 1960, in a summation that remains largely apposite, that writings about Yeats
"have tended to be either critical or factually biographical, with no bridge between"
(1960: 1). "The more that is written," Ellmann points out, "the more elusive he has
become, as critics, friends, and biographers build up a variety of unconnected
pictures" (1960: 1). Ellmann arrays a smorgasbord of sample Yeatses for the reader
and scholar to "choose between" (1960:2): the "nervous romantic sighing through the
reeds ofthe 'eighties and 'nineties and the worldly realist plain-speaking in the
'twenties" (1960: 1/2); the "business man founding and directing the Abbey in broad
day," the "wan young Celt haunting the twilight" and the "occultist performing
nocturnal incantations"; the "dignified Nobel Prize winner and Senator of the Irish
Free State"; and the "libidinous old man and the translator of the Upanishads"
(1960:2). "These portraits," Ellmann adds, "are not easily reconcilable, and the
tendency has been, instead of reconciling, to prove certain of them inessential" - i.e.
particularly Yeats's occult pursuits - "or to split up the poet's life into dozens of
unrelated episodes" (1960:2).
Said himself highlights at the outset, touching on aspects raised in his essay rather
than on the facets of the modernist Yeats I have outlined above, that Yeats has been
"almost completely assimilated into the canon as well as into the discourses of
modem English literature and European high modernism" (1993 :265). These, Said
explains, "reckon with him as a great modem Irish poet, deeply affiliated and
interacting with his native traditions, the historical and political context of his times,
and the complex situation of being a poet writing in English in a turbulently
nationalist Ireland" (1993 :265). However, while Yeats has a "settled presence in
Ireland, in British culture and literature, and in European modernism" (1993 :265),
Said argues, he presents "another fascinating aspect: that of the indisputably great
national poet" who "during a period of anti-imperialist resistance articulates the
experiences, the aspirations, and the restorative vision of a people suffering under the
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dominion of an offshore power" (1993 :265/256). Said is acutely conscious that this is
"not a customary way of interpreting Yeats," but nonetheless firmly situates Yeats as
a poet who from "this perspective" also "belongs in a tradition not usually considered
his, that of the colonial world ruled by European imperialism during a climactic
insurrectionary stage" (1993 :266). Yeats, Said adds, also "belongs naturally to the
cultural domain" by virtue of "Ireland's colonial status," which "it shares with a host
of non-European regions" where "cultural dependence and antagonism" exist
"together" (1993 :266).
While Said's point about "cultural dependence and antagonism" in the colonies is
insightful and certainly applies to Yeats, his grouping of colonies (including Ireland)
into a seemingly homogeneous bloc is a highly contentious manoeuvre. Although
"most of the time they are treated separately," Said argues, the colonies - "India,
North Africa, the Caribbean, Central and South America, many parts of Africa, China
and Japan, the Pacific archipelago, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, North America
and of course Ireland" - "belong in a group together" (1993 :266). Said later justifies
his position by arguing that, while "the physical" and "geographical connections" are
"closer between England and Ireland than between England and India" or "between
France and Algeria or Senegal," the "imperial relationship is there in all cases"
(1993:275). The Irish, Said argues, "can never be English any more than Cambodians
or Algerians can be French," and this is "always the case in every colonial
relationship" because "the first principle" is that "a clear-cut and absolute hierarchical
distinction should remain constant between ruler and ruled, whether or not the latter is
white" (1993 :275).
While a critique of postcolonial theory and Said's "ethical and theoretical values"
(Young 1990: 132) are beyond the scope of this thesis, it must be highlighted that
Said's position invites criticism on grounds of a totalising "theoretical reduction" at
the expense of the "mesh of nuance, complexity and contradiction involved when the
stories of nations intersect with those of supposedly emblematic individuals" (Foster
2001 :xvii) like Yeats. As McCracken points out, Irish "racial attitudes in the 1890s"
were "not radically different from those held elsewhere in Europe at the time," with it
being seen "as an affront to be denied home rule, let alone nation statehood" because
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the Irish saw themselves as " ... 'white men'" (2003:xviii). Irish attitudes "to the
subjugated black population" in South Africa, for instance, were "not as progressive
as their descendants might desire" (2003:xviii). What Foster calls the Irish propensity
to "therapeutic voluntary amnesia" (2001:58) or "elision of memory" (2001:77) might
help to explain why, as McCracken argues, the subject of "Irish racism and racial
attitudes" remains "a much neglected field of study" (2003 :xix). Indeed, Irish
solidarity around the turn of the century was not with the subjugated black population
of South Africa but with their Afrikaner oppressors. As McCracken highlights, the
"Irish pro-Boer movement and the Irish nationalist movement" were for a period
"indistinguishable" (2003 :xx).
Foster echoes McCracken's observation by higWighting the case of the emigrant Irish
in Montserrat, who became the "colonizing elite" and who "treated their African
slaves as badly as any othercolonizers, anywhere, and worse than many" (2001 :xiv).
In this light, Foster points to the "blanket wishful thinking" informing "so many
untested generalizations" and "assumptions" - including "behind comparative post-
colonial studes" - about "the Platonic solidarity between struggling Irish nationalists
and their supposedly analogous victims elsewhere" (2001:xiv). While Said's initial
grouping does not overtly imply solidarity among the colonies, but rather a sameness
in the hierarchical ruler-ruled mode of imperialist hegemony, he does state that Yeats
"belongs naturally to the cultural domain" by "virtue ofIreland's colonial status,"
which Ireland "shares with a host of non-European regions: cultural dependence and
antagonism together." He later proceeds to draw parallels between Yeats and poets
like Cesaire and Neruda.
Although "cultural dependence and antagonism" may be a common denominator in
theory, it is, as Young highlights, "still an open question... whether an African
pastoralist shares the same existential 'bestial floor' with an Irish poet and his
readers" (1990: 131). A "general feature" of "humanist common denominators,"
Young argues, is that they "are meaningless" because "they bypass the local cultural
codes that make personal experience articulate" (1990: 131). It follows, then, that
while the Irish cannot be English any more than the Algerians can be French, it
remains that the Irish cannot be Algerian any more than the Algerians can be Irish.
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Nor can the imperialist "first principle" of ruler-ruled in practice mean an always-
identical relationship across the grouping. The "question" Young raises could
therefore be restated, whether an unspecified black, first-language native language-
speaking, African pastoralist (or even 'resistance' intellectual) shares the same
"cultural domain" as a specifically white, first-language English-speaking, modernist
Anglo-Irish poet and magus schooled in the Western poetical, philosophical and
magical traditions in Europe, namely Yeats, simply "by virtue of' their respective
country's "colonial status".
That said, Said does treat Ireland separately in some detail, preserving the specificities
of the Irish colonial context: the more than seven centuries of "domination" of "the
land" by "an alien power," with the "idea of murdering Gaels" having been "from the
start" royally approved and considered "patriotic, heroic and just" (1993 :268). By the
eighteenth century, Said explains, the opposition to English rule had "under Wolfe
Tone and Grattan" acquired an identity of its own" (1993 :268/269), with patriotism
high during the mid-century and "the extraordinary talents of Swift, Goldsmith, and
Burke" giving the "Irish resistance a discourse entirely its own" (1993 :269). It should
be added that the young Yeats was, again, representative of his times in being
influenced by the milieu of Irish nationalism in 1880s Dublin. By participating in
debates at Contemporary Club and Young Ireland Society meetings and, through this
exposure to the "world of the nationalist intelligentsia" (Foster 1998:45), becoming
heir to this ready-made resistance identity and discourse, Yeats was able to (in
Anderson's phrase) '''think' the nation" (1991:22). The Irish colonial context
therefore conforms to Hobsbawm's general argument that "debate on such questions
as the theoretical criteria of nationhood became passionate" from the 1880s, with "any
particular answer... believed to imply a particular form of political strategy, struggle
or programme" (1990:44). Indeed, the young Yeats was actively engaged and
embroiled in such debate from early adulthood.
Furthermore, as Ellmann points out, Yeats was born "at a fortunate moment" because
"from the early 1840s Celtic scholars were in a fever of translation," with the Celtic
Archaelogical Society and the Ossianic Society "formed for the express purpose of
making texts available in Irish and English" (1964: 17). This made "it possible for
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Yeats to read his national literature" (1964: 17), and to thereby inherit and interrogate
Ireland's established resistance identity and discourse; to, again, 'think the nation'. As
Foster explains, under the influence of the "older Fenianjournalist returned from
exile" (1998:42) O'Leary, Yeats moved "tentatively" towards "more radical politics"
(1998:44) far removed from his Sligo upbringing. Not only did Yeats support Parnell
and Home Rule, but he approved of "the "extremist" (1998:43) and "separatist Fenian
tradition that stretched back to the romantic nationalism ofthe early nineteenth
century and the memory of the 1798 Rising" (1998:44). Fenian tradition "carried an
indefinable aura of romance, nobility and selfless commitment - once it seemed
safely dormant" (1998:42). Aligning himself with Fenianism, Yeats "could find a
place among people whose interests he shared and whose achievements he admired"
(1998:44). Importantly, with O'Leary's help, he enjoyed a ready outlet for his
nationalist poetry and reviews through Irish and Irish American publications. Thus the
course ofYeats's controversial and protean life, informed by an anti-colonial Irish
nationalism brought to bear on many of his roles and activities, was set according to
the historical, specifically colonial conditions of the Ireland of his times.
Putting Yeats's biographical details aside for the moment, what must be emphasized
is Said's comprehensive delineation of the effect of colonial rule on the Irish not only
in geographical and material terms but, crucially, at the level of identity. For instance,
the Ordnance Survey of Ireland ordered in 1824 and "carried out almost entirely by
English personnel," Said explains, was "to Anglicize the names, redraw the land
boundaries to permit valuation of property (and further expropriation of land in favour
of English and 'seignorial' families) and permanently subjugate the population"
(1993 :273). This had, as Said argues (quoting Hamer), "the 'immediate effect of
defining the Irish as incompetent'" and " ... 'depressing their national achievement'"
(1993 :273). As Hamer puts it, in "such a process" the "colonized is typically
(supposed to be) passive and spoken for, does not control its own representation but is
represented in accordance with a hegemonic impulse by which it is constructed as a
stable and unitary entity" (1993:273).
I wish to stress the correlation between this Irish context and Anderson's explication
of census-thinking, which I've argued in chapter one informs the imposition of
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seemingly stable and fixed 'colonial identity' in terms of the Manichaean binary. In
light of the modem Western bourgeois conception of identity as stable and secure, as
described earlier in this chapter, it must be added that this, too, informs and is
informed by the attitude of colonial rule as outlined in chapter one. Given the
modernist destabilization of stable, fixed identity described earlier in this chapter, it
should already be clear that this imposed conception of negative ~ish identity would
be challenged by the 'postcolonial' Yeats. This destabilization is a feature of the
'modernist' Yeats that will be further examined in the next chapter, as a feature of the
'postcolonial' Yeats.
Furthermore, as Said argues, from the ceding ofIreland by the Pope to England's
Henry II in the 1150s, an "amazingly persistent cultural attitude existed toward
Ireland as a place whose inhabitants were a barbarian and degenerate race"
(1993 :266). A "reductive" and "slanderous encapsulation of Irish actualities" would
be "the fate of the Irish at the hands of English writers for eight centuries," in which
the Irish would be defined and portrayed as "potato-eaters", "bog-dwellers" or
"shanty people" (1993 :286). The "idea of English racial superiority" was so long
"ingrained" that "so humane a poet and gentleman" as Edmund Spenser in 1596
proposed "that since the Irish were barbarian Scythians, most of them should be
exterminated" (1993 :268). The Irish identity henceforth imposed by "a whole
tradition of British and European thought" (1993 :284) was that "of a separate and
inferior race, usually umegenerately barbarian, often delinquent and primitive"
(1993 :285). I wish to emphasize that this colonial view of the "primitive" as fit only
for subjugation is diametrically opposed to the modernist (and the 'modernist'
Yeats's) view of the primitive as fit for emulation. It should therefore already be clear
that the attitude of the 'postcolonial' Yeats towards the 'primitive' Irish embraces the
latter, positive sense. This, as I will explain later in this chapter, has more to do with
Yeats's interest in the occult and the unconscious than the 'primitive' peasant as an
embodiment of pre-modern unselfconsciousness and traditional 'folkways'.
Said also underlines the "capacity" of colonialism - including in this Irish context -
for "separating the individual from his or her own instinctual life, breaking the
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generative lineaments of the national identity" (1993:286). Said quotes Fanon's
argument in The Wretched o/the Earth:
"On the unconscious plane, colonialism therefore did not
seek to be considered by the native as a gently loving mother
who protects her child from a hostile environment, but rather
as a mother who unceasingly restrains her fundamentally perverse
offspring from managing to commit suicide and from giving free
rein to its evil instincts. The colonial mother protects her child from
itself, from its ego, and from its physiology, its biology, and its own
unhappiness which is its very essence" (Fanon 2001: 161).
In light of Said's delineation of the comprehensive "banishing" of Irish identity
"except as a lower order of being" (1993:267) from English culture, I wish to stress
that the battlegrounds for resistance thus included the colonizer's view of the Irish as
primitive and racially inferior, as well as the accompanying view of the imperative for
rigorous and ruthless control and subjugation of the colonized - especially on the
apparently "delinquent", instinctive, "evil", fundamentally 'unruly' unconscious
plane. Control of the "unconscious plane" is therefore vital to colonial rule and, I wish
to underline, therefore necessarily vital to the programme of decolonization. In the
Irish context, the "unconscious plane" was clearly a contested site: crucial to the
conception of identity subscribed to by the colonizer and therefore, as I will
demonstrate in the next chapter, also crucial to Yeats's revolutionary conception of an
Irish national identity created seemingly outside of the colonizer's Manichaean
binary.
Overall, Said's examination and construction of Yeats as a 'postcolonial' figure is
organised in terms of what he calls the "two distinct political moments" within the
nationalist revival "in Ireland as elsewhere" (1993 :270). The first, he explains, is the
"pronounced awareness of European and Western culture as imperialism" (1993:270).
This is "a reflexive moment of consciousness" (1993 :270) to which belongs the
literature of "anti-imperialist resistance" (1993 :271). Said argues that the "primacy of
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the geographical element" is the foremost feature that "radically distinguishes the
imagination of anti-imperialism," owing to imperialism being "an act of geographical
violence through which virtually every space in the world is explored, charted, and
finally brought under control (1993:271). The native's "colonial servitude" begins
with the "loss of locality to the outsider" (1993 :271), with a resultant alienation of the
colonized "from their authentic traditions, ways of life, and political organisations"
(1993 :272). Thus anti-imperialist resistance involves the searching for and restoration
of "geographical identity" which, because of the daunting cultural and military
presence of the "colonizing outsider," can attach to a land "recoverable at first only
through the imagination" (1993:271). Again, I wish to higWight the importance of the
imagination to the 'modernist' Yeats as the "antennae of the race" and
"unacknowledged legislator" for mankind, but at the same time foreground this
primacy of the imagination for Yeats as a national "poet of decolonization" who sees
himself as thereby shaping the sensibility of his "imagined community".
Into this category of'geographical imagining' Said places Yeats as an exemplary
figure, citing in particular Yeats's "cartographic" (1993:272) impulse to, as part of
"the culture of resistance," imaginatively "reclaim, rename and reinhabit the land"
(1993:273). Yeats's early collection of poems The Rose (1893), Said argues, is
indicative of Yeats's attempt, because the "space at home in the peripheries has been
usurped and put to use by outsiders for their purpose," to "seek out, to map, to invent,
or to discover a third nature" (1993 :272). This third nature is not "pristine and pre-
historical ('Romantic Ireland's dead and gone', says Yeats)" but one that derives
"from the deprivations of the present" (1993 :272). Thus Yeats's "anti-imperialist
imagination" (1993 :272), Said argues, creates a "sense of the land reappropriated by
its people" and makes possible the "search for authenticity, for a more congenial
national origin than that provided by colonial history, for a new pantheon of heroes
and (occasionally) heroines, myths, and religions" (1993:273).
Said explains that "dominating" the Irish nationalist "movement" for "at least the last
two hundred years" was "the attempt to control the land" (1993 :285). He argues that
Yeats "cannot be severed" from the "quest" to fulfil "the words of the 1916
proclamation that founded the Irish Republic": that the "right of the people of Ireland
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to the ownership of Ireland, and to the unfettered control of Irish destinies" is to be
"sovereign and indefeasible" (1993:285). Quoting Flanagan, Said argues that Yeats
"contributed.... in Irish terms, and of course in a singularly powerful and compelling
manner, that process of simultaneous abstraction and reification that, defiant of logic,
is the heart of nationalism" (1993:285). Yeats's influence on the "movement," Said
highlights, was marked, for "to this work several generations of lesser writers also
contributed, articulating the expression of Irish identity as it attaches to the land, to its
Celtic origins, to a growing body of nationalist experiences and leaders (Wolfe Tone,
Connolly, Mitchell, Isaac Butt, O'Connell, the United Irishmen, the Home Rule
movement, and so on), and to a specifically national literature" (1993:285).
Said is of course describing mostly, to use Eliot's description, the "Yeats of the Celtic
Twilight": the young poet who not only dreams to "arise and go now" (Collected
Poems 1971 :44) to Innisfree and who sets about imaginatively mapping the Sligo and
Irish landscape, complete with Irish place-names (as in "The Fiddler of Dooney"), but
who, under 0' Leary's Fenian influence, consciously draws "heavily on the myths
and beliefs of ancient Ireland" (Foster 2001: 10) in his poetry (as in "The Wanderings
of Oisin") and plays. This is also the poet who argues for an Irish national literature
that "must not fall a prey to mere shibboleths, to ... the Shamrock and the Pepperpot"
(Ellmann 1960:107), and takes "seriously his role" as "a folklorist" (Castle 2001:53)
in displacing colonial stereotyping of the Irish as "potato-eaters", "bog-dwellers" or
"shanty people". Yeats's folklorist role is, I have indicated, reflective ofthe
modernists' "primitivism" outlined earlier. As I will demonstrate in the next chapter,
these 'modernist' and 'decolonizing' concerns merge - and the emphasis moves from
external landscape or Nature to internal, psychological Nature (the unconscious) - in
driving Yeats's conception ofIrish national identity and the method of its
(self)construction.
Suggesting the limitations of what he calls this "nativism" (i.e. the emphasis on
geography and traditional culture) as a response to the "first moment" or "awareness
of "Western culture as imperialism," Said argues that nativism "alas, reinforces the
distinction" between colonizer and colonized "even while revaluating the weaker or
subservient partner" (1993:275). It has led, he argues, to "compelling but demagogic
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assertions about a native past, narrative or actuality" that "stands free from worldly
time itself' (1993:275). Including at the level of identity, Said suggests, to "accept
nativism is to accept the consequences of imperialism, the racial, religious and
political divisions imposed by imperialism itself' (1993 :276). In addition, to "leave
the historical world," Said warns, for "the metaphysics of essences like negritude,
Irishness, Islam, or Catholicism is to abandon history for essentializations" that have
"the power to turn human beings against each other" (1993 :276). Therefore the
progression (including, Said suggests, Yeats's) from nationality to "nationalism" to
"nativism" is "more and more constraining" (1993 :277).
However, Said tempers his rejection of nativism, and his emphasis on the limitations
of what he sees as Yeats's nativism, by pointing out that "it is impossible to avoid the
combative, assertive early stages in the nativist identity" and that these "always
occur" (1993:277) in the colonies. Yeats's early poetry, Said argues, "is not only
about Ireland but about Irishness," and in Said's estimation Yeats shows "a good deal
of promise in getting beyond" these stages, in "not remaining trapped in the emotional
self-indulgence of celebrating one's own identity" (1993:277). Specifically, Said
identifies three positive aspects in regard to Yeats's "promise" at the level of identity:
firstly, "the possibility of discovering a world not constructed out of warring
essences"; secondly, "the possibility of a universalism that is not limited or coercive,
which believing that all people have only one single identity is - that all the Irish are
only Irish, Indians Indians, Africans Africans, and so on ad nauseum"; and thirdly,
and most importantly, the fact that "moving beyond nativism does not mean
abandoning nationality" but that it "does mean thinking of local identity as not
exhaustive, and therefore not being anxious to confine oneself to one's own sphere,
with its ceremonies of belonging, its built-in chauvinism, and its limiting sense of
security" (1993:277). As I shall demonstrate in the next chapter, Yeats's Doctrine of
the Mask - as his method for consciously creating Irish national identity anew in a
'free' rather than 'enforced' manner - is in fact the fulfilment of this "promise" in
each of these three aspects.
Of particular significance in Said's delineation ofnativism, in which he also pinpoints
the "almost magically inspired, quasi-alchemical redevelopment of the native
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language" (1993 :273), is his comment that Yeats is an "especially interesting"
exponent of nativism. Yeats, Said explains, expresses - in common with "Caribbean
and some African writers" - the '''predicament of sharing a language with the colonial
overlord," and "belongs in many important ways to the Protestant Ascendancy, whose
Irish loyalties were confused, to put it mildly, ifnot in his case quite contradictory"
(1993 :274). As Foster argues, Yeats's "relationship to Irish Protestantism is central to
his life" (2001 :121), and that Said chooses not to explore and interrogate this aspect
of Yeats in any depth is perhaps symptomatic of the fact that, as Foster also points
out, Yeats's Protestantism is "oddly little looked at by scholars" (2001:121).
However, it is a facet that cannot be ignored in examining Yeats's conception ofIrish
national identity, complicating as it does (but, as I shall argue, not undoing) Said's
overall construction of the 'postcolonial' Yeats.
Said argues that "the overlapping" Yeats "knew existed of his Irish nationalism with
the English cultural heritage," which "both dominated and empowered him," was
"bound to cause tension" (1993 :274). He speculates that "the pressure of this urgently
political and secular tension" prompted Yeats "to try to resolve it on a 'higher', that
is, non-political level" (1993:274). He therefore argues that there is "a fairly logical
progression from Yeats's early Gaelicism, with its Celtic preoccupations and themes,
to his later systematic mythologies as set down in the programmatic poems like 'Ego
Dominus Tuus' and in the treatise A Vision" (1993:274). He argues that the "deeply
eccentric and aestheticized histories" that Yeats "produced in A Vision and the later
quasi-religious poems elevate the tension to an extra-worldly level, as ifIreland were
best taken over, so to speak, at a level above that of the ground" (1993:274).
By reference to Deane, Said adds that "Yeats's return to mysticism and his recourse to
fascism ... underline the colonial predicament" of a "culture indebted to the mother
country for its own self and for a sense of 'Englishness' and yet turning towards the
colony" (1993:274/5). However, he adds (again by reference to Deane) that Yeats's
"wilful mysticism and incoherence" - far from "representing an outdated nationalism"
- "embody a revolutionary potential" in that Yeats insists that Ireland should "retain
its culture by keeping awake its consciousness of metaphysical questions" (1993 :275).
A partial melding of the 'modernist' and 'decolonizing' Yeatses occurs in Deane's
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argument: in "a world from which the harsh strains of capitalism have removed
thought and reflection," the poet who "can stimulate a sense ofthe eternal and of
death into consciousness is the true rebel," a "figure whose colonial diminishments
spur him to a negative apprehension of his society and of 'civilized' modernity"
(1993 :275). Said, however, suggests that this "rather Adorno-esque" formulation of
Yeats" renders "Yeats more heroic than a crudely political reading would have
suggested," and he states that Yeats's "outright fascism, his fantasies of old homes
and families, his incoherently occult divagations" (1993 :275) should not be excused.
As a "small corrective," Said argues, "we might more accurately see Yeats as an
exacerbated example of the nativist phenomenon" which "flourished elsewhere (e.g.
negritude) as a result of the colonial encounter" (1993:275).
In light of Said's claim that Yeats' s nativism is in itself inadequate as a response to
colonial rule, it is necessary for me to address and state clearly my own position with
regard to two major components crucial to the study of Yeats, in terms of my focus on
Yeats's conception of Irish national identity. These components are (1) Yeats' s
Anglo-Irish, Protestant Ascendancy background, which illuminates what Said calls
Yeats's "unacceptable and indigestible reactionary politics," his so-called "outright
fascism" and "fantasies of old homes and families"; and in particular (2) Yeats' s
"incoherently occult" or magical "divagations" which, deemed inexcusable by Said,
are evidently relegated by him to an "otherworldly" realm of non-political
strangeness. Said in effect dismisses Yeats's occult preoccupations as a kind of what
Larissy terms "hocus-pocus" (1997:xxiv); as bizarre writings encompassing "the
eternal" and "death" and operating "at a level above that of the ground," i.e. detached
from everyday 'reality'. Yeats's concern with the occult and magic, Said suggests, is
indicative of a nativist "abandonment of the secular world" and resultant degeneration
into "small-scale private craziness... encouraged by imperialism" - "hardly what
great resistance movements had imagined as their goals" (1993:276), he quips.
Firstly, while blow-by-blow historical, biographical, and literary analyses of Yeats's
specific relationship to Protestantism (both in terms of Christianity and Irish minority
cultural identity) as well as to Catholicism over his long lifetime is the most likely
means of doing this complex subject any justice, and while (as Kiberd points out)
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there is "not a single full-length book yet written on the Protestant elements in the art"
(1996:421) of writers like Shaw, O'Casey, Beckett, Synge and Yeats, a firm position
on Yeats's relationship to Protestantism can and must, nonetheless, with some
confidence be taken insofar as it relates to his conception of Irish national identity. A
firm and defensible position is, I submit, possible and highly plausible, particularly in
light of the comprehensive biographical and historical details provided by literary
historian Foster and a number of insightful essays by historico-literary critic Kiberd.
As I will proceed to demonstrate, my position means reconceiving Said's comments
about Yeats in a way that effectively bolsters, rather than undermines, his overall
construction of Yeats as a 'postcolonial' figure.
While Said largely sidesteps the issue, it must be registered that Yeats was from very
"early" and with great "vehemence... assailed by literary and political enemies" who
"were prepared to impeach him on the grounds of Protestant Ascendancy
background" as well as "moral and political unsoundness" (Foster 2001:47). Said
himself, as I shall continue to underline in this chapter, praises Yeats for being a "poet
of decolonization" yet throughout his essay repeatedly takes Yeats to task for "moral
and political unsoundness" and occult "craziness". The general impeachment of Yeats
by his enemies in the Irish colonial context of his times, as Foster points out, is
usually linked to Yeats's Senate speeches, and in particular Yeats's 1925 "polemic
against building Catholic moral teaching into the fabric of Irish law regarding
divorce" (2001:47). Foster's overview of the disparate and at times amusing stances
taken on Yeats by his obituarists is especially enlightening in this regard.
Complicating assent to Said's claim that Yeats as Ireland's national poet "articulates
the experiences, the aspirations, and the restorative vision of a people," Foster shows
that the "thorny question" dominating "many ofthe post-mortem evaluations" was
"how Irish was Yeats?" (2001:81). Foster explains that the "validity of Yeats' s
credentials as the voice of his fellow countrymen" had "for long been a matter of
debate" (2001 :86) before his death in 1939, with public expression of doubt and even
negation of his 'national poet' credentials dating back at least 35 years before his
death. In particular, the Catholic press "vituperatively disputed" Yeats's "claims to
Irishness" for at least "fifteen years before his death" as well as in articles after his
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death, arguing that "the greatest Irish poet was not, in point of fact, Irish at all" and
"had no right to speak for Ireland" (2001 :87). For the Catholic press, Yeats's death
"declared open season on the enemy culture" (2001:86).
The reasons cited for disqualifying Yeats from "claims to nationality" (2001 :86)
intersect with, and show the insufficiency of, both objective and subjective criteria for
belonging to a 'nation' examined in chapter one. These grounds for disqualification in
Yeats's case included: "the un-Irish sound of ,Pollexfen'" (2001:87) on his mother's
side ofthe family, and his belonging "by birth to the Protestant Anglo-Irish" (blood,
racial, religious, historical and cultural ties); his "'aping an aristocratic attitude'"
(2001 :89); his campaign against divorce (religion); his "suspect" (2001 :86) residential
credentials owing to "frequent absences from Ireland" (2001 :88) while he travelled or
lived "outside Ireland" (2001 :86) for much of the year (geographical residence within
'national' borders); his drawing of a British government Royal Literary Fund pension
(state allegiance); the "non-Catholic nature" ofYeats's "mystical beliefs" (2001:87);
his English writing (language), including 'immoral' or 'indecent' poetry like '''the
foul Swan song"', i.e. "Leda and the Swan" (2001 :86); his being an ''' ... essentially
English writer'" (2001 :88) and his status as "the supreme man ofletters writing in
English" of his time (2001 :87); his "quarrel with the nation" (i.e. conventional Irish
Catholic nationalism) and "his quarrel with Christianity" (2001 :87); and his "long war
on sacred things" (2001:87) as "'the repudiator of the Gael'" (2001:89). To this long
list could be added Yeats being "on dining terms with Asquith and Balfour"
(2001 :60), having been offered a knighthood in 1915 (though he declined it), and
having been made (according to The Irish Times) a candidate for the English Poet
laureateship in 1930 (2001:85).
Of course, an opposite (fittingly Yeatsian) counter-movement occurs among
obituarists as well, with some hailing Yeats as "a champion of freedom" (2001:83)
and celebrating him "as an Irishman" (2001:91) who was "passionately Irish"
(2001 :85). In some cases, as Foster shows, Yeats was portrayed (much to the chagrin
ofthe Catholic Press) as being able to catch "the very mind of the simple Catholic
people" (2001 :91) in his early work, and as being - despite "the poet's hieratic,
snobbish, exotic affectations, not to mention his Protestant background and unionist
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family" - ultimately "more Irish than the Irish themselves" (2001 :93). However, this
stressing of Yeats's Irishness was also tantamount to reclaiming Yeats "from the
'English' identification" (2001 :84) and annexing of Yeats "for their own" (2001 :88)
by English obituarists, and a Catholic Press "all too ready to cede ownership on
Ireland's behalf' (2001 :88). Foster explains that Lord Dunsany likened Yeats's "loss"
to "that of Kipling, Barrie and Housman" (2001: 85). Against this backdrop, the "Irish
critics of the next generation" would contest "the claims of English obituarists to
appropriate Yeats's death as a loss to 'English literature'" (2001 :86).
All of this is to illustrate not only Yeats's contested Irishness but also the deep
"political and secular tension" that Said identifies, as something more than the
"overlapping" ofYeats's own "Irish nationalism with the English cultural heritage"
(i.e. an internalised predicament). This tension was (implicit in Said's analysis) a very
real, external furnace of public or 'national' debate and vitriol about Yeats' s claims to
Irish identity. This was a furnace felt and often stoked by Yeats during his lifetime,
particularly given that the "Free State's ethos was inevitably Catholic" (Foster
2001:103) and its increasing, what Yeats called "grossly oppressive" (Larrisy
1997:450) marginalization of the Protestant minority. As Larissy describes it, Yeats
was "tempted to despair of the possibility of an independent Ireland and was repelled
by what he saw as the narrow philistinism and materialism of the Catholic middle
class" (1997:xxi) - and he did not hide his feelings from the Catholic establishment.
Indeed, as Yeats quipped during his "Debate on Divorce" speech in the Senate (1925),
after a comment by FitzGerald that "I think this is becoming very heated": "I mean it
to be heated... "(Larrissy 1997:449).
In addition, as Larissy explains, "a profound irony attends any estimate of Yeats" that
"sees him, with Edward Said, as a 'poet of decolonization'" (1997:xx). For not only is
Yeats "the author of the patriotic play Cathleen ni Houlihan" and member of the Irish
Republican Brotherhood, he is "also the boy whose first songs were Orange rhymes,
and whose dream was 'to die fighting the Fenians'; the poet who in the introductory
poem to Responsibilities (1914) "proudly recalls his forebears" (1997:xxi) who, in the
Williamite wars, "withstood... James and his Irish" (Collected Poems 1971: 113).
Such biographical details underline for Yeats's detractors the 'Anglo' in Yeats's
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Anglo-Irish Protestant background. This background, it must be stressed, also
complicates Said's description of Yeats as a nativist mobilising his geographical or
"cartograpic" impulse and imaginatively "reclaiming" the land from English
domination. Kiberd argues that a "familiar strategy of the Irish Protestant imagination,
estranged from the community, yet anxious to identify itself with the new national
sentiment" (1996: 107) was to identify with the land. To "Protestant artists" Irish
history "could only be, as Lady Gregory insisted, a painful accusation against their
own people" and "so they turned to geography in the attempt at patriotization"
(1996:107). The emphasis on locality by Yeats, Synge and Gregory was, Kiberd
argues, a deliberate "aligning" ofthemselves with "the Gaelic bardic tradition of dinn-
sheanchas (knowledge of the lore of places)," but "there was undeniably something
strained about their manoeuvre" (1996: 107) precisely because of their Anglo-Irish
background.
One could cite other examples taken by Yeats' s detractors to underline the' Anglo'
aspect of his background, but the point I wish to convey is the deep (Irish Catholic)
suspicion and paranoia that attaches to Yeats's Anglo-Irish Protestant background and
which has fuelled debate surrounding his sincerity and legitimacy as Ireland's
national poet. In doing so, I hope to have illustrated that as an Anglo-Irish Protestant
Yeats was "born astride many of the borders which separate Irish people" (Foster
2001 :99) and that, given this historical context, his claims to Irishness and the right to
shape an Irish national identity that accommodated him were from the start severely
compromised. Against this backdrop, it therefore comes as no surprise that in the
"long-running debate about the un-Irishness of Yeats" the Catholic Bulletin
interpreted Yeats's famous 'we' remark in his lecture "The Child and the State"
(1925), that "'Ireland has been put into our hands that we may shape it,'" as a
"Protestant claim on behalf of a 'New Ascendancy'" to "' ... control Irish interests'"
(2001 :87). The Catholic will within Ireland to exclude Yeats from Irishness, I
contend, must be duly registered in the consideration of his conception of Irish
national identity.
It is Yeats's Anglo-Irish Protestant roots, then, that illuminate Said's analysis of his
internal conflict comprising "cultural dependence and antagonism together," and in
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particular Said's identification of an "urgently political and secular tension" informing
and informed by Yeats's predicament of "sharing a language with the colonial
overlord." While the majority ofIreland's inhabitants, like Yeats, could not speak
Gaelic or the later curricularised Irish, and spoke only English, it is the'Anglo'
element in Yeats's background that (under pressure from his detractors) problematizes
his 'Irishness' as well as his use and love ofthe English language and literature as an
'Irish' poet. This tension, indicative of "the colonial predicament" of "a culture
indebted to the mother country for its own self and for a sense of 'Englishness' and
yet turning towards the colony," is best expressed by Yeats himself (with a note of
sexism) in "A General Introduction for my Work", significantly "left behind" for
"posthumous publication" (Foster 2001 :94):
" ... no people hate as we do in whom [the] past is always
alive. There are moments when hatred poisons my life and
I accuse myself of effeminacy because I have not given it
adequate expression... Then I remind myself that though
mine is the first English marriage I know of in the direct line,
all my family names are English; that I owe my soul to
Shakespeare, to Spenser, to Blake, perhaps to William Morris,
and to the English language in which I think, speak and write;
that everything I love has come to me through English. My
hatred tortures me with love, my love with hate." (Foster 2001 :94)
Foster explains that "the Celtic Revival became the Gaelic Revival" which was
"rapidly politicized" (2001 :99) along with the revival of the Gaelic language,
increasingly aligned with Catholicism in defining 'Irishness'. In 1908, Father Peadar
o Laoghaire, "a great influence in the Gaelic League," argued that "speaking English
was incompatible with faith and patriotism" and use of English "sapped 'the very
fibres of mental and moral nature'" (2001 :99). It meant "only a more complete
obliteration of the historic faith and patriotism of Ireland" (2001 :99). Writing in
English, he argued, "could not be patriotic" (2001: 100). This complemented
Corkery's suspicion that a "colonial ethos" marked Irish writers "writing to be read in
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England, 'with the insolence of Ascendancy-minded literature,' instead of 'belonging'
to the Irish world" (2001: 101). The Irish colonial context, then, provides an example
of an aspect of the nativism criticised by Said: the "almost magically inspired, quasi-
alchemical redevelopment of the native language" (1993:273).
However, it was "exactly" this pro-Irish Catholic, anti-English 'nativist' conception of
national identity - wherein use of the Gaelic and/or curricularised Irish language, and
its prioritisation over the English language, were deemed objective criteria of national
belonging - that "the nationalist Yeats wanted to prove untrue" (Foster 2001:99). As
Foster argues, Yeats decided "that the borders of acceptable nationalist expression
needed to be redrawn" (2001 :100). However, while Yeats, in his Senate speech on the
Irish language (1923), protests against "the histrionics which have crept into the
Gaelic movement," and especially against those people who "pretend to know a thing
that they do not know and which they have not the smallest intention of ever
learning," he nonetheless states that "I wish to see the country Irish speaking"
(Larissy 1997:448). From the 'love-hate' quote above, we can ascertain the deep and
torturing conflict or "tension" within Yeats around this issue that lasted till the end of
his life.
Yeats's Anglo-Irish Protestant background also illuminates the continuing
controversy over his "primitivism", and to that degree what Said calls his "nativism",
particularly regarding Yeats's treatment of the Irish 'peasant' in his work. Of course,
as my earlier outlining of the construction ofthe 'modernist' Yeats shows, Yeats is
"not the only modernist to draw on a primitivist discourse" (Castle 2001 :46). TS
Eliot, several decades after Yeats, and with his emphasis on the verbum infans, is a
case in point. Furthermore, the "fashionable", "modish" popularity of the "Irish
peasant" trope during Yeats's lifetime is reflected, for instance, in Kavanagh' s being
"welcomed and patronized" at the outset of his career in the 1930s "as a peasant poet"
(Quinn 2004:xiv). However, Yeats's emphasis on the local and 'primitive' underlines
for contemporary critics (and his detractors) his own "historical 'placing'" (Foster
2001:121) as an Anglo-Irishman writing in the English language "with one eye
cocked on the English audience" (Kiberd 1996: 115). As Castle puts it, Yeats's
"ambivalent social status as an Anglo-Irishman in colonial Ireland" and his
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"involvement in the cultural nationalism of the Revival" meant that "his relationship
to the primitive was far more complicated than it was for a metropolitan modernist
like Eliot" (2001:46). Again, Yeats's Anglo-Irish Protestant background
problematizes his status as Ireland's national poet and his claims to Irish identity,
raising questions about his 'right to represent' his countrymen and right to contribute
to defining' Irishness' .
While Yeats's literary treatment of the Irish peasant is largely beyond the scope of
this thesis, in considering Said's portrayal of Yeats as a nativist and construction of
Yeats as Ireland's national "poet of decolonization" the controversy - circling always
back to Yeats's Anglo-Irish Protestant background - must be registered. In short,
there is a sentiment, expressed in various ways by critics like Kiberd, Howes and
Castle, that Yeats "may be said to hannonize with colonial thought" in his
"construction of an idealized peasant" (Castle 2001 :52). However, rather than
rebutting in depth the various arguments of these and other critics as to Yeats's
(unwitting or not) 'collusion' with imperialist and/or Ascendancy logic in his
treatment of the native culture, I wish rather to argue simply that these claims - in
considering Yeats in relation to Irish national identity - have not been adequately
weighed against his Doctrine of the Mask. Yeats's doctrine, upon the kind of close
examination undertaken in the next chapter, effectively consigns such arguments to a
limiting concentration on the "early" Celtic Twilight Yeats whom the "middle-age"
Yeats (to use Eliot's qualified distinction) in many ways - as a modernist, advanced
nationalist and occultist - subsumes and supersedes. Hence my constant emphasis in
this chapter on the "middle age" Yeats and therefore on dates from 1914, but more
particularly from" 1919 on," in order to foreground the modernist Yeats but also, as I
shall explain later in this chapter, the importance ofthis period in tenns of Yeats's
nationalist and occult views as they relate to his conception ofIrish national identity.
In short, two broad points must be emphasized in regard to Yeats's treatment of the
Irish peasant, relating as they do to the concerns of this thesis. Firstly, Yeats's
rejection in the 1890s of the "editorial misrepresentations" (Castle 2001:55),
"rationalizations and stereotyping" of the Irish by the English and in the work of
Anglo-Irish compilers like T Crofton Croker and Samuel Lover who "created the
69
stage Irishman" (2001 :53) is well documented. However, more than this, as Foster
argues, Yeats "was very conscious of the need for Ireland to be modem in a fulfilling,
independent sense" (2001 :34). Yeats repeatedly warned against "the perils of
nostalgia" and stressed "the need to bring Ireland to the cutting edge of the European
and international experience" (2001:35). In essays and speeches in and after 1910,
notably the year that Yeats "first" uses the term 'mask' "prominently in verse"
(Ellmann 1960: 174), Yeats "attacked the idea of sanitized and idealized history, and
the creation of pious and backward-looking stereotypes of Irishness which created
'images for the affections'" (Foster 2001 :34/35). In "JM Synge and the Ireland of his
Time" (1910), for instance, Yeats denies that Irish history is "a parade of pasteboard
heroes" (Foster 1998:420) and suggests "the Soldier, the Orator, the Patriot, the Poet,
the Chieftain and above all the Peasant" are only images "for the affections"
(1998:419). In this "'grand refusal'" of "the 'theme-park' approach to Irish history,"
Foster argues, Yeats effectively repudiates "the Young Ireland canon of literature
which he had imbibed in the O'Leary circle" (2001:123).
Yeats is therefore acutely aware of the inadequacy ofthe 'peasant' as a representation
of Irishness - including those representations of the peasant by himself. Castle
speculates that the "controversy over Synge's Playboy ofthe Western World" may
have been "the point at which Yeats realized that he had failed to capture the
'essence' of Irish folk culture" (2001:88). Foster states that it was clear to Yeats by
the time of Synge's death in 1907 that "a culturally nationalist movement could not be
above politics in the way he had initially conceived - nor above sectarian politics,
when they reared their head" (2001: 122). Yeats, Castle argues, thereafter "redefined
the goals of a Revivalist project of cultural redemption" in terms of the modernist's
"reclamation of the artist's right to represent, which was, for Yeats, the right of
possession" (2001:88). By 1910, Foster explains, Yeats had "formally set up an
alternative set of artistic standards" and, in his essay on Synge, "formally posits the
writer's individual mission against the pressures of nationalist political conformity -
what Heaney (who has walked this ground) has called 'the quarrel between free
creative imagination and the constraints of religious, political and domestic
obligation'" (2001:122). What Foster calls Yeats's announcement of "the primacy of
the creative imagination - wherever it leads" (2001: 123) is therefore more than just a
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modernist stance as outlined earlier in this chapter, but an overtly nationalist one as
well that informs his "commitment to free speech and liberty of conscience"
(2001: 123) as Protestant values in opposing Catholic censorship and divorce
legislation in the Free State. Castle cites "The Fisherman" - dated 1919 - as a "quietly
programmatic instance of this right to represent, one that underscores the
inauthenticity of the representations that proceed from it" (2001 :88).
Yeats, Castle argues, "frankly admits the imaginary status of the peasant he had
celebrated in the 1890s" (2001 :88): he is "A man who does not exist! A man who is
but a dream," merely an emblem of "cold/And passionate" (Collected Poems
1971: 167) poetry. In this "repudiating" of "the Arnoldean rustic of redemptive
Celticism" (2001 :88), Castle argues, Yeats ratifies "the poet's artistic autonomy"
(2001 :89). This underscores not only "Yeats's awareness of his own role in creating
phantasmic constructions" (2001 :89) of a "wise and simple man" in "grey Connemara
cloth" (Collected Poems 1971:167) but also celebrates "the heroism of his attempt to
use such constructions in order to confront those who would oppose his desire"
(Castle 2001 :89) "To write for my own race/And the reality" - particularly that
"audience" he scorns: "The clever man who cries/The catch-cries of the clown/The
beating down of the wise/And great Art beaten down" (Collected Poems 1971: 166/7).
Clearly, in "The Fisherman", the modernist and Anglo-Irish Protestant Yeats stakes
his claim to both Irishness and the status of Irish national poet. Later in his essay, Said
claims Yeats's national "poetic calling", as presented in "The Fisherman", "develops"
like Neruda's "out of a pact made between people and poet" (1993:282). However, it
should be clear that it in fact arises in great measure from what Yeats sees as an
heroic defiance of those (Catholic Irish) who opposed his "right to represent" and
claim Irishness.
Foster furthermore points out that Yeats's memoirs about the 1890s (which he began
in 1916) repeatedly return to the theme of "the conflict between nationalist
propagandist politics and the imperatives of the creative artist," emphasizing that "the
artist's influence, while remaining independent, will play its own political part" by
"radicalizing the new Ireland" (2001 :67). This is an argument Yeats "would reiterate
again and again," including in his Nobel Prize speech in 1923 ("the year after Ireland
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achieved some kind of independence") in which he "cannily" related "the honour
bestowed upon himself' (2001 :67) to this fledgling national independence. Again, I
wish to stress that this time frame (after 1914 and particularly after 1919) coincides
with Yeats's emphatic emergence as a modernist outlined earlier in this chapter and,
as I shall proceed to explain, his emphatic (re-)emergence as an advanced nationalist
energized by a major resurgence in his occult activities.
Indeed, and secondly, coupled with this shift away from primitivism and nativism to a
modernist autonomy of the imagination is Yeats's deep and, from 1914, reinvigorated
preoccupation with the occult. Ellmann argues that Yeats sought through folklore "to
capture from the peasantry first, an insouciant spontaneity and second, a multitude of
images sanctioned by tradition" (1964:89). In doing so, Yeats's "pastoral impulse"
was "not naYve": he "did not think of folk art as the talented creation of an unta1ented
group of country bumpkins" but "as mainly the work of individual artists who had
escaped the infection of current intellectual and literary movements and of an
excessive self-consciousness like his own" (1964:89). Yeats therefore 'fits'
Sheppard's description of modernist intellectuals being attracted to "primitive" art and
"peasant culture" (Giles 1993 :31), feeling "rightly or wrongly" that "pre-modern or
non-Western cultures" have "not abstracted the logos from the rest of the personality
and co-exist with rather than seek to dominate external Nature" (1993:32). However,
Castle notes, there is after about 1897 "a shift" in Yeats's view ofIrish folklore
which, I contend, ultimately renders somewhat redundant critics' claims of Yeats
'harmonizing' with colonial or Ascendancy logic in his representations of the peasant.
Indeed, he argues that Yeats's shift is to "a greater interest in the nature of mystical
consciousness itself, rather than the folkways of those who possess it" (2001:76).
Castle explains that:'fairy-faith", for Yeats, depends "not so much upon ancient
traditions, oral and recorded, as upon recent and contemporary psychical experiences,
vouched for by many 'seers'" (2001:41). There arises in Yeats's thinking a "growing
conviction ... that a native Irish literature need not rest on anthropological
assumptions of racial or cultural difference" (2001 :41), assumptions indicative of the
'objective' criteria for 'nation' status discussed in chapter one. Castle adds that there
also arises in Yeats's thinking a "growing conviction" that "the lessons he had learned
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combating these assumptions would pennit him to create something newly original,
something 'wildly Irish', in competition with other notions ofIrishness" (2001 :78).
This "making new" or creation of "new originals" is, of course, not only the forte of
the modernist avant-garde but also in line with Irish bardic tradition in which the bard
"similarly fashioned and refashioned traditional materials in the creation of new
traditional texts" (2001:68).
Feelings "of social and political displacement" which "Yeats once thought he could
overcome in a unity with the peasant mediated by a redemptive ethnographic
imagination" therefore give way "to an emancipatory self-fashioning" (2001 :83). In
"Swedenborg, Mediums and the Desolate Places" (1914), Yeats explicitly "reconciles
his folkloric work with Lady Gregory with his burgeoning interest in occultism," and
portrays the "Swedenborgian vision of heaven" as "identical to the peasant vision of
fairlyland" (2001:86). Yeats is therefore by this time clearly "no longer the Revivalist
ethnographer seeking to evoke and thereby redeem the tangible folkways of the
peasantry" (2001 :86). His emphasis is, rather, on 'emancipatory self-fashioning',
infonned by his preoccupation with the imagination and the unconscious as means to
invoking "the occult power of artistic inspiration" (Foster 1998:30). This new
emphasis on self-fashioning in tenns of "personality", I contend, culminates in
Yeats's Doctrine of the Mask and its incorporation into the System ofA Vision. As I
will demonstrate in the next chapter, Yeats's doctrine and System represent a
conscious attempt by Yeats "to bypass the political dimensions" (Castle 2001 :84) of
Catholic and Protestant investments in their seemingly irreconcilable cultural
identities within Ireland in order to allow for the creation of an inclusive, unified, non-
essentialist Irish national identity free of colonial Othering and therefore
'postcolonial' .
In light of these two factors, Said's claim that "political and secular tension" arising
from the "overlapping" of Yeats' s "Irish nationalism with the English cultural
heritage" prompted Yeats to "try to resolve it on a 'higher' ... non-political level"
(1993:274) requires reconceiving. I have so far attempted to illustrate the extent not
only of English Othering of the Irish (individually and collectively) as a stable,
unified and 'inferior' entity at the level of identity, but that the 'Irish identity'
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problem for Yeats was furthermore two-fold. Firstly, as Said highlights, a personal,
inner conflict as to how to 'resolve' or circumvent the externally imposed, what
Larissy calls "hyphenated condition of being Anglo-Irish" (1997:xxi), with the
"tension" of that inherited identity brought on by all the negative historical
associations of the Anglo (read England and Protestant Ascendancy) side in the eyes
of the Catholic majority, in order to claim Irishness. And secondly, to address the
external correlative of that inner tension, to find a way for the minority Protestant
(Anglo-Irish) and majority Catholic (Gaelic Irish) cultures within Ireland to "resolve"
or bypass their conflicting, divisive investments in rigidly separate cultural identities
in favour of an over-arching, inclusive Irish national identity that did not require the
relinquishing of those separate identities. In all three cases, the "tension" rests on the
problem or challenge of how to circumvent externally imposed, inherited or passively
received, seemingly stable and fixed identities - i.e. 'Irish' Othered by 'English'; and
'Catholic Irish' and 'Protestant Anglo-Irish' as Othered by each other - and formulate
Irish identity anew in an inclusive rather than exclusionary manner.
Each case, it should be clear, owes its historical existence to the colonial encounter in
the first instance, relies on being perceived as a stable, fixed entity, and presents in
itself and collectively an obstacle to the creation of a 'postcolonial' Irish identity and
forging of Irish national unity. Length constraints prevent my citing the many
instances ofYeats's "war" or vociferous "quarrels" (whether as poet, nationalist-
literary committee-man or through his work in the Abbey Theatre) with his
countrymen and women (including his Muse, Maud Gonne) in his attempts to widen
what he saw as a narrow, exclusionary and therefore limiting Catholic, bourgeois
conception of national identity. However, as Foster states, a development in Yeats's
"protean life" that remained "constant" throughout these quarrels was "his distancing
from the conventional nationalist pieties of the day" and "his belief that these political
beliefs were too closely interwoven with the Catholic establishment to accommodate
either artistic or political freedom" (Foster 2001:47).
It must, however, quickly be added that there are also a number of instances in which
similarly narrow Protestant pieties and bigotry (also stemming from the notion of
identity as stable and fixed) were targeted by Yeats. As Foster puts it, Yeats' s
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memoirs, written in 1921, about the 1890s return "to the idea that extreme-nationalist
abstractions were like the fixed ideas of hysterical people, turning the mind to stone"
while Protestant or "unionist prejudices" were "their mirror image" (2001 :77). It is
Yeats's sustained excoriation of both Catholic and Protestant pieties at various stages
throughout his lifetime that accounts for Castle's admission, in his analysis of On the
Boiler, that "discussing Yeats's cultural politics" often forces one to "conclude with
the rhetorical equivalent of an exasperated shrug" (2001 :95). It also accounts for
Castle's conclusion that Yeats's primitivism, which informed Yeats's interest in
eugenics in the 1930s, "not only remained a powerful determinate of his work, but in
the end frustrated any clear message that we might take from it" (2001 :97).
With these instances of excoriation well documented by critics, it suffices to state my
position thus: that while Said speculates that Yeats, in A Vision, attempts to resolve
the "urgently political and secular tension" of his Anglo-Irishness on a "higher",
"non-political" level, Yeats is by no means divorcing himself from
"uncompromising" political "actuality" (Foster 1998:476) but is in fact confronting it
at the level of national identity. Indeed, while Said suggests that the "deeply eccentric
and aestheticized histories" Yeats produced in A Vision "elevate the tension to an
extra-worldly level, as if Ireland were best taken over... at a level above that of the
ground," I contend that Yeats's A Vision (informed by Per Arnica Silentia Lunae) is in
fact very much this-worldly and political in nature. I hold that what Said considers
"incoherently occult divagations" in works like Per Arnica Si/entia Lunae and A
Vision in fact directly address this "tension", demonstrating Yeats's conviction that
Ireland is best "taken over" on the ground by first taking it over "at a level above that
of the ground" in a way not fully appreciated by Said, i.e. in the mind, at the
psychological or psycho-pathological level of identity. As Kiberd puts it, for Yeats the
"project of inventing a unitary Ireland is the attempt at achieving at a political level a
reconciliation of opposed qualities which must first be fused in the self' (1996: 124).
Put another way, for Yeats "personal liberation must precede national recovery" or
political independence, "being in fact its very condition" (1996: 124).
Kiberd points out that there was "nothing triumphalist about the cultural
Protestantism" (1996:423) of writers like Yeats, who not only wanted Irish self-rule in
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Ireland but who "wished for a fusion of two traditions, not just Gaelic with Anglo-
Irish, but Catholic with Protestant as well" (1996:424) in order "to 'bring the two
halves together'" (1996:425) within Ireland. Yeats' s nationalist project was therefore,
in short, "to Catholicize the all-too-Protestant Ireland of his youth, and then to
Protestantize the all-too-Catholic Ireland of his age" (1996:451). In this process or
long "war", Yeats consistently "sided with the underdog" throughout his lifetime, first
with "the Catholic peasantry in an English-occupied Ireland" and later "with the
minority in a new state already enacting legislation to outlaw" Protestant "liberties of
the individual conscience" (1996:450/51).
Kiberd argues that the "thesis of the Catholicized Protestant and the Protestantized
Catholic had been implicit in the Irish Revival from the onset" (1996:425). Yeats' s
father, Kiberd explains, had taught impartially "that the Catholic Church was 'good
for the heart but bad for the brain,' adding that 'had the Irish been Protestants they
would long ago have thrown offthe English tyranny'" (1996:425). This, Kiberd adds,
"fully anticipated Shaw's statement that a true Protestant was ipso facto an Irish
Republican" and his argument "that without strong doses of Protestant self-reliance,
the Irish Catholic mind would never free itself of imperial occupation" (1996:425).
For Shaw, "the unquestioning obedience given by Catholics to a priest whom they
called 'father' (rather than 'brother') merely fostered in them a submissiveness which
had proved invaluable to the English too" (1996:426). This, Kiberd explains, "did not
mean that John Butler Yeats or George Bernard Shaw despised Catholicism: they
simply felt that a fusion of both traditions would produce a new Ireland greater than
the sum of its parts" (1996:425). In this way, Kiberd argues, "Every honest Catholic
could henceforth become his or her own priest; and, equally, all Protestants should be
able to confess their sins, once in a while, not just to their God but to someone else"
(1996:425).
The link, generally, between colonial rule and "the Christian religion" (2001 :32) is
identified by Fanon, whose insights illuminate this conciliatory 'Protestant'
perspective. What he describes as "the inevitable religion", he argues, helps in
"calming down the natives" (2001 :52) in the colony. As he puts it, all "those saints
who have turned the other cheek, who have forgiven trespasses against them, and who
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have been spat on and insulted without shrinking are studied and held up as
examples" (2001 :52). At the same time, the Church calls the colonized not "to God's
ways" but to "the ways of. .. the master, ofthe oppressor," condemning the
colonized's "embryonic heresies and instincts" and its "evil as yet unborn" (2001 :32).
The colonized's "traditions and myths" become "the very sign of that poverty of spirit
and of their constitutional depravity" (2001:32). These insights also illuminate
Kiberd's observation of how "hugely ironical" it was "that while Protestants like
Hyde, Lady Gregory and Yeats went about collecting legends of healing wells and
peasant miracles, the Catholic clergy was resolutely attempting to extirpate these
beliefs, or at least, to subordinate them to a more rationalized theology" (1996:425).
In regard to Yeats specifically, as Foster explains, in the 1880s and early 1890s he
was in his Fenian youth "in the process of repudiating his background and discovering
an Ireland outside unionist Sligo or Ascendancy-clerical Dublin," and wrote "as
searingly about Irish Catholic sensibilities" as he would "about Protestant pieties"
(2001: 116). While in later life Yeats' s attitude to Trinity representatives was
"moderated", Foster explains, the "Protestant world in toto remained under his
anathema" (2001: 116). However, the idea that "echt-Irishness necessitated cradle-
Catholicism" was "in line" with Yeats's "own thinking in the 1880s and 1890s" - "all
the more striking", Foster notes, because "in later life he repudiated this belief so
completely" (2001: 118). Foster remarks that "as the years went by" Yeats discovered
that "your background, what has made you, survives repudiation and can return to
claim you in strange ways in the end" (2001: 116). He is of course referring to Yeats's
Senate speech on divorce, in which Yeats consciously "elected to place himself in the
tradition of very different Irish writers in English: Berkeley, Swift, Burke, exactly
those Anglo-Irish sages whose claims to Irishness he had dismissed in his youth"
(2001:125).
However, I submit that while Foster argues that Yeats' s background returned "to
claim" him, it is equally justifiable to suggest that Yeats in fact with conscious and
dramatic intention claimed his background in order to forcefully argue for a more
inclusive version of Irish national identity. Importantly, as Gregory points out, Yeats
"did not consider himself any less of an Irishman for his Protestant background"
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(2000:12). And as Foster himself points out, in Yeats's speeches during the Home
Rule crisis (1912-14) he repeatedly "attacked the intolerance apparently inseparable
from Irish life" and "compared Catholic and Protestant bigotry to 'two old boots'
bobbing around the stagnant pond ofIrish politics" (2001:125). Foster cites one
particular instance, at a debate in 1914 to commemorate Davis's centenary, where
Yeats, in "a masterly exhibition of balance-holding," also "gently chided Provost
Mahaffy for failing to follow Davis's example of tolerance towards his antagonists"
and "condemned Davis's ally John Mitchell for preaching hatred of England instead
of love of Ireland" (2001 :123).
This was the kind of hatred Yeats associated with the "ascendant" Catholic
nationalism "pioneered by Griffith" (2001 :123) within Ireland. As Yeats put it:
"Hatred of England soon became hatred of their own countrymen as when they had
learned to hate one man, perhaps for a good reason, they hated probably twenty men
for bad reasons" (Foster 1998:524). I contend that Yeats, as I will demonstrate in the
next chapter, in Per Arnica Silentia Lunae and A Vision advocates the creation of Irish
national identity in a manner free of hatred for England, thereby avoiding the
replication of the colonizer's Manichaean opposition at the level of identity. He also
attempts to defuse Catholic and Protestant intolerance and bigotry through the
bypassing of these seemingly stable and fixed identities by subscription to an over-
arching and inclusive Irish national identity. He also consciously and deliberately
constructs himself as 'Anglo-Irish' not by passively received heritage but anew by
active choice - indicating that one need not give up one's cultural identity in
assuming an inclusive national identity. Yeats demonstrates that Irish national identity
"need not rest on... assumptions of racial or cultural difference" (Castle 2001:78). His
choosing and construction of himself as (Anglo-)Irish in A Vision, which informs his
poetry, writings, and Senate speeches, may instructively suggest his adoption of a
public, specifically Protestant 'Mask' in staking the minority Protestant claim to Irish
identity against the majority Catholic will to marginalize and exclude the Protestant
minority from a narrowly Catholic definition of 'Irishness'.
I wish also to stress that, far from pursuing ulterior Ascendancy, anti-Catholic
interests, Yeats's adoption of his cultural identity and "mission to Protestantize Irish
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culture" came at a time when "Catholic triumphalists were seeking to make the
independent Irish state an instrument of their theology" (Kiberd 1996:439). This
theology resulted in what Yeats in his Debate on Divorce speech in the Senate (1925)
called intolerant and "exceedingly oppressive legislation" imposed on the Protestant
minority "to deprive it of rights which it has held since the 17th century" (Larrisy
1997:449). More specifically, as Kiberd argues, the general Protestant "mission" was
"only achieved to a significant degree after its sponsors had effectively conceded
defeat in the political sphere" (1996:439) - a point that emphasizes Yeats's
assumption of a pugnacious oppositional role in politics as a counterbalancing
measure against the limitation of 'intellectual freedom' by the Catholic establishment.
It also emphasizes the extent to which Catholic paranoia about Yeats's'Ascendancy
ambitions' exaggerated his 'Anglo' dimension and overshadowed the fact that Yeats
was in fact as an Irishman "deeply committed" to the "new national state" (Foster
2001:103).
As Foster points out, Yeats's "youth spanned the exact period of crisis which
inaugurated the decline ofthe Irish Protestant Ascendancy" (1998:xxix) and, as Butler
argues, Yeats was in the Senate "an isolated figure" and "even in Ireland the range of
his influence was very small" (Foster 2001: 195). What Said calls Yeats's
"unacceptable and indigestible reactionary politics" must therefore be reconceived in
terms of the role (however detested by Yeats's detractors) of "the opposition" in a
democracy, and Yeats more correctly seen as a contrarian or minority "opposition"
figure whose marginalization contributed to what Orwell, in his essay "WB Yeats",
refers to as Yeats's famed "hatred of democracy" (Orwell 1943). Said claims Yeats's
"later reactionary politics" not only "belied" but "even cancelled out" his
"adumbrating the liberationist and Utopian revolutionism in his poetry" (1993 :283).
However, I have shown that Yeats' s liberationist impulse in fact persisted in the very
form of his reactionary politics. As one obituarist put it, Yeats was "a champion of
freedom - but, above all, against the tyrannies of democracy," and "the democracy
which he never spared to resist or rebuke" marched "to its credit, behind his coffin"
(Foster 2001 :83).
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The increasing marginaIization of the Anglo-Irish Protestant minority and puritanical
limitation of artistic freedom, through such measures as the Irish literary censorship
bill drafted and passed in 1928-29, illuminates what Foster calls Yeats's "losing
battle" (2001: 107) to promote Irishness as synonomous with artistic independence.
This "losing battle" was, of course, allied to his efforts to 'Protestantize' Catholic
Ireland and therefore to 'non-essentialize' Irish national identity. Yeats's battle
included, for instance, defending free speech and therefore works like Joyce's
Ulysses; fighting censorship in arguing for "The Need for Audacity of Thought"; and
injecting the irreligious and erotic into his poetry, as in the Crazy Jane series, in
attempting to define modern Irish literature against "un-Irish limitations" (2001: 108).
This "losing battle" therefore illuminates what Said calls Yeats's "unacceptable" and
"not to be excused" attitudes, including "his rejection of politics" (1993 :278).
Said is of course referring to Yeats's "passionate anti-statism" (Paulin 1992:2) in "A
General Introduction for my Work". Yeats denies that he is a nationalist "except in
Ireland for passing reasons" and dismisses "'State and Nation' as merely 'the work of
the intellect. .. not worth the blade of grass God gives for the nest of the linnet'"
(1992:2). However, as Paulin argues, such comments were "disingenuous" for Yeats
was in fact "a dedicated nation-builder, the shadow of the gunmen who founded the
Irish Free State" (1992:2). Rather, the words "passing reasons" amplify both Yeats's
rejection of the Irish Catholic nation-state and awareness that a genuinely independent
(artistically free), 'postcolonial' Ireland was no longer possible given its entrenched
Catholic ethos.
Yeats's "losing battle" also illuminates what Said calls his "outright fascism".
Yeats's, it must be stressed, short-lived flirtation with the Blueshirts in 1933 could to
an extent be explained (as Pound's far more severe subscription to political extremism
and mental control might be) in terms of the tendency "within the paradigm which is
offered as modernism" towards "a rationalist, modernizing ambition which endorses
technological progress and the renovation of society through aggressive
administration and directed change" (Wheale 1995:24). However, it was more, I
submit, a result of what Butler calls Yeats's "disillusionment" with the "drab unheroic
Ireland" of the "parochial" new nation-state which ensured "that 'men ofletters' lived
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like outlaws in their own country'" (Foster 2001: 195). This "disillusionment",
compounded by his rapid disillusionment with the Blueshirts, finds expression in his
dismissal of "State and Nation" in "A General Introduction for my Work". As Butler
argues, when Yeats "saw that Irish fascism promised to be as drab and demagogic as
Irish democracy" he "rapidly back-pedalled and rewrote the song he had composed
for the Blueshirts, making it so fantastic that no political party could sing it" (Foster
2001:195).
Foster points out that whether the Blueshirts could be defined "as Fascist is
debatable," for while the movement "could have become so" it was "not objectively
Fascist" (2003:472). Yeats was rather, Butler argues, the leader of the "campaign"
against censorship and "in everything he did and said" was "a champion of
intellectual and moral and social freedom," which in Butler's opinion contributed to
"a real obstruction on the road to Auschwitz" (Foster 2001: 195) as opposed to
conventional, ineffectual political rhetoric. This much Said, contradicting himself in
his essay, alludes to in pointing out that Neruda accepted Yeats "as a national poet
representing the Irish nation in its war against tyranny" and that Yeats "responded
positively" to the "unmistakably anti-fascist call" in defence of the Spanish Republic
in 1937 - despite Yeats' s "frequently cited dispositions towards European fascism"
(1993 :281).
I wish to stress, along with Foster, that "for all his interest in Mussolini," doubts
"about liberalism" (2001: 106), and so-called anti-democratic views, Yeats "defended
free speech as part of his ideal Irish cultural project" (Foster 2001:106). This
emphasis on freedom extends to Yeats's conception ofIrish national identity.
Orwell's claim (based on Menon's analysis) that A Vision has "sinister implications"
and that Yeats's tendency in "political terms ... is Fascist" (Orwell 1943) must be
dismissed simply on the basis that, by Orwell's own admission, he had personally
never read A Vision. In addition, to my mind, Yeats's prioritisation of the child over
st~te interests, in his Senate speech on "The State of School Education: School
Attendance Bill", is far from a fascist position. Yeats writes: " ... the child itself must
be the end in education, and in anything you want to do with the child... In the
modem world the tendency is to think of the nation; that it is more important than the
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child ... There is a tendency to subordinate the child to the idea of the nation. I suggest
that whether we teach either Irish history, Anglo-Irish literature or Gaelic, we should
always see that the child is the object and not any of our special perquisites" (Larrissy
1997:452). As I will show in the next chapter, this policy of non-coercion -
emphasizing individual liberty and self-actualisation in a manner devoid of any fascist
overtones - is a hallmark of Yeats's conception of Irish national identity.
For Yeats, then, the "ideal of self-election" is "intimately linked to the crusade for
Irish self-determination" (Kiberd 1996:450), with his envisaged fusion of the two
traditions within Ireland "consistent with the principle that both sides could 'glory in
our difference' at a personal level" (1996:451). The Irish, he envisions, "could and
should pay full respect to their inherited traditions, while offering tender care also to
rival codes" (1996:451). Kiberd explains that Yeats hoped that Irish "intellectual
leaders" would demonstrate "in their writing and their lives" this "fusion of values"
which "should be enshrined in the state's eventual constitution" (1996:451). My
position on Yeats is therefore that he was, as Kiberd argues, "forever crossing and
recrossing the sectarian divide" (1996:452) which, of course, meant there were "those
on both sides of the religious divide who knew what Yeats's project implied and did
not like it one bit" (1996:452). It is this "crossing and recrossing the sectarian divide"
that ultimately frustrates attempts by detractors and some critics to 'prove' Yeats's
harmonization with Ascendancy or colonial logic in his works.
As I have indicated in this chapter, no sooner are the construed' Anglo' and Protestant
aspects of Yeats emphasized than the modernist and 'Irish' nationalist aspects
mitigate against and resist their assertion. Yeats's proposition in Per Amica Silentia
Lunae that "every movement, in feeling or in thought, prepares in the dark by its own
increasing clarity and confidence its own executioner" (Jeffares 1990:46) appears to
apply in the case of such critics. Yeats's "crossing and recrossing," coupled with his
deep involvement in the occult, also undermines a tendency among critics to 'over-
explain' his thinking and works strictly in terms of his Anglo-Irish 'Protestant-ness'.
For instance, Kiberd' s argument that Yeats attaches to the land in accordance with a
general Anglo-Irish strategy to join the national sentiment, while compelling, seems
to me to sideline the actual, individual lived experience of Yeats's childhood and
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genuine love for the Sligo landscape; and to subtly undermine Yeats's full claim to
native Irishness.
In addition, Foster's explanation of Yeats's interest in the occult (a not strictly
'Protestant' domain, it must be said) in terms of a tradition of 'Protestant magic'
seems to me, while also compelling, to 'box' Yeats into his Anglo-Irish background
rather than allow more for his individual lived experience in the diverse "cultural
milieu within which Yeats was operating, the occult establishment of England and
Paris from 1885 until the 1930s" (Graf2000:xvi). Certainly, Foster's speculation that
such a tradition could be "seen on one level as a strategy for coping with
contemporary threats" like Catholicism "and on another as a search for psychic
control" (1998:50) does not adequately 'explain' specifically Yeats's attraction to the
occult, which incidentally drew and continues to draw adherents from diverse
backgrounds and walks of life who, like many of the modernist artists and writers,
often reject "the socially-endorsed forms of religion, such as Christianity" (Wheale
1995:23/24). Foster's argument neglects Ellmann's point, for example, that "in his
endeavour to construct a symbolism" Yeats "went where symbols had always been
the usual mode of expression" (1964:3), i.e. the occult.
There are other instances of questionable emphasis on Yeats's 'Protestant-ness', but
these two - and a third I am about to raise - suffice in indicating my own querying of
much of the Yeats criticism that has emerged since Said's essay. Despite Yeats having
attempted to circumvent his Anglo-Irish identity (in a conciliatory claiming of Irish
identity) as well as claim this cultural identity (in claiming his heritage), recent
criticism emphasizes his background by birth with a subtle sense of determinism. This
seems indicative of a propensity to, finally, keep Yeats in the 'Anglo-Irish' mould
more than the 'Irish' fold. Significantly in this regard, Kiberdclaims that Yeats's
"version of identity" is "a cornerstone of Protestantism" whereby "the individual must
justify God's love by perfecting its object" and be reborn daily as the "incorruptible
self' as described in "the Protestant service for the Burial of the Dead" (1996: 122).
However, as I will demonstrate in the next chapter, this encapsulation of 'striving,
daily rebirth and incorruption' is more a convenient and useful metaphor for aspects
of Yeats's "version of identity", which is in fact of such Nietzschean and occult
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proportions that any suggestion that it reflects conventional Protestant religious
conviction or identity must be summarily dismissed.
Indeed, the ideas informing Yeats's "version of identity" would hardly be endorsed by
Protestant ministers - or Catholic priests, for that matter. (It might be added that
ministers and priests would also not be enamoured by the fact that "Yeats for the most
part accepted the Nietzschean position" that "Christ was a weak, impotent, and
illusory god" (Ellmann 1964:92), and that Yeats refers to God in A Vision by so
"absurdly mechanical" (1960:286) a title and "unprepossessing a term" as The
Thirteenth Cone or Cycle "to ensure that He would be discussed only as 'it', never as
a personal deity, least of all as a Christian one" (1964: 159). This is a God that,
Ellmann indicates, brought Yeats "to no Church" (1960:286).) Yeats's version ofIrish
national identity, it must be stressed, owes far more to his culling and synthesis of
occult sources, and to his modernist and nationalist inclinations, than the Protestant
service highlighted by Kiberd. The equation of what is in fact Yeats's modernist,
nationalist and specifically occult emphasis on achieving full, independent selfhood
and self-determination with a generic Protestantism does not, to my mind, constitute
in itself an adequate' explanation' or encapsulation of Yeats' s "version of identity".
While the Yeatsian attitude of 'striving, daily rebirth and incorruption' at the level of
identity is portrayed by Kiberd as harmonizing with Protestant thought, I contend it
cannot by any means be categorized simply as a Protestant notion tied to Yeats's
Anglo-Irish Protestant background. As I will demonstrate in the next chapter, it in fact
comprises a striking parallel with Fanon's notion of endless self-creation by the
decolonized.
On the basis of my arguments above, then, I wish to posit my central thesis: that while
Said, in constructing Yeats as a 'postcolonial' figure, throughout his essay repeatedly
dismisses Yeats's occult or magical preoccupations and works as "incoherently occult
divagations," the examination of Yeats's occult dimension in fact bolsters rather than
undermines or detracts from Said's construction. Far from being in themselves non-
political, detached from the 'real' world, and on the whole not only relatively
unimportant in Yeats's oeuvre but also "indigestible" and "unacceptable" in political
terms, works like Per Amica Silentia Lunae and A Vision, informing a wide range of
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Yeats's poetry and works after 1916, are in fact political in focusing on national
identity in the Irish colonial context. A Vision is written, as I shall demonstrate in the
next chapter, as what Kiberd calls "a kind of constitution for the infant state"
(1996:451). One of the main arguments behind the "poetic thinking" ofA Vision is,
Kiberd argues, the reconciliation of "disparate, once warring, factions" within Ireland
through the formulation of a "Third or Middle Way" and dissolving of these
"antinomies" (1996:451), and it must be underlined that this operates at the level of
identity. Reconciliation, as Kiberd points out, was the "major task" ofYeats's
"newly-independent nation," and "the underlying desire" ofA Vision is "to render
those labels" (Protestant and Catholic) "meaningless" (1996:451) or no longer
divisive in terms of Irish national identity and Irish national unity.
National reconciliation and national unity are therefore key themes ofA Vision, for as
Foster emphasizes (quoting Lyons), the Irish were deeply and intensely "divided
rather than united" (2001 :40) during Yeats's lifetime. A Vision, I contend, argues and
demonstrates that "people can reconcile more than one cultural identity within
themselves," and that a strategic and conciliatory "abandonment of the old, prescribed
positions may be a liberation for both sides" (2001 :54). A Vision therefore reflects the
fact that Yeats crossed not only national but secular and intellectual "borders all his
life," and in doing so was, as Foster argues, "always transgressive, always bent on
breaking out of genre, always bent on liberation" (2001: 100). A Vision is, I submit, far
from "extra-worldly" and "non-political", but a direct confrontation of the
uncompromising, (post)colonial actuality of the Ireland ofYeats's "age".
I have so far demonstrated that it is precisely because of Yeats's "hyphenated
condition of being Anglo-Irish" (Larissy 1997:xxi) that Yeats cannot be confined to
the "first" political moment delineated by Said. In this moment, nativism - thereby
accepting the racial, religious, and political divisions imposed by imperialism
itself'(Said 1993:276) and "believing all people have only one single identity"
(1993:277) - comprises the only response via "anti-imperialist resistance" literature to
"the pronounced awareness of European and Western culture as imperialism"
(1993 :270). That Yeats had, according to AE, by 1884 "already developed a theory of
the divided consciousness" (Ellmann 1960:55) or "bifurcated self' (1960:77) only
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serves to drive home the point that identity for Yeats could not be unreflectively
"single" - even in this nativist phase. Yeats's long-held "notion ofthe divided self'
(Foster 2003: 108), as I will demonstrate in the next chapter, underpins his conception
of identity as not single, but in fact constructed and multiple.
Crucially, however, Said argues that Yeats also belongs to the "second, more openly
liberationist" political moment: that is, to the "idea of liberation" born when
"conventional nationalism" is revealed as "both insufficient and crucial, but only as a
first step" (1993:271). Out of this "paradox", Said argues, comes a "strong new post-
nationalist theme" (1993 :271) within the nationalist revival. In this liberationist phase,
Said later explains, one doesn't "give in to the rigidity and interdictions of self-
imposed limitations that come with race, moment, or milieu; instead you move
through them to an animated and expanded sense ... which necessarily involves more
than your Ireland, your Martinique, your Pakistan" (1993:279). Said holds that, as
reflected in Yeats' s "sustained anti-British sentiment" and "the anger and gaiety of his
anarchically disturbing last poetry," Yeats "partially belonged to this second moment"
(1993 :278). In this "phase", Said argues, liberation "and not nationalist
independence" is "the new alternative," with liberation "by its very nature"
(1993:278) involving what Fanon calls in The Wretched a/the Earth "a
transformation of social consciousness beyond national consciousness" (2001 :203).
On this basis, Said argues, "the unacceptable attitudes of Yeats" - namely "Yeats' s
slide into incoherence and mysticism during the 1920s, his rej ection of politics, and
his arrogant if charming espousal of fascism (or authoritarianism of an Italian or
South American kind)" - are "not to be excused" but can be "easily" situated and
criticized "without changing one's view of Yeats as a poet of decolonization"
(1993 :278). I wish to underline that, no sooner does Said associate Yeats "more fully"
with the "poetry of decolonization and resistance" and "the historical alternatives to
the nativist impasse" (1993 :279) than he, again, dismisses Yeats' s occult dimension
as inexcusable and unacceptable - a crazy "slide" into extra-worldly "incoherence and
mysticism" detached from political reality. Yeats's 'occult' works, including Per
Arnica Si/entia Lunae and A Vision, are therefore, by implication, portrayed as an
inexcusable but ultimately inconsequential aberration of the 'postcolonial' Yeats; an
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aberration that Said argues should not detract from Yeats's status as a poet of
decolonization. On the contrary, as I have argued above, Yeats's occult dimension
and his Per Arnica Silentia Lunae and A Vision are in fact thisworldly and political at
the level of Irish national identity, and rather than being seen as an unpalatable
aberration should more productively be seen as an important facet of Yeats as a poet
of decolonization. Indeed, I contend that whereas Said dismisses Yeats' s magical
preoccupations in constructing him as a 'postcolonial' figure, the incorporation of this
facet ofYeats would in fact aid and bolster this construction immensely, rather than
detract from or undermine it.
Of course, Yeats's occult dimension, as I have outlined in this chapter, is a feature of
modernism and the 'modernist' Yeats. It is therefore somewhat surprising that Said
dismisses this aspect of the 'modernist' Yeats and yet foregrounds "the instability of
time" as a feature of work by poets of decolonization. Without mentioning that this is
an acknowledged feature in the work of many modernist artists, Said proceeds to
argue that the "shifts in Yeats's accounts of his great cycles invokes this instability,"
as does Yeats's "easy commerce in his poetry between popular and formal speech,
folktale and learned writing" (1993 :280/1). This after having in effect dismissed A
Vision in particular as incoherent craziness, a work in which Yeats' s gyres and great
cycles, as I have indicated earlier in this chapter, are linked with an attitude of
Nietzschean 'tragic joy'. Said argues that this destabilization of time through "wrong
turns, the overlap, the senseless repetition, the occasionally glorious moment"
provides Yeats, "as it does all the poets and men of letters of decolonization" like
Tagore, Senghor, and Cesaire, with "stem martial accents, heroism, and the grinding
persistence of 'the uncontrollable mystery on the bestial floor'" (1993 :281). In this
way, Said argues, Yeats "rises out of his national environment and gains universal
significance" (1993:280). While I do not wish to challenge Said's argument in this
regard, I do wish to underline that it is Yeats's occult, modernist dimension that is
central to this decolonizing feature of his work.
Said also proceeds to construct Yeats as a poet of decolonization who "partially"
belongs to the second or liberationist phase, by reference to a range of Yeats's poetry
which is, significantly, post-1916. I have already described Yeats's emphatic
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emergence as a modernist after 1914 and particularly (in Eliot's words) "from 1919
on", and have throughout this chapter stressed dates around this time in anticipation of
highlighting that this coincides with the emphatic emergence of Yeats as an advanced
nationalist in the period 1916 to 1922. As Foster explains, Yeats was by 1914 "very
far from being a revolutionary" (2001 :59) and "far estranged from extreme
nationalism" (2001:60). He was, rather, as "a convinced Home Ruler" (2001:59) an
'''establishment' nationalist" (2001 :60), positing the "quintessentially Yeatsian" and
"impartially offensive" argument that Home Rule "would 'educate Catholics mentally
and Protestants emotionally'" (2001 :59/60). However, after 1916, Yeats "adapted his
public persona in order to emerge as a founding father of the new nation in 1922"
(2001 :59), and it is therefore chiefly on this period that Yeats's reputation as Ireland's
national poet rests.
The years from 1916 to 1920 are, as Foster describes it, "remarkable" in that "a good
deal" of Yeats's nationalist writing "was withheld from publication" owing to
political sensitivities surrounding World War One, when in "many people's eyes"
pro-rebel "equalled pro-German" (2001 :66). For instance, as Foster explains, although
Yeats's ambivalent and ambiguous "poem of apparent atonement about the rebels"
(2001 :63), "Easter 1916", would "be read as republicanism pure and simple" and
"absorbed into the canon of inspirational revolutionary literature" (2001 :64), this was
"still far from being Yeats's position" (2001 :65) at the time. It was only, strategically,
first published in 1920 - three days before MacSwiney's (by then assured) death on
hunger strike in prison. Yeats was also careful in writing "An Irish Airman Foresees
His Death", given that "even moderate nationalist opinion" was "against the war
effort," to "reverse the message" ofRobert Gregory's death "for king and country"
(2001 :68) by portraying "the warrior-airman as an exponent ofNietzschean tragic
joy" and as lacking "sympathy" for the "imperialist cause" - which was "the exact
opposite of what Gregory apparently actually felt" (2001:69). This, too, was first
published only after the war, in 1919.
Foster argues that as events built to "revolution all around him" (2001 :79), Yeats self-
consciously "knew what he was doing" (2001 :74) in laying "claim" (2001 :79) to these
events and constructing himself publicly as Ireland's national poet: revising his The
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King's Threshold; staging MacSwiney's The Revolutionist at the Abbey Theatre;
denouncing the English government's policy in Ireland, which bred the atrocities of
the Black and Tans near Gort, in his famous Oxford Union speech in 1921; and
releasing his collection Michael Robartes and the Dancer in 1921. This collection,
emphatically confinning his "sincerity as an Irish nationalist," has "in deliberate
sequence" (2001:75) "Easter 1916", "Sixteen Dead Men" and "The Rose Tree". This
"rewriting of his political position" also resulted in Yeats turning his poem "about the
dislocations of the world after the Great War" intb "a poem about the Irish War
instead" (200: 177), namely "Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen". Written in 1921, the
line "We, who seven years ago ... " would have directed the reader to 1914 and World
War One, but the title of the poem instead directs the reader to "the Home Rule Bill,
with all its brave hopes" (2001 :76) and, of course, to 1919: "when the Anglo-Irish
War began" (2001 :77).
Foster writes that by the time of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of December 1921 Yeats had
"written himself back into Irish history" (p2001:77). As "three-quarters ofIreland
emerged into quasi-independence in 1922," Foster argues, Yeats "emerged alongside
as the poet of the revolution" (2001 :62) - a position that had seemed "unlikely"
(2001 :79) given his political stance in 1914. In this, "and in so many ways," Foster
concludes, Yeats's "biography is the history of his country" (2001:59). It is therefore
not surprising that Said focuses on this period in his construction of Yeats as a poet of
decolonization. Said lists "Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen", "Easter 1916" and
"September 1913" as among the "great poems of that climactic period after the Easter
Uprising of 1916" which impart the sense of "a terrible new beauty that changes the
old political and moral landscape" (1993 :280). One must, of course, overlook Said's
erroneous inclusion of "September 1913", published in Responsibilities (1914), in this
post-1916 list. This aside, Said argues that Yeats, like "all poets of decolonization,"
"struggles to announce the contours of an imagined or ideal community, crystallized
by its own sense not only of itself, but of its enemy" (1993 :280). That, like Neruda,
Yeats does so "under the shadow of domination," Said argues, connects Yeats's
"protocols of exhortation and expansiveness" in a poem like "The Fishennan" with
"the narrative of liberation" depicted by Fanon in The Wretched ofthe Earth.
89
Significantly, Said also argues that Yeats's "greatest decolonizing works" centre on
"the birth of violence, or the violent birth of change, as in 'Leda and the Swan'"
(1993 :284). He adds that the "greatest theme" in the poetry "that culminates in The
Tower (1928)" is "how to reconcile the inevitable violence of the colonial conflict
with the everyday politics of an ongoing national struggle," and "also how to square
the power of the various parties in the conflict with the discourse of reason,
persuasion, organization, and the requirements of poetry" (1993:284). Said argues that
Yeats is exemplary in perceiving, almost a half-century before Fanon's assertion, that
"liberation cannot be accomplished simply by seizing power" (1993 :284). Said
declares that Yeats' s "prophetic perception" that "violence cannot be enough" and
that "the strategies of politics and reason must come into play" is "the first important
announcement in the context of decolonization of the need to balance violent force"
with "an exigent political and organizational process" (1993 :284). That "neither Yeats
nor Fanon offers a prescription for making a transition after decolonization to a period
when a new political order achieves moral hegemony," Said argues, is "symptomatic
of the difficulty that millions live with today" (1993 :284).
Said's emphasis on Yeats's advocacy of a pragmatic politics, and of the notion that
"seizing" political power does not automatically translate into liberation, brings me
back to my earlier arguments in this chapter about Yeats's "tension" resting on the
problem of how to circumvent externally imposed, inherited or passively received,
seemingly stable and fixed, "single" identities. These were 'Irish' Othered by
'English'; and 'Catholic Irish' and 'Protestant Anglo-Irish' Othered by each other. As
I've argued, A Vision not only advocates the creation ofIrish national identity and
Irish national unity in a manner free of reciprocal hatred for England (thereby
avoiding replication of the colonizer's Manichaean opposition at the level of identity),
but also the reconciliation of the "disparate, once warring, factions" within Ireland
through the formulation of a "Third or Middle Way" and dissolving of these
"antinomies" (Kiberd 1996:451) at the level of identity, including the Anglo versus
Irish "tension" within himself. As I will demonstrate in the next chapter, Yeats is,
clearly, imagining a community: an inclusive new Irish nation.
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In doing so, he is not giving in "to the rigidity and interdictions of self-imposed
limitations that come with race, moment, or milieu" at the level of identity. As Yeats
wrote on one of his "poetic manuscripts": "Talent perceives Difference/Genius unity"
(Foster 1998:58), and at the level of identity the former (talent) may be seen in terms
of the exclusionary, divided Ireland of his time and the latter (genius) in terms of his
inclusive imagined community. I've earlier argued that Yeats was "forever crossing
and recrossing the sectarian divide" (Kiberd 1996:452) and that there were "those on
both sides of the religious divide who knew what Yeats's project implied and did not
like it one bit" (1996:452). As Kiberd puts it, an "art that deliberately opposes its own
age" is "reflected in a notion of genius" - which can be seen to equate with Unity - as
"never like that country's" immediate "idea of itself" (1996:302) - which can be seen
to equate with Difference. However, out of "the contest with current codes" (Catholic
and Protestant) a "symbolic projection of the future community emerges" (1996:302)
- and this is the projection, I submit, of Per Amica Silentia Lunae and A Vision: a
united Irish nation.
Forming part of the "magical poetics" (Graf2000:99) of Per Amica Silentia Lunae,
and of his "philosophical framework" (Unterecker 1969:29) as expressed in A Vision,
these ideas inform the collections containing the nationalist poems Said highlights. As
Ellmann remarks, "No one would suppose, on reading the extra-national Vision, that
Ireland would occur so prominently in the poetry written contemporaneously with it"
(1964:165). While A Vision is "not... a full background for his verse," Ellmann
explains, "it is drawn upon when it is needed, sometimes running counter to the verse,
sometimes parallel, sometimes compounding with it" (1964:165). Unterecker notes
that although "almost everything Yeats wrote after 1922 and a good deal that he wrote
before that date is linked to A Vision, one can read the poems without knowing the
system" (1969:29). Knowing the System does, however, illuminate and extend the
connotations of many of his poems, in various ways. This is confirmed by Jeffares's
long list of "Poems Associated With or Included in Per Amica Silentia Lunae and A
Vision" (1990:321/22), which includes poems in The Tower (1928) like "Leda and the
Swan" (1924), "Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen" (1921) and "Meditations in Time of
Civil War" (1923). The notion of balancing violent force with political pragmatism
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that Said notes, I suggest, cannot be divorced from the "esoteric subtext" (Graf
2000:xvi) of these collections.
Indeed, it must be registered that Yeats's emphatic emergence as a modernist and
advanced nationalist in the public eye coincides with a resurgence in his occult
activities and the concretisation of his'occult' thoughts into his Doctrine of the Mask.
Per Arnica Silentia Lunae (1917), as Graf argues, "serves as the fulcrum of Yeats's
career" because in it Yeats articulates his doctrine or magical poetics "definitively",
thereafter crafting "the poetry that has led critics to name him a great modem poet"
(2000:xiii). Written to explain what Yeats calls his "convictions" and "metaphysical
beliefs" (Graf2000:xiv) to Iseult Gonne, Per Arnica Silentia Lunae is Yeats's self-
proclaimed "'spiritual history'" (Jeffares 1990:76) and its ideas of mask and anti-self
are condensed into verse in its didactic introductory poem, "Ego Dominus Tuus". The
importance of Per Arnica Silentia Lunae in Yeat's thinking is evident in his
Introduction to A Vision. As Yeats puts it, A Vision builds "up an elaborate
classification of men according to their more or less complete expression of one type
or another," upon the "simple distinction" in Per Arnica Silentia Lunae "between the
perfection that is from a man's combat with himself and that which is from a combat
with circumstance" (Jeffares 1990:75). The "combat" with one's self and with
circumstance that Yeats refers to, I wish to suggest, can be related directly to the
"tension" stemming from Yeats's three-fold 'identity' problem delineated in this
chapter.
While Per Arnica Silentia Lunae is "a distillation ofthe ideas" (Foster 2003 :76) in
"Swedenborg, Mediums, and the Desolate Places" and Yeats's earlier 'dialogue' with
his so-called 'spirit guide' Leo Africanus, and thus may appear non-political and
extra-worldly, it also has a strong emphasis on this-worldly psychology and, as I will
show in the next chapter, an implicit and explicit political or colonial dimension. As
Foster points out, in Per Arnica Silentia Lunae's "original fonn" Yeats "confronted
the ideas of Freud and Jung more than he had done before (though their names were
excised for the published versions)" (2003:76). This modernist concern with "human
psychology" (Ellmann 1964:93) extends to A Vision, which also has its "roots in
personal psychology" (Foster 2003 :606). Moreover, as Ellmann argues, Yeats's
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Doctrine ofthe Mask focuses on "the problem of identity" (1960: 177), and is "so
complex and so central in Yeats that we can hardly attend to it too closely"
(1960: 175). Per Amica Silentia Lunae, although an 'occult' work, constitutes a key
text in understanding Yeats's conception of Irish national identity.
Furthermore, Foster explains that while Yeats "watched as Irish opinion settled in a
new direction over 1917-18" he "emerged with a new wife, a rejuvenated interest in
occult and psychical research, and a new home - the Norman tower which he bought
in 1916 and had begun to renovate" (2001:67). Yeats was also, Grafpoints out, a
member of the Amoun Temple of Stella Matutina for eight years, "from 1914 until
1922 when it was dissolved" (2000:35). From 1917, Yeats would for years be
preoccupied with working on the hundreds of pages of his mediumistic wife George's
automatic script or "spirit communication" (2000: 158). The result was the first
version ofA Vision (finished and published in 1925), which he revised and re-
published in its final form in 1937. Undoubtedly, the System gave Yeats "prophetic
authority" (Ellmann 1960:236) and "'metaphors for poetry'" (Jeffares 1990:75), and
is what Yeats in the Introduction to A Vision credits for his poetry gaining "in self-
possession and power" (1990:75) in The Tower and The Winding Stair and Other
Poems (1933).
However, it is also deeply concerned with the inner conflict "between who we are and
what we dream of becoming" (Ellmann 1964: 160), and with the uniting of a person or
collectivity "to their images of themselves" (1964: 108). This is because A Vision is
prefigured by Per Amica Silentia Lunae, and extends its concern with "the problem of
identity" in the colonial context. Ellmann writes that as early as the end of November
1917 the first part ofA Vision, the classification into 28 types of what Ellmann calls
"human personality" but which I view rather in terms of 'identity', had already "been
outlined" (1960:226). This "astrological pattern-making," Foster indicates, was
prefigured in the examination of the archetypes of saint, hero and artist in Per Amica
Silentia Lunae. The Doctrine of the Mask articulated in Per Amica Silentia Lunae is
incorporated into and reimagined in the symbolism ofA Vision, rendering A Vision
the work "of a mind that tries to see people" - and, I would add, nations - "as
constructs" (Foster 2003:284). While it can be read "on one level as a commentary on
93
the process and achievement of artistic inspiration" (2003 :606), it also represents, I
contend, an exploration of Irish national identity as a construct.
That there is a 'national' dimension to A Vision is undeniable. Following the atrocities
of the Black and Tans, which drove "once unlikely people to join Sinn Fein" (Foster
2001:71), Yeats in 1920 busied himself in Oxford with "his philosophical system"
(2001 :73), A Vision, and his autobiographical "Four Years: 1887-1891". The latter,
Foster explains, is "preoccupied with how 'a nation or an individual' might achieve,
through emotional intensity... a symbological, a mythological coherence," with Yeats
self-consciously relating his youth to "what he actually calls 'the future birth of my
country'" (Foster 2001 :73). This is also a preoccupation in A Vision, with both works
in large measure products of Yeats' s interrogation of the problems and strategic
opportunities of 'identity itself' in the colonial context, in terms of the impending
"birth" of the 'new' Irish nation-state. As Ellmann points out, Yeats rewrote his
Autobiographies between 1919 and 1922 "with A Vision in mind," and "suffused it
with the serenity of the man" (1960:241) of Phase 17.
Yeats, as I will demonstrate in the next chapter, constructs and defines himself in A
Vision as the ideal Irish national poet, assigning himself to Phase 17 along with other
'Daimonic' poets like Dante, Shelley and Landor in a System "constructed around
archetypal artistic personalities"(Foster 2003: 108). The ideas of Per Arnica Si/entia
Lunae are "related to his own mentality, balanced between intuitive artistic genius and
everyday pragmatist: 'antithetical' and 'primary' selves" (2003: 108). In doing so,
Yeats 'remakes' himself by choosing, adopting and "cultivating" the 'identity' or
"Poetic Personality" (Ellmann 1960:239) of Phase 17. As a result, his
Autobiographies became "no longer a mere autobiography" but, as Yeats wrote to
Lady Gregory in 1920, a '''political and literary testament.. .intended to give a
philosophy to the movement" (1960:242). "Every analysis of character, of Wilde,
Henley, Shaw & so on," Yeats writes, "builds up my philosophic nationalism - it is
nationalism against internationalism, the rooted against the rootless people"
(1960:242).
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In constructing Yeats as a postcolonial figure, Said argues that through the '"great
poems of summation and vision" like "Among School Children" (1928), '"The Tower"
(1928), '"A Prayer for My Daughter" (1921), '"Under Ben Bulben" (1939) and '"The
Circus Animals' Desertion" (1939), Yeats '"reconstructs his own life poetically as the
epitome of the national life" (1993 :286) and "rises from the level of personal and folk
experience" to that of "national archetype" without forfeiting "the immediacy of the
fonner or the stature ofthe latter" (1993 :286). However, in light of the'occult'
backdrop I have outlined, it is exactly Yeats's exploration of 'identity itself and
construction of himself in A Vision as the archetypal Irish national poet of Phase 17,
who is at the same time Anglo-Irish, which informs his "reconstruction of his own life
poetically" through these poems. In Yeats's occult works, as in the poetry Said
higWights, "the artist's integrated life provides the platonic parallel for the creation of
a national myth" (Foster 2001:73). As Foster argues, Yeats's "role in the Irish Story"
involved "mastering the past through visionary narration," in so doing '"shaping the
present and future consciousness of 'the nation' - whoever they were" (2001 :xix/x).
And this '"constructing" of a nation, Foster argues, "revolves around" the "tension
created when the affinnation of personal identity intersects with the invention of epic"
(2001 :xx).
However, Yeats's rooting in the national must also be situated in his Blakean
approach to nationality, i.e. his tendency to, in Blake's words in '"Auguries of
Innocence," see "a World in a Grain of SandlAnd a Heaven in a Wild Flower" (Butter
2003:114); in Yeats's case, to see the universe through the 'nation'. This approach is
compatible with Yeats' s poetic notion that "symbolism holds the cosmos together" by
its "interconnecting correspondences," and his occult principle that "Everything is
related to everything else" (Ellmann 1964:25). As Ellmann argues, the "ultimate
purpose ofYeats's use of nationality" in his verse is "paradoxically, to enable him to
transcend it" (1964:15). As the young Yeats wrote:
'"To the greater poets everything they see has its relation
to the national life, and through that to the universal and
divine life: nothing is an isolated artistic achievement; there
is a unity everywhere; everything fulfils a purpose that is not
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its own; the hailstone is a journeyman of God; the grass blade
carries the universe upon its point. But to this universalism,
this seeing of unity everywhere, you can only attain through
what is near you, your nation, or, if you be no traveller, your
village and the cobwebs on your walls. You can no more have
the greatest poetry without a nation than religion without symbols.
One can only reach out to the universe with a gloved hand - that
glove is one's nation, the only thing one knows even a little
of' (Ellmann 1964:15/16).
With this liberationist rather than nativist attitude, then, Yeats moves through "self-
imposed limitations that come with race, moment, or milieu" and moves to "an
animated and expanded sense... which necessarily involves more than your Ireland,
your Martinique, your Pakistan" (1993:279). Although Yeats would later "worry the
glove, as all do when it ceases to fit" (Kiberd 1996:301), a liberationist stance and
paradoxical transcendence of nationality in the awareness of the constructedness of
national identity are, as I will demonstrate in the next chapter, key features of the
'postcolonial' Yeats's Doctrine of the Mask. Tightening glove, I contend, is discarded
in favour of unifying Mask. And A Vision, continuing Per Arnica Silentia Lunae 's
reification ofthe (collective) unconscious, becomes in part a representation of what
Unterecker calls "Yeats's effort to construct a metaphor for the correlation of all
things" (1969:24).
Again, the modernist, occult dimension - informing this 'universal' outlook - is at
work in Yeats's thinking. Indeed, for Yeats, the unity of "everything" extends to the
mind, encompassing the imagination and (collective) unconscious. As early as 1901,
in his essay "Magic", he posits "three doctrines": firstly, that "the borders of our mind
(sic) are ever shifting, and that many minds can flow into one another, as it were, and
create or reveal a single mind, a single energy"; secondly, that "the borders of our
memories are shifting, and that our memories are a part of one great memory, the
memory of Nature herself'; and thirdly, that "this great mind and great memory can
be evoked by symbols" (Graf2000:34). Again, by recourse to an occult, modernist
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preoccupation with the unconscious, seen as underlying identity-as-construct, Yeats
moves through "self-imposed limitations that come with race, moment, or milieu" and
moves to "an animated and expanded sense" (1993 :279) of selfhood. I will
demonstrate in the next chapter that Yeats associates the unconscious with "genius" or
artistic inspiration as a key element in identity-creation. As I've explained earlier in
this chapter, Yeats holds that "Talent perceives Difference/Genius Unity". His
association of the unconscious with "genius" (what he calls an individual or nation's
Daimon) therefore informs his conception of an inclusive Irish national identity, and
his vision of Irish national unity.
In this vein, it must be noted that while Yeats constructs himself in A Vision as an
Irish national archetype, in writing A Vision he necessarily also "forgot he was an
Irishman" (Ellmann 1964:xiv) owing to his awareness and exploration of 'identity-as-
construct'. That Yeats had in 1924 "still hoped to introduce A Vision directly into the
political scene" (Ellmann 1960:249), written as what Kiberd calls "a kind of
constitution for the infant state" (1996:451) and with the intention of providing what
Foster calls "a spiritual foundation for the new nation-state" (2003:316), must also be
viewed in these "extra-national" (Ellmann 1964:165) terms. In this, Yeats's emphasis
extends beyond national independence to a paradoxically wider sense of personal or
psychological liberation at the level of identity in the first instance, involving through
the application of his Doctrine of the Mask what Said associates with the second
liberationist moment of decolonization: a "transformation" of personal and "social
consciousness beyond national consciousness" (Said 1993 :278).
In all, Said concludes, Yeats "stopped short of imagining full political liberation, but
he gave us a major international achievement in cultural decolonization none the less"
(1993 :287/88). This is the basic difference, Said argues, between Yeats and Fanon:
Fanon's "theoretical and perhaps even metaphysical narrative of anti-imperialist
decolonization" is "a discourse of that anticipated triumph, liberation, that marks the
second moment of decolonization"; Yeats, on the other hand, "sounds the nationalist
note and stands at a threshold" he "cannot cross," although "he sets a trajectory in
common with that of other poets of decolonization" (1993 :283). Yeats, Said offers,
"might at least" be given "credit" for "adumbrating the liberationist and Utopian
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revolutionism in his poetry" that, in Said's estimation, is "belied and even cancelled
out by his later reactionary politics" (1993 :283).
However, it is my contention that Yeats does, in fact, imagine full political liberation
- to be achieved first at the level of identity - and that he therefore fully, not partially,
belongs to this second moment. As I've argued, Yeats's "project of inventing a
unitary Ireland is the attempt at achieving at a political level a reconciliation of
opposed qualities which must first be fused in the self' (Kiberd 1996:124). Put
another way, for Yeats "personal liberation must precede national recovery" or
political independence, "being in fact its very condition" (1996: 124). The Doctrine of
the Mask, articulated in Per Amica Silentia Lunae and incorporated into A Vision, is
therefore exactly Yeats's prescription at the level of identity for what Said describes
as "making a transition after decolonization" to a 'postcolonial' period "when a new
political order achieves moral hegemony". A genuinely 'postcolonial' political order
would, in Yeats's scheme, necessarily be preceded by psychological decolonization,
to be achieved through the conscious fashioning and adoption of an inclusive national
identity that inspires national unity. His doctrine, informing his poetry, is therefore
indicative of what Said calls his "prophetic perception" that "violence cannot be
enough," that "the strategies of politics and reason must come into play" and that
"violent force" must be balanced with "an exigent political and organizational
process" (1993 :284).
This explains why it may seem that Yeats "stopped short": full 'postcolonial' political
liberation was for Yeats an unknown not to be imposed, something 'new' necessarily
arising only once full psychological decolonization at the level of identity had
occurred - a poetic creation. As I have indicated, Foster argues that Yeats sought to
shape "the present and future consciousness of 'the nation' - whoever they were"
(2001:xix/x). This suggests that Yeats expected an inclusive, imagined Irish
community, which had never before existed, would in effect create itself, with a new
political order arising as the expression of this creation. However, such national
'newness' did not occur in Ireland as Yeats had hoped, with the Catholic ethos of the
Free State preserving the cultural divisions, resting on the notion of stable, fixed
identities, inherited from colonial rule. As I have argued in this chapter, his
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reactionary politics can therefore be seen as a response to the failure in Ireland to
achieve the 'postcolonial' liberation he had hoped for, and does not by any means
'cancel out' his liberationist commitment.
Rather, the failure to achieve psychological decolonization at the level of identity in
the first instance must be seen as a reason for what Said calls "the difficulty that
millions" of ex-colonized people "live with today" (1993 :284), namely essentialist,
exclusionary division (including at a political level) rather than non-essentialist,
inclusive unity. This failure to achieve full postcolonialliberation in Ireland is
anticipated, and warned against, in A Vision. That Yeats constructs himself as a poet
of Phase 17 born into the age of Phase 22, and therefore "doomed to belong to 'a
tragic minority'" (Ellmann 1960:241), suggests that Yeats anticipated political
liberation in Ireland and 'Irish-ness' would not be 'full' enough to include the Anglo-
Irish Protestant minority. Tragically in Yeats's reckoning, colonial "differences" at
the level of identity would after political liberation be retained and 'enforced' at the
expense of full national inclusivity and unity. Furthermore, as Said argues earlier in
his essay, in the liberationist phase one realises that "nativism is not the only
alternative," and embraces the "possibility of a more generous and pluralistic vision
of the world, in which imperialism courses on, as it were, belatedly in different
forms ... and the relationship of domination continues, but the opportunities for
liberation are open" (1993 :277/8). One could, perhaps, hardly find a better summation
of Yeats's phases of the moon and their intricacies, in which the "opportunities" for
liberation remain open but liberation is itself never to be taken for granted or
guaranteed.
In Yeats' s scheme, should liberation be achieved its longevity is, after all, always
threatened by the cyclical nature of existence. The opportunities for liberation are
even at times temporarily foreclosed by the challenges of the Four Faculties and the
gyres of history. Yeats, then, anticipates colonial oppression coursing on "in different
forms" and the "relationship of domination" continuing. Certainly, and importantly,
liberation is for Yeats not an inevitable "destination" to be finally achieved on a linear
trajectory but - invoking a Nietzschean attitude of 'tragic joy', and drawing on an
'occult' reification of the unconscious and imagination - a state of mind and being
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constantly renewed by choice and requiring daily protection lest it pass away.
Liberation, Yeats holds, may be fatally limited by the certainty of change and
people's temporality/mortality, but this does not devalue the ever-recurring, heroic
pursuit and attainment of it. Rather, this spurs it on. As it is put in "Vacillation":
"What's the meaning of all song?/'Let all things pass away'" (Collected Poems
1971 :285). As I will demonstrate in the next chapter, there are in fact striking parallels
between the mage-poet Yeats's Doctrine of the Mask/System and psychotherapist
Fanon's narrative in The Wretched ofthe Earth, with both deeply concerned with
psychology and identity in the colonial context and "marked throughout with the
accents and inflections of liberation" (1993 :283).
Said, as I have shown, reaches his conclusion that Yeats "stopped short of imagining
full political liberation" by consistently dismissing Yeats's occult, 'modernist'
dimension throughout his essay. In his final dismissal of this dimension, Said states
simply that "Yeats's full system of cycles, pernes, and gyres seems important only as
it symbolizes his efforts to lay hold of a distant and yet orderly reality as a refuge
from the turbulence of his immediate experience" (1993 :287). Again, Said drastically
- and finally - reduces the importance ofA Vision to the 'postcolonial' Yeats,
characterizing it as an ineffectual escape from immediate colonial experience to a
"distant" and "extra-worldly" reality far removed from it. However, as Larissy warns,
the "magic and occult sciences" that remained "interwoven with Yeats' s profoundest
thoughts throughout his life" should "never be treated as an eccentricity to be
discounted in a consideration of his poetry and criticism" (1997:xxiii) - and this is
particularly true, I contend, ofYeats's Doctrine of the Mask and liberationist
conception ofIrish national identity.
As I have repeatedly underlined in this chapter, Yeats's occult symbolism can also be
seen as metaphorical and profoundly thisworldly, for while Yeats was "talking about
spirits he was, indeed, talking also about images, and he often did so in a way which
left it open to the reader to remain agnostic about the spirits" (Larissy 1997:xxv).
Yeats bluntly informs his readers of his position in Per Amica Si/entia Lunae, writing
that "mental images no less than apparitions" are "forms existing in... Anima Mundi"
which can be "mirrored in a particular vehicle" or individual, and that he sees "no
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reason to distinguish" (Jeffares 1990:54) between these fonns. It must be recognized
that Yeats's Doctrine of the Mask, and the "battle" ofA Vision, unfold not in an extra-
worldly spiritual realm but "in the depths of the mind when the eyes are closed" (Ross
2001 :85). That Yeats's doctrine is therefore, when all is said, a psychological rather
than extraworldly process confimls its ancem with facing the "uncompromising
actuality" of everyday 'reality', including and especially in the Irish colonial context,
at the level of identity.
To discount Yeats's occult dimension, as Said does, as an 'eccentricity' or aberration
is not only to drastically downplay and even ignore the importance of this 'modernist'
feature in Yeats's work, but to fail to heed Yeats's own words in "If! Were Four and
Twenty" about his determination to "hammer" his "thoughts into unity" (Ellmann
1960:241). As Yeats puts it, he has "three interests": in "a fonn ofliterature", in "a
fonn of philosophy" (magic and the occult), and "a belief in nationality" (Ellmann
1960:241). None of these "seemed to have anything to do with the other," he writes,
but having constructed himself as the archetype of Phase 17 he declares that "all
three" are "one," are "a discrete expression of a single conviction" (1960:241) of
unity. Each, Yeats writes, "has behind it" his "whole" being and "has gained thereby a
certain newness" (1960:241). Against this backdrop, it is clear that in his construction
ofYeats as a 'postcolonial' figure, Said has focused on only two ofYeats's three
primary interests, and marginalized the other (magic and the occult). In so doing, the
'modernist' Yeats has been largely overlooked, and an incomplete picture of the
'postcolonial' Yeats presented.
While Said's dismissal of the 'modernist' Yeats's occult dimension is (to use his
words regarding Yeats's "slide into incoherence and mysticism" against him) "not to
be excused" (1993 :278), it is entirely understandable. Ellmann points out that Yeats's
occult activities "have understandably made everyone uneasy" (1960:3). "It would be
more comfortable," Ellmann writes, "if the outstanding poet of our time had
hobnobbed with, say, Thomas Henry Huxley, instead of Helena Petrovna Blavatsky,
Samuel Liddell MacGregor Mather, a medium in Soho, or Shri Purohit Swami"
(1960:3). "But," he adds, Yeats "has not obliged us, and a number of critics have
therefore attacked him for failing to attach himself to a more decent and gentlemanly
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creed" (1960:3). Nevertheless, Ellmann explains, Yeats "found in occultism, and in
mysticism generally, a point of view which had the virtue of warring with accepted
beliefs, and of warring enthusiastically and authoritatively" (1960:3). He also warns
that occultism is "a big centre, a much bigger one, in fact, than is generally
acknowledged," and points out that along with "spells and spooks from every culture
it has managed to assimilate many of the leading philosophical notions of eastern and
western thought" (1960:3). "To identify it with hocus-pocus alone," he cautions, "is
evidence of a socially acceptable common sense but not of acquaintance with the
subject" (1960:2).
Ellmann's caution might well be redirected at Said decades later, although Said is far
from the only critic guilty of disparaging and disregarding Yeats's occult
"divagations" in the decades since his death and since Ellmann's warning. As Graf
argues, echoing Ellmann, there has been a tendency in the "literary community" to
"not take magic seriously" and to think of this aspect ofYeats as "an embarrassing
pastime better left unacknowledged" (2000:35). The "tendency of scholars" to
"second-guess or to ignore the esoteric subtext" of Yeats's works "has resulted in Per
Amica being thoroughly ignored, even though Yeats kept writing about how important
it was and how A Vision arose from the thoughts expressed there" (2000:xvi). Yeats,
Graf argues, is himself partly to blame for this situation. Pointing out, as Ellmann
does in 1960, that Yeats called A Vision his "public philosophy" and harboured "a
different, private philosophy that was not contained in A Vision" (2000:xv), Graf
argues that "Yeats is largely responsible for making his true intent completely esoteric
and unreadable to modem scholars who do not understand his magical worldview"
(2000: 159).
Indeed, as Ellmann argues, Per Amica Si/entia Lunae is "built up out of evasion so
skilful that the reader is never sure whether he is being presented with a doctrine or
with a poem in prose" (1960:223). And as for A Vision, Ellmann observes, much of
the argument "is clothed in a style more metaphorical than any used in English prose
since the seventeenth century" (1964: 162). He writes that "in so far as it was
philosophical, Yeats felt compelled to apologize for it" (1964:163). "Ifno reader has
ever been converted to its doctrines," he adds, "the reason is that one is never sure
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what is being offered for acceptance or what attitude the writer wishes to elicit"
(Ellmann 1964:162/63). This is echoed by Foster, who describes A Vision as "his
(Yeats's) bizarre study of the philosophy of history" (2001: 71). In highlighting that A
Vision has "found few followers," he adds: " ... it is hard to believe that it deserves
them" (2003:606). In "the end," Foster argues, "following the 'System'" necessitates
"the suspension not only of scepticism" but "of the faculty of rational analysis"
(2003 :285).
In all, the arcane content and abstruse prose of both Per Amica Silentia Lunae and A
Vision have not only left critics guessing and condemned both works to receiving
short shrift as 'serious' literary material in comparison to his poems, but also ensured
that Yeats' s hopes of introducing his occult writings into the political scene were
doomed to failure. As Hamburger puts it, Yeats's poetic mask proved "valid only in
Yeats's poetry and not in those spheres, like politics and social life and even literary
criticism, to which Yeats vainly tried to apply its 'philosophy'" (1969:83). The utter
'failure' ofYeats's doctrine and System in practical terms has prompted a number of
critics to nevertheless espy a lesser, non-political value in A Vision. Foster argues that
A Vision's "real value" is "to students of Yeats's mind" and of his artistic
"aspirations" (2003 :285), while Ellmann argues that the "best part" ofA Vision is "not
the explanation of the symbols" but "their application to psychology and history,
where the 'animation of experience' dominates abstract definition"(1964: 163/4). The
direct link between the psychology and aspirations articulated in these works and the
Irish colonial context, and therefore the implicit and explicit political content of these
works, has been largely overlooked. As I will show in the next chapter, one can agree
with Ellmann's observation that "the inconsistencies" ofA Vision "are ofless
importance than the powerful sense of tumultuous life, and of the struggle to
transcend it, which the book conveys" (1964:164), and add that this tumultuousness
and struggle cannot be divorced from the colonial context in which these works were
produced.
The abstrusity of Per Amica Silentia Lunae and A Vision, one may speculate, could
also be partly explained by historical circumstances: pro-rebel meant pro-German
around the time Per Amica Silentia Lunae was written, there was a Literary Fund
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pension and censorship to consider, while Yeats himself was in physical danger
during the Civil War when A Vision was being compiled and completed. Obscurity of
meaning, then, may have suited Yeats on more practical, rather than artistic, levels. In
all, though, Yeats's occult precepts and writings, bizarre and somewhat confusing to
even his most sympathetic readers and critics, left him in glaring intellectual solitude.
As Ross argues, what "was most important to Yeats" was "what happened inside his
mind" (2001: 113), and clearly this distanced him from his countrymen and
contributed to the failure of his ideas to enter the popular imagination. His occult
works' seeming lack of material currency, exacerbated by the abstrusity of their
expression and complexity of their content, ensured they did not have purchase in the
public or political spheres. Given the Catholic ethos of the new state, and Yeats' s
forever compromised position as an Ang1o-Irish Protestant, the 'occult' outpourings
of a so-called Ascendancy poet were from the start doomed to be unwelcome and
fodder for scorn and ridicule. As I have indicated, the stable, fixed identities Yeats
attempted to circumvent in theory were, in the end, in practice not dislodged or
disowned.
This distance between Yeats and his countrymen exposes what may be deemed the
Achilles Heel of Yeats' s political thinking: his problematic conflation of the
individual and nation. As Kiberd argues, to read Yeats's Autobiographies is "to be
constantly impressed and unnerved by the casual ease" with which he substitutes
himself "as a shorthand" for his country and countrymen, "writing an implicit and
covert constitution" for Ireland in the image of his "very creation" (1996: 119). As I
have indicated in this chapter, Ellmann points out that Yeats rewrote his
Autobiographies "with A Vision in mind," and "put reticence upon his narrative and
suffused it with the serenity of the man who has achieved Unity of Being"
(1960:241), turning himself "into that man of phase 17 whom, once he had posited, he
had decided to resemble" (1960:242). Yeats's substitution of himself "as a shorthand"
for his countrymen can therefore be re1at~d to his construction of himself as an Irish
national poet and archetype in A Vision, a system which indeed conflates self and
nation.
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Kiberd argues in regard to the Irish colonial context that, with the loss of native
landscape and culture, the Irish artist turns to his "own private world" and "volunteers
to fill the cultural vacuum, as a promissory note for a yet-to-be-implemented nation"
(1996: 119). The artist, Kiberd argues, "equates self and nation": thus, in Joyce's A
Portrait ofthe Artist as a Young Man, "one youth" can claim "to incarnate the
uncreated conscience of his race" (1996: 119), while Yeats can do the same in "To
Ireland in the Coming Times": "Nor may I less be counted one/With Davis, Mangan,
Ferguson,lBecause, to him who ponders well,lMy rhymes more than their rhyming
telllOfthings discovered in the deep,lWhere only body's laid asleep" (Collected
Poems 1971 :57). In "such a self-charged context," Kiberd argues, "nation-building
can be achieved by the simple expedient of writing one's autobiography," and
"autobiography in Ireland becomes, in effect, the autobiography of Ireland"
(1996: 119). This notion is echoed in Foster's repeated references to Yeats' s biography
being in many ways "the history of his country" (2001:59).
Kiberd explains that, in the Irish colonial context, the artist's ideal is "the achieved
individual, the person with the courage to become his or her full self' (1996: 119) -
exactly, I contend, also the ideal ofthe 'modernist' Yeats and the ideal expressed in
Per Arnica Si/entia Lunae and A Vision. As a result, Kiberd argues, the "Irish self'
becomes "a project," with the reader "invited" to become "a co-creator with the
author" (1996: 120). The "characteristic text" is "a process, unfinished, fragmenting,"
refusing "to exact a merely passive admiration for the completed work of art"
(1996:120). This explains, to an extent, the "short aphoristic reflections" (Foster
2003:75) and what Ellmann calls the skilful "evasion" (1960:223) of Per Arnica
Si/entia Lunae, and the "astrological pattern-making" (Foster 2003:75) and what
Ellmann calls the extremely "metaphorical" (1964: 162) style ofA Vision. Both works,
non-linear in structure, seem unfinished and splintered, apparently requiring their
completion through the active engagement of the reader.
Indeed, as Ellmann draws attention to, in the last pages ofA Vision "Yeats describes
how, having fully evolved and knitted together the symbol ofA Vision, he draws
himself up into the symbol, as he could well do now that it was wholly personalized
as a system and systematized as an expression of personality" (1960:286). However,
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"after building up a system over three hundred pages," Yeats startlingly "in the last
two pages sets up that system's anti-self' (1960:286): he prioritises The Thirteenth
Cycle, which Yeats states "is in every man and called by every man his freedom"
(1960:286). It "knows what it will do with its own freedom," he adds, "but it has kept
the secret" (1960:286). In irrevocably destabilizing or, in a sense, 'undoing' his
System with an over-riding infusion of "free will, liberty and deity" which "is able to
alter everything," and by informing the reader that this Thirteenth Cycle "is in every
man and called by every man his freedom" (1960:286), Yeats appears to invite the
Irish reader to freely co-create with him the kind of ideal Irish self (of Phase 17) that
he himself has constructed; to, in fact, recreate it for him or herself.
A Vision, then, presents itself as an 'unfinished' work and process, with the ideal Irish
self becoming "a project" for the reader - and Yeats standing in as exemplar. Yeats
thus envisages Irish sovereignty, and in this regard Anderson's argument, outlined in
chapter one, is apposite: nations, he argues, dream "of being free and, if under God,
directly so" (1991 :7). The "gage and emblem of this freedom," Anderson adds, "is the
sovereign state" (1991 :7). However, that few if anyone in Ireland knew of or chose to
accept Yeats's invitation, as extended through not only A Vision but also Per Amica
Si/entia Lunae, to fashion and become "his or her full self' and in due course a new
type of nation(-state) is perhaps final proof that self and nation in Yeats's case were
not one and the same. This proof is compounded by the marginalization of Yeats by
the Catholic establishment precisely because of his Anglo-Irish Protestant
background. In the final analysis, the Irish did not understand what he was getting at,
and many Catholic Irish did not care to simply because it came from him.
This is to, again, emphasize that Per Amica Si/entia Lunae and A Vision, and the
'modernist' Yeats himself, were (and continue to be) seen by many as morally,
'philosophically' and politically objectionable. Yeats was, of course, aware of this.
Anticipating his critics, he wrote that when his reason had "recovered" he viewed his
System as merely "stylistic arrangements of experience" that helped him "to hold in a
single thought reality and justice" (Jeffares 1990:86). This disingenuous explanation
appears to inform Said's summation ofYeats's System as important only insofar as it
"symbolizes" Yeats's "efforts to lay hold of a distant and yet orderly reality"
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(1993 :287). However, Yeats's metaphorical System is itself the answer to his
detractors. As Unterecker points out, the "pattern of overlapping gyres which
constitutes Yeats's Great Wheel" could in Yeats's System "only be accepted by the
man of phase 17 because only that man would be concerned with that sort of
synthesis" (1969:28). For those in other phases, other "religious, historical or
psychological systems would be not only necessary but the only possible true ones"
(1969:28). Believing in or disbelieving his System, and the extent of this, is therefore
up to the individual. For Yeats, Unterecker argues, 'truth' is "only that which the
individual can believe," for the "only true view of the world is the individual's"
(1969:28).
This is not pure relativism, however, for as Yeats wrote elsewhere: "Man can embody
truth but cannot know it" (Ellmann 1964:214); and elsewhere: " ... the world being
illusive one must be deluded in some way if one is to triumph in it" (1964: 109).
Individuals - including himself - Yeats therefore grants, "may be deceiving others
and they may even be practising a form of deception upon themselves" (1960: 176).
The concept of the False Mask in his System makes this point. Rather, Yeats is more
specific: his System presents the Nietzschean notion that "the individual creates his
own world" (1964:94), and posits that "man must have a dream of what he might be
in order to become it" (Ellmann 1964: 108). The individual, it demonstrates, must
have an ideal or Mask to weld him or herself to at the level of identity if self-
determination is to be achieved. Yeats thus answers his detractors with what Pippin
calls in general terms a "modernist authority," presenting in A Vision an artistic
imagination that, although "difficult, opaque, strange, elitist, uncommercial, self-
defining," demonstrates in its artistic activity "a kind of integrity and autonomy
foreclosed in bourgeois life" (Pippin 1991:32). In particular, Yeats's "intensely self-
conscious, historical, even philosophical art" presents his readers and detractors with
what Pippin calls generally "a finally modem 'honesty'" - i.e. with, in the very
multiplicity of the Mask in his System, what Pippin calls in general terms a
"recognition of the contingency and mutability of human ideals" (Pippin 1991:32).
There are, therefore, many objections that could be lodged against Yeats's Doctrine of
the Mask and System, given the multiplicity of perspectives represented by his
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readers, critics and detractors. Not the least of these objections would be Yeats's
modernist subscription to what Sheppard calls a "firm spiritual substratum" existing
beyond or "within what looks like entropic chaos or unreso1veable conflict" (Gi1es
1993 :35). Fanon, of course, dismisses the collective unconscious insofar as he objects
to what Crewe calls "Eurocentric, universalizing psychoanalysis," with "its erasure of
cultural and political difference" (De Kock 2001 :292). Fanon argues in Black Skin,
White Masks that the collective unconscious is "not dependent on cerebral heredity"
as lung posits but "the unreflected imposition" of 'white' or European "culture"
(1967: 191); and that in the collective unconscious "the black man is the symbol of
Evil" (1967: 188) and furnishes the "white man" with the very "mechanism of
projection" or "transference" (1967:190). These arguments, however, point
emphatically to the notion of the unconscious in relation to colonial Othering and
oppression, and are not inconsistent with Yeats's anti-colonial perspective in the
specifically Irish context. Rather, as Sheppard explains, subscription to a (collective)
unconscious is a modernist "sense" that "is deeply repugnant to those critics who have
accepted the (anti-)ontology of postmodernism" (Giles 1993:35). Nevertheless,
however repugnant, impractical and indefensible Yeats's Doctrine of the Mask and
System (or aspects of these) may be deemed by many to be, it remains my thesis that
the incorporation of the 'modernist' or occult Yeats into Said's construction of the
'postcolonial' Yeats would serve to bolster rather than undermine this construction.
That few if anyone accepted Yeats's invitation to "co-create" or recreate the ideal
"Irish self', and thereby "a new kind of nation" (Unterecker 1963 :31), does not, I
contend, undermine the value of his interrogation of 'identity' in the Irish colonial
context. Neither does it devalue his proffering of his Doctrine of the Mask as a
"prescription" for the achievement of a postcolonial Ireland at the level of identity.
Indeed, I submit that the 'modernist' Yeats, complete with occult preoccupations, and
Said's'postcolonial' Yeats should, rather than be seen as "two different men", more
productively be reconceived (invoking Yeats' s diagram purely for illustrative
purposes) as two interpenetrating gyres that together provide a fuller, more dynamic
picture of the individual Yeats.
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As I have drawn attention to, Ellmann points out that the "portraits" of Yeats created
by his biographers and critics in general "are not easily reconcilable, and the tendency
has been, instead of reconciling, to prove certain of them inessential" (1960:2). lithe
gyres, given their intricacies, are not an appropriate image of such reconciliation in
this regard, it suffices to state that an understanding of the 'modernist' Yeats is, in
fact, essential to an understanding of the 'postcolonial' Yeats - and vice versa. Where
the 'postcolonial' Yeats is separated from and not yet reconciled with the 'modernist'
Yeats, Yeats's conception ofIrish national identity and credentials as a 'postcolonial'
figure cannot be fully appreciated. The stark "Difference" between the constructions
of the 'modernist' and 'postcolonial' Yeatses should therefore give way to an
emphasis on their underlying "Unity".
* * * * *
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Chapter Three: Yeats's Conception of Irish National Identity
Yeats's grasp of the problems and strategic opportunities of 'identity', particularly
regarding the espousal of individual and collective identity in the face and wake of
colonial oppression in Ireland, fmds considered expression in his development,
refinement and articulation of his Doctrine of the Mask. Moreover, I contend that
Yeats's doctrine - explicated in the magical poetics of Per Amica Silentia Lunae,
incorporated into the mechanics and embodied by the overall structure ofA Vision,
and expressed in a wide range of Yeats' s works - stands as one of the foremost
articulations from within the colonial context, of a model or "prescription" for the
envisioning and adoption of an emphatically 'postcolonial' national identity. It is a
prime example of why, in addition to the roles and activities (such as 'nationalist' or
'political agitator') generally associated with him by biographers and critics, Yeats
should be recognized in great measure and with a high degree of prioritization as a
postcolonial visionary.
The Doctrine of the Mask must be viewed against the backdrop ofYeats's earlier
'correcting', in "The Celtic Element in Literature", of Matthew Arnold's essentialist
stereotyping ofthe Irish as racially inferior. As Castle indicates, Ernest Renan - in his
influential essay "Poetry of the Celtic Races" - characterises the Celtic temperament
as "feminine, childlike, given to messianism and a 'transparent' or 'realistic
naturalism'" that is "the sign of 'the love of nature for herself, the vivid impression of
her magic'" (2001 :47). This tactic offeminization, Castle points out, "had the effect
of marginalizing Celtic races with respect to the patriarchal puritanism of English
imperialists" (2001 :47). Building on this marginalization and popularizing it as a
colonial trope, Arnold - in his "On the Study of Celtic Literature" - develops Renan's
"portrait of a feminized race forsaken by its conquerers" into "an imperial allegory of
paternal appropriation" of "the Gael" (2001 :47). The Gael's '''typical' qualities of
energy, dynamism and turbulence," Arnold argues, justifies the inclusion of "the Irish
in an imperial collective" (2001:47).
Arnold severely moderates his passion for the Irish, however, by insisting that "the
'Celtic nature' is inherently 'sentimental'" (2001 :47). For Arnold, as Castle argues,
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"sentimental" means a range of qualities, including "a lively personality, a keen
sensitivity, sociability, hospitability, eloquence" and most of all "a desire 'to aspire
ardently after life, light, and emotion, to be expansive, adventurous and gay'"
(2001:47). The Celt, Arnold adds, is "always ready... 'to react against the despotism
of fact'" (2001:47). It is the Celt's "sentimental" nature that Arnold "finds not only
attractive but in some ways desirable as a quality that might augment the English
character, already dominated by Teutonic materiality and political strength"
(2001:47). His union of English and Irish therefore resembles what Howes describes
as "a happy partiarchal marriage between the feminine and attractive but inferior Celt
and the masculine and superior Saxon" (1996:22/23). The Saxon's rule is deemed to
be "natural and inevitable," but the Saxon's existence "would be enriched by a
feminine influence" (1996:23). The Celt is "a specimen of maimed masculinity, of
illness and lack," but "the Celt coupled with the Saxon" could become "the angel in
the British house of empire, sweetening and completing it" (1996:23).
Arnold therefore rehearses the deracination and miscegenation of the colonized,
accepting "into the imperial fold a sentimental, politically emasculated subaltern race"
(Castle 2001:47) while encouraging the Irish "to accept the cultural role" that the
Saxon "assigns to them" (2001 :48). This is a role, Castle explains, "designed to
further the aims of imperialism at the cost of the Celt's native language and customs"
(2001 :48). The Celt, rather than "exercising its will in the political arena," must "be
content with becoming an object of modern science" (2001 :48) and history. This
reduction, through political emasculation, to "the status of an anthropological
curiosity," Arnold implies, "could only have come about because of racial inferiority"
(2001 :48).
Subscribing also to the nineteenth-century stereotype of the Irish "as 'undisciplinable,
anarchical, and turbulent by nature,'" Arnold ascribes this unruliness to the Celt's
particular affinity with "the wild magic of nature" (2001:49). The Celt, Amold claims,
appears '''in a special way attracted by the secret before him, the secret of natural
beauty and natural magic, and to be close to it, to half-divine it'" (2001:49). This
affinity, along with the Celt's "sentimentality", severely moderates "any hint of
masculine energy and suggests a creative receptivity - a 'reverence and enthusiasm
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for genius, learning and things of the mind' - that is gendered feminine" (2001 :49).
The Amoldean perspective is that "a 'feeling for what is noble and distinguished,' an
'indomitable personality', and 'sensibility and nervous exaltation' give the Celt access
to nature's 'weird power and... fairy charm'" (2001:49).
Amold thus effectively consigns the Celtic people "to a realm of magic naturalism"
that is "at the farthest remove from cultural and political power" (2001:49). Castle
quotes the assertion of Caims and Richards, that Amold defines the typical '" Celtic'
personality" as "feminine, irrational, impractical and childlike" (Castle 2001:49).
What I wish to stress is that this is an imperialist imposition at the level of identity.
The Irish are represented as being, in their 'essence', inferior. This is a categorization
concordant with Fanon's diagnosis ofthe colonizer-colonized relationship, explained
in chapters one and two, whereby the colonized "child" is on "the unconscious plane"
(2001: 169) subject to rigorous control of its "fundamentally perverse... ego" and
"essence" (2001: 170). At the level of identity, in line with Hamer's arguments
outlined in chapter two, the Irish are portrayed as supposedly "passive and spoken
for"; the typical Gael is "represented in accordance with a hegemonic impulse" by
which "it is constructed as a stable and unitary entity" (Said 1993 :273).
Yeats, in what is itself an act of decolonization given this imposition of negative
identity, challenges Amold's claim of English racial and cultural supremacy. Against
Amold's assertion that the Celt is "unique in being able to 'half-divine' natural
magic," Yeats counters in "The Celtic Element in Literature" that "this ability is not a
racial trait" but "one characteristic of a people" who are "able to sustain contact with
an 'ancient worship ofNature'" (Castle 2001 :50). Yeats writes that the Celt's
"'natural magic'" is really just "the religion of the world, the ancient worship of
Nature" (2001 :50). He therefore subtly shifts Celtic spirituality "from a racial to a
temporal plane," and makes "a bold claim for the spiritual superiority of a 'timeless
people'" (2001 :50).
Notably, Yeats does not take issue with Amold's attempt to prove a Celtic influence
on English literature, but rather claims that unlike other folk traditions "the Celt alone
has been for centuries close to the main river of European literature" (2001: 51). Yeats
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also does not take issue with Arnold's argument that "'Celtic art seems to make up to
itself for being unable to master the world and give an adequate interpretation of it, by
throwing all its force into style,''' and thus the notion that "expression" in Celtic
literature seems "usually to precede conceptualization" (Kiberd 1996:116). Nor does
Yeats take issue with Arnold's famous conclusion that the Celtic sensibility can be
defined "as a 'passionate, turbulent, indomitable reaction against the despotism of
fact''' (Castle 2001:50).
However, Yeats quickly refutes "any racial stigma attached to the reaction against
'facts,''' claiming the Celt's response is in order to "embrace" that which is "superior
to facts" - the "timeless, spiritual substratum of folk traditions" (2001 :51). In all, this
is the position that Yeats takes in regard to Arnold' s "mystification of the Celtic
character": what is for Arnold "'a magically vivid and near interpretation of nature,'''
Castle argues, is for Yeats "real" (2001:58). For Yeats, the "other-worldly is
simultaneously this-worldly"; and "magic, far from being an eccentricity of the Celtic
imagination," is "at the heart ofYeats's Revivalist project" (2001 :58). As I will
demonstrate in this chapter, this is the position informing Yeats's Doctrine of the
Mask, in which the "timeless, spiritual substratum," Nature and "magic" are
conjoined and interfused in terms ofYeats's conception ofIrish national identity.
Castle argues that the effect of Yeats' s statements is "to refute on literary-historical
grounds the subaltern status of the Celtic people that Amold presupposes on racial
grounds" (2001 :51). The "primitiveness of the Celt" described by Amold in terms of
racial essence "is redefined as a spiritual trait that links the ancient to the modem in a
continuous, timeless unity" (2001:51). Furthermore, Yeats's "assent to the binomial
distinction between primitive and civilized peoples," Castle argues, "carries the
proviso that the Irish Celts were neither pre-literate, having an intimate connection
with a rich folk tradition, nor without history, having an equally intimate connection
with an 'ancient religion'" (2001:52).Yeats's response therefore "appears to grant
Amold's claims a certain legitimacy as a scholarly description of Celticism" while it
simultaneously "subtly reinterprets his central argument about the Celtic imagination
and its relation to English literature and the British Empire" (2001 :49).
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However, Castle argues, while "Yeats subtly reverses Arnold's call for Celtic
submission to the British Empire," this reversal "raises an important question: does it
generate an anti-colonialist discourse capable of resisting the discriminatory effects of
primitivism, or does it in fact fail to avoid a remystification of the Celt, thus
reinscribing Arnold's strategies of binomial racial and cultural typing?" (2001 :51). As
Foster puts it, "though jeering at Matthew Arnold" Yeats still "apparently" subscribes
"to the Arnoldean view of the Celt as dreamy, sensitive and doom-laden" (1998:53).
Castle posits that the "subversion is by no means complete," and that "a residual
reliance on primitivist discourse in Yeats's appeal to an 'ancient worship of Nature'"
and "surfacing more explicitly in his folklore projects" blocks Yeats "from offering a
decisive critique of imperialist Celticism and its anthropological assumptions about
the Irish 'race'" (2001:51). Castle states that while Yeats "challenges the cultural
superiority of the English and offers a kind of prophylactic for the madness of
colonial domination," the fact that he "does so without seriously questioning Arnold's
primitivist assumptions indicates either a subtle strategy or a blind spot" (2001 :50).
The view that it indicates a blind spot hinges largely on Yeats's literary treatment of
the Irish 'peasant', with a number of critics accusing Yeats of (unwitting) complicity
with imperialist or Ascendancy logic. However, as I've argued in chapter two, the
occult deeply informs the 'modernist' Yeats's so-called 'primitivist discourse', to the
extent that he prioritises the occult over 'the primitive'. In addition, I have pointed to
the 'modernist' Yeats's acute awareness of the constructedness of representations of
Irishness in the colonial context, and have highlighted his reclamation of "the artist's
right to represent" (Castle 2001 :88) in a poem like "The Fisherman" (1919). The
incorporation of Yeats's Doctrine of the Mask into A Vision constitutes, I contend, a
decisive rebuttal and flouting of Arnold. Yeats's doctrine is illuminating evidence of
the fact that his apparent 'failure' to "seriously" question Arnold's primitivist
assumptions is indeed a "subtle strategy" and not a "blind spot".
What appears to have escaped the notice of critics is that Yeats, in articulating his
doctrine in Per Arnica Silentia Lunae and A Vision, uses the very same terms and
concepts used by Arnold. The essentialist, racial stereotyping of the typical Irishman
"as 'undisciplinable, anarchical, and turbulent by nature" (2001 :49); as having a
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"special affinity with 'the wild magic of nature'" (2001:49); as having a '''reverence
and enthusiasm for genius, learning and things ofthe mind'" (2001:49); as being
"sentimental" (2001:47); and as having a sensibility that can be defined "as a
'passionate, turbulent, indomitable reaction against the despotism of fact" (2001 :50) is
more than just deliberately unhooked by Yeats from a racial basis. As I will
demonstrate in this chapter, Yeats intentionally appropriates and mobilises these
terms and concepts in ways that would never have been approved of by Arnold, to suit
Yeats's own vision of a non-essentialist, 'postcolonial' Irish national identity. Indeed,
Yeats effectively usurps, transmogrifies and implodes the original terms and
meanings constituting Arnold's imposition of negative Irish identity. The words used
by Arnold therefore subversively buttress Yeats's "prescription" for creating a
positive, distinct Irish national identity that dismantles the binary opposition of
'superior' colonizer- 'inferior' colonized.
As Kiberd argues, Arnold's view is that the "Irish imagination could raise and
ennoble English pragmatism and that both could couple in a complete British person,"
and Arnold's proposed "fusion of Celtic and Saxon elements" is posited "in order to
deny the separatist claims of the Irish" (1996:425). In this context, I wish to again
underline Yeats's tenet, explained in chapter two, that a fusion of Protestant and
Catholic traditions in Ireland "would produce a new Ireland greater than the sum of its
parts" (1996:425). Kiberd argues that this "deftly" repeats Arnold's "manoeuvre", but
"in the opposite direction, recruiting the pragmatism of the English Prostestant for an
expanded and enhanced Irish personality" (1996:425). Arnold's proposal, rendered
"in order to deny the separatist claims of the Irish," is therefore "mischievously
modified ... with the strategic purpose of asserting that very claim" (1996:425).
Kiberd argues elsewhere that the "idea of uniting Catholic imagination with Protestant
efficiency must have seemed to Yeats a wily appropriationJor Ireland alone of the
Amoldean theory of Irish creativity 'completing' English pragmatism in a unified
British personality" (1996:124). As I will demonstrate in this chapter, Yeats's
Doctrine of the Mask enacts this conciliatory strategy at a 'medium-level' in
attempting to effectively render the divisive labels of "Protestant" and "Catholic"
within Ireland "meaningless" (1996:451), or rather, no longer mutually exclusive in
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'national' terms. However, it must be added that this strategy is also enacted in
Yeats's doctrine at a 'macro-level' in tackling English Othering. Yeats's seeming
"blind spot" in regard to seriously questioning Arnold's primitivist assumptions is
shown in his doctrine to in fact be an anti-colonial modification of Arnold's
Celticism. Yeats's doctrine transforms the terms of Arnold' s racial stereotyping of the
Irish in such manner that "a potentially insulting cliche is retrieved by Yeats in a
subtle and subversive fashion, to underwrite the very separatist claim which Arnold
sought to deny" (1996: 124).
In doing so, Yeats' s "residual reliance on primitivism" - which Castle argues blocks
Yeats "from offering a decisive critique of imperialist Celticism and its
anthropological assumptions about the Irish 'race '" (2001 :51) - in fact emerges as
'modernist' esotericism and psychology 'dressed up' like the proverbial wolf in
sheep's clothing. This is in order to call for, at the level of identity, what Foster calls a
"distinctively Irish passion and imagination against the imposition of bloodless (and
self-interested) English rationalism" (1998:53). I contend that Yeats's brand of
inclusive and liberated Irishness, as articulated in his Doctrine ofthe Mask in Per
Arnica Silentia Lunae and its incorporation into the System ofA Vision, does indeed
"generate an anti-colonialist discourse capable of resisting the discriminatory effects
of primitivism" (Castle 2001:51). I will draw on Fanon's statements and arguments in
particular to underline this anti-colonialist discourse, in showing that it does indeed
"avoid a remystification of the Celt" and the "reinscribing" of"Arnold' s strategies of
binomial racial and cultural typing" (2001 :51) - precisely because it debunks
Arnoldean primitivism and Arnold himself altogether. Yeats' s doctrine constitutes "a
decisive critique of imperialist Celticism" and its "anthropological assumptions about
the Irish 'race'" (2001:51). It promotes a non-essentialist, postcolonial Irish national
identity designed to induce Irish national unity.
* * * * *
Yeats's Doctrine of the Mask delineates a process whereby individuals and nations
may, through a realisation of and engagement with the constructedness of identity,
achieve "Unity of Being" - a desired state of "true unified being" (Graf 2000: 103) in
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which psychological "fragmentation and abstraction" has been "overcome" (Foster
2003: 179). Later in this chapter I will return to the issue, raised in chapter two, of
Yeats's problematic conflation of the individual and nation in the System ofA Vision,
in considering the implications of this for his conception of Irish national identity. At
this stage, I wish simply to outline that the three elements of the process are the mask,
the anti-self, and their "spiritual counterpart" (Ellmann 1964:151) the daimon. The
process consists of four stages, each described metaphorically: turning from a mirror;
meditating on a mask; a resultant immersion in and becoming the anti-self; and, in
turn, a resultant evocation of the daimon that unites the individual or nation 'to itself.
According to Yeats's theory, which is applied to poetry in Per Amica Si/entia Lunae,
"before the daimon could find the artist, the artist had to become his anti-self, often by
using a mask" (Graf2000:98).
While these elements are treated separately, they in fact constitute an arrangement of
overlapping, conflated concepts and images informed by and informing what Heaney
calls the "unifying drive" that is "central to Yeats's mind" (2000:xxi). As dominant
motifs in Per Amica Si/entia Lunae that converge on and interfuse with one another in
a unity, they are later "reimagined" inA Vision "in terms of new conceptions"
(2000:xxii) which "mirror one another" (Ellmann 1964:151), such as Yeats's gyres,
Four Faculties, and the Great Wheel of his phases of the moon. Regarding the "new
conceptions", Yeats himself admits in Part XVII of "The Completed Symbol" in A
Vision that he has "now described many symbols which seem mechanical because
united in a single structure, and of which the greater number, precisely because they
tell always the same story, may seem unnecessary" (Jeffares 1990:221). However, he
adds, they have all "evoked for me some form of human destiny" (1990:222). The
'placement' and meaning of these complex concepts in Yeats's Doctrine of the Mask,
as well as the relationships between them, will be elucidated in this chapter in
examining Yeats's conception of a non-essentialist, inclusive, postcolonial Irish
national identity.
* * * * *
117
Yeats's doctrine is delineated from start to finish within the framework of
problematizing and interrogating 'identity', with the espousal of positive Irish identity
in colonial circumstances a central concern. In Book V of the first section of Per
Arnica Si/entia Lunae, "Anima Hominis", Yeats portrays Irish middle-class society as
blindly subscribing to a false, superficial 'reality' based on imposed or passively
received and imitative identities. These identities, being seemingly stable and unified,
appear to be 'natural' and 'normal'. The "crass, commercial" (Kiberd 1996: 125)
society that Yeats disparages is the domain of what he calls, strategically 'borrowing'
Arnold's derogatory term, "sentimentalists" or "practical men" who "believe in
money, in position, in a marriage bell, and whose understanding of happiness is to be
so busy whether at work or at play that all is forgotten but the momentary aim"
(Jeffares 1990:40).
Materialistic, conforming, subscribing to social roles and appearances, and lacking
self-knowledge beyond their single, 'fixed' identities, these "sentimentalists" find
their "pleasure in a cup that is filled from Lethe's wharf' (Jeffares 1990:40). They
have thus, Yeats implies, forgotten their deeper creative nature and lapsed into
spiritual torpor through oversubscription to a superficial sense of selfhood. They are
'sleepwalking' through what Yeats calls in "Ego Dominus Tuus" the "common
dream" (Jeffares 1990:34) of their lives. Yeats's strategic use of the word
"sentimentalists" alerts the reader immediately to the fact that his disparagement of
the middle class has a colonial dimension, and that what is at issue and at stake is Irish
national identity in the colonial context. In appropriating and mobilising this term,
Yeats invokes the backdrop of Arnold' s imposition of negative identity on the Irish.
Yeats is suggesting that the middle class - which he believes has "neither family
tradition nor a belief in anything beyond the material world," is "acquisitive, priest-
ridden" and "ready to take up shibboleths" (Ellmann 1960: 180) - is an attractive and
happy helpmate for colonial rule. As I've outlined earlier in this chapter, Arnold's
conception of the inherently "sentimental" (Castle 2001:47) nature of the Irish
suggests a happy, Celtic vacuity fit for "patriarchal marriage" (Howes 1996:22/23): a
"lively personality, a keen sensitivity, sociability, hospitability, eloquence" and most
of all "a desire 'to aspire ardently after life, light, and emotion, to be expansive,
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adventurous and gay'" (Castle 2001 :47). Irish society, Yeats implies, is in effect
'happily married' to not only materialism but to a colonial superficiality at the level of
identity that informs and is informed by modem materialism.
This is a view of 'the middle class' in the colonial context in general that is basically
endorsed by Sartre and Fanon. In The Wretched afthe Earth, Fanon bemoans the
stultifying ties of the middle class to colonial politics and "the Christian religion"
(2001 :32). He argues that, owing to the colony becoming "a market" for the "mother
country", what he calls "reasonable nationalist political parties" (2001 :51) within the
colony gamer support on the basis of protecting bourgeois economic interests. This
results, he argues, in negotiations with "the mother country", which allows "the
people to work off their energy" through "peaceful" (2001 :51) and ineffectual
industrial action and boycotts.
The urban middle class or "puppet bourgeoisie of businessmen and shopkeepers,"
Sartre argues in the Preface to The Wretched afthe Earth, can generally be seen as a
creation of colonial "dividing and ruling" (2001: 10). Occupying "a privileged
position," the middle class is, Sartre holds, a "sham from beginning to end" (2001: 10)
as far as national revolution is concerned. Fanon points to the historical "incapacity of
the national middle class to rationalize popular action" and its "incapacity to see into
the reasons for that action" (2001: 119), owing to its ties with capitalism and therefore
its "psychology... of the businessman" (2001: 120). He writes that this "traditional
weakness" is "not solely the result of the mutilation of the colonized people by the
colonial regime" (2001: 119). Echoing Yeats, he submits that it is "the result of the
intellectual laziness of the national middle class, of its spiritual penury" (2001: 119).
Fanon warns that after independence the middle class which "refuses to follow the
path of revolution" often falls "into deplorable stagnation" whereby it is, he argues,
"unable to give free rein to its genius," a situation it formerly blamed on "colonial
domination" (2001: 121).
While Yeats' s 'branding' of the Irish middle class as "sentimentalists" may appear to
confirm his renowned "condemnation" and "active hatred" (Ellmann 1960: 180) of
this social grouping, and appear to align him with 'aristocratic' Protestant Ascendancy
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hubris and even imperialist logic, I contend that Yeats is in fact consciously
attempting to redefine Irishness. He is fulfilling Fanon's third or "fighting phase" of
the colonized intellectual, in which the writer, having failed to "lose himself in the
people and with the people," instead must "shake the people" (2001: 179). Rather than
"according the people's lethargy an honoured place in his esteem," Yeats "turns
himself' into what Fanon calls "an awakener of the people" (2001: 179). From this, as
Fanon argues, "comes a fighting literature, a revolutionary literature, and a national
literature" (2001: 179), and it is in this light that both Per Arnica Silentia Lunae and A
Vision must be viewed.
As Castle highlights, Yeats's Irish readers were all too familiar with Amold' s view of
the Irish as racially inferior. Amold had imposed negative identity on the Irish in what
Yeats himself pointed out in his response were certain "'well-known sentences'"
(Castle 2001 :50) in Ireland, which I've outlined earlier in this chapter. The term
"sentimental" as a defining feature of "the 'Celtic nature'" (Castle 2001:47) was
therefore a stinging colonial imposition. In this light, Yeats's mobilisation of
"sentimentalists" to lambaste Irish middle-class society in fact suggests that he is with
tactical forethought attempting to spur his readers' subscription to his doctrine
through '''the shock of new material'" (Ellmann 1960:244). Yeats's aim is to inflict
upon his middle-class readers the experience - already had by Swift, Goldsmith and
Berkeley - of finding "in England" the "opposite" that stings "their thought into
expression" and makes "it lucid" (Kiberd 1996:322), regardless of whether they
associate that "England" with Yeats himself.
This attempt to "shock" and even enrage is consistent with Yeats's status as a (high)
modernist. As I've indicated in chapter two, as part of the "avant-garde" Yeats's aim
is "in Ezra Pound's phrase" to '''make it new'" by "violating accepted conventions
and decorums," to "shock the sensibilities of the conventional reader and to challenge
the norms and pieties of bourgeois culture" (Abrams 1981:110). Given Arnold's
Othering ofthe Irish, Yeats's attempt to "shock" is at the same time an attempt at
decolonization by redefining Irishness positively. As Kiberd argues, Yeats "spoke
neither for the noble nor the beggarman" when "the chips were down" but "for the
emergent middle class" (1996:319). The economic system "set up by colonialism," as
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Fanon notes, "hardly left" the middle class "any other choice" (2001: 120). That
Yeats's Anglo-Irish identity is foregrounded by his detractors assists this project,
adding to the "shock" inflicted. As I will clarify in this chapter, Yeats is specifically
attempting to ensure that the middle class gives "free rein to its genius" - a term used
derogatorily by Arnold as an aspect of Celtic inferiority but which for Yeats is
associated with inclusive Irish national unity.
In Book I of "Anima Hominis", Yeats emphasizes what he perceives to be a
disjunction between his inner, private world and the external, "daily social world"
(Coote 1997:385) of the "sentimentalists". He portrays the effect of the external world
of conventional society on his inner world of thoughts and emotions as deeply
disturbing. He reveals that, after he has socialised with "fellow-diners", he reflects on
his feelings of "hostility that is but fear" and on his "undisciplined sympathy" in his
interactions with "women" and "men who are strange to me" (Jeffares 1990:36). His
fellow-diners, he adds, hardly seem to him "of mixed humanity" (1990:36), implying
what Anderson describes as colonial "completeness and unambiguity" (1991: 166) at
the level of identity. Yeats reveals that he analyses his conversations "in gloom and
disappointment," and expresses anxiety that he has perhaps "overstated everything
from a desire to vex or startle" (1990:36). His concern, he confides, is that all his
"natural thoughts have been drowned" (1990:36).
Clearly, Yeats perceives an opposition between the individual's private, inner world
and the external, everyday world. The latter, he suggests, distorts and oppresses the
former's expression - whether "drowning" it completely, lulling the individual
through social pleasantries into "undisciplined sympathy" with 'herd sentiment', or
provoking what Yeats describes as his own hostile self-assertion in "dominating at a
dinner party" (Coote 1997:385). Yeats's resultant feelings of alienation and anxiety
reflect what could be termed a kind of 'identity crisis': his extreme self-consciousness
and acute awareness, since adolescence, of "the discrepancy between what he was and
what he wanted to be, between what he was and what others thought him to be"
(Ellmann 1964:93). In light of his private difficulties in socialising and his dejection
over his "divided self' (Foster 2003:108), Yeats asks: " ... and how should I keep my
head among images of good and evil, crude allegories?" (Jeffares 1990:36).
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Yeats is not only deeply "troubled" by his fractured selfhood but, as Graf explains,
also dissatisfied that, in modern society, people see themselves "as separate" not only
"from others" but "from the world," which consequently "seems to be made up of
polar opposites like good and evil" (2000:105). In Yeats's Blakean tenns, these are
"what the religious call Good & Evil," where Good is "the passive that obeys Reason"
and "Heaven", and Evil "the active springing from Energy" and "Hell" (Butter
1989:53). 'Moral' and 'reasonable' society is therefore governed by an "illusion of
dualism" (Graf 2000: 105) that facilitates and fortifies simplistic, passively received,
conventional representations and categories of thought. Yeats suggests that because
single, 'fixed' identities appear to be 'natural' and 'nonnal' in modem society, there
is a prevailing simplism with regard to 'identity' itself. Modem society, Yeats
implies, uncritically promotes exclusionary alterity with regard to identities, which are
predicated on a "crude" Manichaean binary of "good and evil".
By distinguishing between the external, public world and the inner, private world,
then, Yeats sets up the central conflict or opposition of his Doctrine of the Mask and
System: that between what he calls "primary" or "objective" (external or outwardly-
focused), and "antithetical" or "subjective" (internal or inwardly-focused),
psychological states or aspects of being. This opposition is later reimagined in A
Vision as Yeats's "fundamental symbol" (Jeffares 1990: 120): the interpenetrating
gyres, where the "double cone or vortex" represents "subjectivity and objectivity as
intersecting states struggling one against the other" (1990:122). As one "diminishes",
so the other "increases" (1990: 120). Their interaction is thus what Yeats calls, quoting
Heraclitus: '''Dying each other's life, living each other's death'" (1990: 120). In this
way, the "opposed values" do not "cancel one another out" (Kiberd 1996:326), and
nor does Yeats allow one pole to "predominate ... to the total exclusion" of "its
opposite" (Hamburger 1969:81).
I wish to emphasize that the gyres, as Yeats's basic symbol, in themselves reflect his
deep awareness of aherity as the interdependence of opposites on each other for their
own meaning - including at the level of identity. Yeats draws a distinction in A Vision
between a "contrary" (the conceptual basis of his doctrine) and a "negation". Quoting
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Blake, he explains that these constitute a great "gulph" between "simplicity and
insipidity": Contraries "are positive ... a negation is not a contrary" (Jeffares
1990: 123). Referring to Hegel, he describes "negation" as "two ends of the see-saw"
(1990: 123) that appear to 'cancel' one another out in turn. While I will proceed to
demonstrate the relation of the gyres to 'Anglo' and 'Irish', I wish for the moment to
underline that Yeats's symbol targets the problem of the colonized's espousal of
positive identity.
From the distinction Yeats draws, it is clear that he is aware, like Fanon, that the
"zones" occupied by colonizer and colonized are "not complementary" but
"opposed", and that their single, 'fixed' identities are obedient "to the rules of pure
Aristotlean logic" in that "both follow the principle of reciprocal exclusivity" (Fanon
2001 :30). Yeats is aware that the imposed negative identity of the 'inferior' colonized
or Other, even though apparently cancelled out by the 'superior' colonizer or Othering
Self's positive identity, serves to shore up and define the colonizer in terms of a
Manichaean binary, in the same way that "evil" shores up and defines "good". In
Yeats's Blakean terms, colonial identity is a "negation". As Fanon points out, there
can be no "conciliation", for "of the two terms, one is superfluous" (2001 :30).
Yeats's symbol, depicting dual opposites as interpenetrating rather than separate,
reflects his deep awareness that the view of "good" necessitates "a vision of evil"
(Kiberd 1996:323). It illustrates that images of "good and evil, crude allegories" are
not mutually exclusive, but inextricably invest each other with meaning. It can be
seen that, in Per Arnica Silentia Lunae, Yeats portrays modem society as lacking the
"vision of evil," and as trafficking instead in stultifying "negations" at the level of
identity. In this light, Yeats's gyres constitute a symbol of psychological
decolonization, highlighting the insipidity of colonial negation. Like Blake, Yeats
holds that "Without Contraries is no progression" (Butter 1989:53), and as I will
demonstrate in this chapter, Yeats appropriates and redeploys this insight in
confronting the problem of the Other's espousal of a positive identity in the face and
wake of colonial oppression. As I will also demonstrate, Yeats ultimately constructs
himself in A Vision as an individual whose 'postcolonial' awareness of the insipidity
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of colonial negation allows him to be "content to see both good and evil" (Jeffares
1990: 174).
While Kiberd holds that the gyres "remain vibrating in a sort of dynamic equilibrium"
(1996:326), Ellmann more accurately captures the sense of the System's "furious
movement" (1964: 161/2) in stating that the "vortexes" are "inextricably entwined yet
perpetually at war with one another, now one and now the other triumphant in a series
of regular, inconclusive battles" (1964: 152). Their relationship is therefore intensely
antagonistic. The conflict of antinomies, between 'primary' and 'antithetical', reflects
for Yeats consciousness itself. As Ellmann highlights, Yeats believed "that he had
discovered in this figure of interpenetrating gyres" the "archetypal pattern" which is
"mirrored and remirrored by all life, by all movements of civilization or mind or
nature" (1960:231).
I wish to emphasize that Yeats situates the battle of the gyres within the "human
mind" (Ellmann 1964: 162). Heaney rightly states that there is "surely political
meaning, at once realistic and visionary" in Yeats' s "sense oflife as an abounding
conflict of energies" (2000:xxiv), and it is this political dimension of Yeats's gyres
that Kiberd explicitly foregrounds. Kiberd argues that the primary gyre may be
associated with "Anglo" and the antithetical gyre with "Celtic" (1996:318). This is a
position I agree with in broad terms in light of Arnold's essay, and which I will
proceed to elucidate and substantiate in this chapter. For the moment, I wish to
highlight that Yeats submits that individuals and nations contain both primary and
antithetical qualities "in varying proportions" (Ellmann 1960:229) - not merely one or
the other. The conflict between 'Anglo' and 'Irish' aspects is therefore situated within
the colonized individual's mind. That, psychologically, individuals possess both
aspects is, again, a decolonizing notion, showing that "the theory" of the "absolute
evil nature" of the colonized is not to be countered by "the theory" of the "absolute
evil" (Fanon 2001:73) of the colonizer.
Furthermore, this psychological battle is indicative ofYeats's "tension", outlined in
chapter two, regarding externally imposed or inherited, seemingly stable and fixed
identities: namely 'Irish' Othered by 'English', 'Catholic Irish' and 'Protestant Anglo-
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Irish' as Othered by each other, and the resultant 'Anglo' versus 'Irish' conflict within
himself. As Ellmann indicates, Yeats had emphasized the interiority of the "continual
combat" of opposites in asking: "Why should we honour those that die upon the field
of battle? A man may show as reckless a courage in entering into the abyss of
himself' (1960:6). Kiberd foregrounds the colonial dimension ofYeats's comment,
suggesting it may have been posited to soften "the physical-force elements in Irish
nationalism" and to argue that "Now that the English have gone, the Irish may draw
back from the prosaic quarrel with others to the more poetic quarrel with the self'
(1996:319). While Kiberd correctly highlights Yeats's concern with Irish
psychological liberation after the withdrawal of the English, it must be added that
Yeats's concern predates and anticipates the founding of the Free State.
As Kiberd alludes to but does not explore, Yeats had already posited in Per Amica
Silentia Lunae in 1917 that "We make out of the quarrel with others, rhetoric, but of
the quarrel with ourselves, poetry" (Jeffares 1990:40). The quarrel with others is not,
of course, limited to that between the Irish and English. As Fanon points out, the
"colonized's muscular tension finds outlet ... in tribal warfare, in feuds between septs"
and in "quarrels between individuals" involving "a positive negation of common
sense" (2001:42). This was certainly true of the Catholic-Protestant divide before and
after political' liberation' in 1922. Accordingly, Yeats writes in the "Introduction" to
A Vision that he distinguishes in Per Amica Silentia Lunae "between the perfection
that is from a man's combat with himself and that which is a combat with
circumstance," and that A Vision builds on this "simple distinction" (Jeffares
1990:75).
The colonizer and rival factions within Ireland can therefore be associated with the
"combat with circumstance". As I've argued in chapter two, Yeats holds that
"personal liberation must precede national recovery" or political independence,
"being in fact its very condition" (Kiberd 1996:124), and this may be associated with
the individual's "combat with himself' in terms of, as I will explain in this chapter,
the prioritisation of imaginative self-construction over circumstance or Othering. The
ambiguity of "ourselves", however, indicates Yeats's close association of the combat
within individuals with the "quarrels" among the Irish specifically, and his suggestion
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of poetic creation in both cases has a clear 'nation-making' dimension. In all, as I've
argued in chapter two, Yeats is faced with the problem of the colonized's espousal of
a positive, inclusive national identity in the face and wake of colonial rule in Ireland.
Knowing that assuming political power does not automatically translate into
liberation, Yeats's concern is with developing a 'decolonized' or 'postcolonial'
psychology within Ireland - individually and collectively - in order for genuine
political freedom from colonial rule to be achieved. As Kiberd points out, A Vision's
"are mostly internal quarrels, struggles ... inside the person" shadowed by external
conflicts like the Irish Civil War "which, in Yeatsian terms, was a regrettable but
almost predictable phase in nation-building" (1996:319). Yeats, as I will proceed to
demonstrate, through his Doctrine of the Mask and System imagines full political
liberation and national unity in Ireland as a result of psychological decolonization of
the Irish at the level of identity. His imagining is therefore not limited to strictly
political liberation, which by 1925 (when A Vision was published) had already been to
a significant extent achieved, in spite of the ensuing Civil War, with the establishment
of the Free State.
In line with his distinction between "a man's combat with himself' and "with
circumstance" (Jeffares 1990:75), Yeats explains in A Vision that the subjective cone
"is called that of the antithetical tincture because it is achieved and defended by
continual conflict with its opposite," while "the objective cone is called that of the
primary tincture" (1990:122). Subjectivity, he adds, "tends to separate man from
man" and "objectivity brings us back to the mass where we begin" (1990:122). By the
antithetical cone, Yeats explains, "we express more and more, as it broadens, our
inner world of desire and imagination, whereas by the primary ... we express more
and more, as it broadens, that objectivity of mind which... lays 'stress upon that
which is external to the mind' or treats 'of outward things and events rather than of
inward thought' or seeks 'to exhibit the actual facts, not coloured by the opinions or
feelings'" (1990: 123). The antithetical tincture, he adds, is "emotional and aesthetic"
whereas the primary tincture is "reasonable and moral" (1990: 123).
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Already, it is evident that Yeats draws on the tenninology used in Arnold's
stereotyping of the Irish as racially inferior. The association of the Irish with the
antithetical gyre (desire, imagination and emotion), as I will proceed to explain
further, is clear in that it opposes "fact" (Castle 2001 :47), which is aligned by Yeats
with the primary gyre (external world or "actual facts"). Thus Yeats refonnulates
Arnold's claim that the Celt is "always ready... 'to react against the despotism of
fact'" (2001:47). Yeats initially explains that the "ftrst gyres clearly described by
philosophy are those described in the Timaeus which are made by the circuits of 'the
Other' (creators of all particular things), of the planets as they ascend or descend
above or below the equator," which are "opposite in nature to that circle of the ftxed
stars which constitutes 'the Same' and confers upon us the knowledge ofUniversals"
(Jeffares 1990:120). Following Yeats's commencing line of thought in calling his
cones Discord and Concord respectively, 'the Other' is associated with Discord or
subjectivity, and 'the Same' with Concord or objectivity. The Concord of
Empedocles, Yeats explains, "fabricates all things into'an homogeneous sphere,' and
then Discord separates the elements and so makes the world we inhabit" (1990: 119).
Again, the relation ofthe gyres to the colonial context is clear: the objective or
primary gyre (Concord, the Same) relates to homogeneity and confonnity, and
therefore to the notion of 'fixed' identity infonning bourgeois culture and imposed by
colonial rule; while the subjective or antithetical gyre (Discord, the Other) relates to
the Celt's "indomitable reaction against the despotism of fact," and therefore to a
notion of identity "opposite in nature" to that of 'ftxed' identity and homogeneity.
Thus Yeats writes his own meanings into the Aristotlean 'same-other' dichotomy
infonning 'colonial identity'. This opposition of "objective" and "subjective" is
explored in "Ego Dominus Tuus", the introduction to Per Arnica Si/entia Lunae. The
didactic poem takes the fonn of a dialogue between Hic and Ille, or as Pound
famously mocked, between "Hic and Willie" (Kiberd 1996:446) - the fonner
defending the objective, the latter the subjective. This foreshadows Aherne and the
'double-minded' Robartes in "The Phases of the Moon" (1919). Jeffares's notes to
"Ego Dominus Tuus" are revealing: "Hic and Ille are Latin demonstrative pronouns,
here used in the sense of 'the one' and 'the other'" (1990:370). In line with Pound's
comment, and as I will demonstrate throughout this chapter, Yeats can be said - in
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terms of Jeffares's notes as well as the meanings of homogenizing 'Same' and
heterogeneous 'Other' that Yeats attributes to his gyres - to favour subjectivity over
objectivity and therefore to favour the category of 'the Other' or Cell.
He does so in such manner that these categories of 'Same' and 'Other' - insofar as
Yeats presents, describes and discusses them in Per Arnica Si/entia Lunae and A
Vision - resonate deeply with the liberationist concerns that attach to the term 'Other'
as a marker of negative identity imposed on the colonized by the colonizer or
'unitary' Self in endorsing Sameness through exdusionary alterity and negation. For
Yeats, the colonized Irish are positively rather than negatively associated with being
'Other' , and this' other' state of mind is subversively Yeats's proposed zone of
imaginative self-construction by the (ex)colonized Irish. As I will explain, Yeats
reimagines this opposition between 'the Same' (primary) and 'the Other' (antithetical)
in terms of the Great Wheel of his phases ofthe moon and the Four Faculties moving
within the gyres, such that his Doctrine of the Mask rather aptly 'redoubles' by
reinforcement into Yeats's System for, quite literally, an Irish psychological
'revolution' at the level of national identity.
That Yeats favours subjectivity or the antithetical state over the objective or primary
one is evident almost immediately in Book I of "Anima Hominis", in which he
outlines his antidote to the sense of fractured selfhood and 'identity crisis' he
experiences after socialising. Summarising the visionary experience that precedes
writing poetry, he reveals that after he shuts his door, lights a candle and invites "a
marmorean Muse," he finds "an art where no thought or emotion has come to mind
because another man has thought or felt something different, for now there must be no
reaction, action only, and the world must move my heart but to the heart's discovery
of itself, and I begin to dream of eyelids that do not quiver before the bayonet: all my
thoughts have ease and joy, I am all virtue and confidence" (Jeffares 1990:36).
Graf explains that only when "Yeats's mind" is "submerged" in an antithetical state
can he "become a totally subjective individual, overcome the illusion of duality, and
find a 'revelation of reality'" (2000: 106). Not only does subjectivity bring Yeats the
inspiration to write his poetry, but it also allows him to keep his head among the
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"images of good and evil, crude allegories" informing identity in the 'primary'
everyday world. The colonial dimension is alluded to by Yeats' s employment of the
military image of the bayonet. As Fanon points out, the colonizer and colonized's
"first encounter was marked by violence" and "their existence together. " was carried
on by dint of a great array of bayonets and cannon" (2001:28). Yeats's description
aligns "bayonet" with the 'primary' world and colonial oppression, and projects
Yeats's "dream" of the self-possessed, heroic Irish individual whose "eyelids do not
quiver" in the face of military might and threat of death. This colonial dimension, in
which'Anglo' is associated with primary and 'Celtic' with antithetical qualities in
terms ofYeats's 'correcting' of Arnold's essentialist definition of the Irish as racially
inferior, becomes even clearer in A Vision.
As Kiberd argues, the title A Vision in fact "deliberately refers the Irish reader back to
the aisling or vision-poem, practised by the fallen bards like 0 Rathaille" (1996:318).
It therefore suggests Yeats's overall favouring of antithetical, 'Celtic' qualities in his
System. This extends to Yeats's Great Wheel of the 28 phases of the moon, in which
any "antinomial conflict" can be registered "in terms of the waning or waxing of the
moon" in similar fashion to "the preponderance of one or the other gyre" (Ellmann
1964:157). Basically, the Great Wheel depicts the "single incarnation" (Jeffares
1990: 131) or lifetime of "a particular man" (1990: 132) who moves from "the
completely unindividualized or objective state of infancy (phase 1), rising to the full
individuality or subjectivity of maturity (phase 15), and sinking back at last into
'second childhood and mere oblivion' (phase 28)" (Ellmann 1960:226/227).
In this scheme, there is again an overall opposition between objectivity and
subjectivity: the primary phases occur from Phase 22 and the antithetical phases from
Phase 8, with Phase 1 (the culmination of the primary phases) and Phase 15 (the
culmination of the antithetical phases) positioned directly opposite each other. Phase 1
and Phase 15, Yeats explains, "are not human incarnations because human life is
impossible without strife between the tinctures" (Jeffares 1990:129). The individual
dies at phase 28 and "after a period begins the round once more," but Yeats usually
treats the phases as "a series of incarnations rather than as the stages of a single
lifetime" (Ellmann 1960:227).
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Again, Yeats avoids replicating the "crude" Manichaean binary in terms of which the
colonizer's "saying" that '''All natives are the same'" might unwittingly be aped by
replying that all the English are " ... the same'" (Fanon 2001 :72). All individuals
'travelling' around the Great Wheel contain both objectivity and subjectivity "in
varying proportions" (Ellmann 1960:229) and not merely one or the other. Yeats
reveals that while the Great Wheel "taken as a whole" is divided into primary and
antithetical phases, "seen by different analysis" (Jeffares 1990:135) the phases are
alternately antithetical (odd numbers) and primary (even numbers) and every phase is
in fact "in itself a wheel" (1990: 136). Again, the conflict is not merely between the
individual and external, including and especially colonial, circumstances, but within
the individual or "human mind" (Ellmann 1964:162). Yeats's portrayal of this inner
war in terms of the Four Faculties moving within the gyres (i.e. in the mind) will be
elucidated later in this chapter in re-examining the phases of the moon.
It suffices at this stage to underline that Yeats' s delineation of the primary phases
suggests the type of "uniformity and massification" that marked "English society,
whose members were all (according to Blake) 'intermeasurable', or (in Yeats's
elaboration) 'chopped and measured like a piece of cheese'" (Kiberd 1996:323).
These phases, which begin with the "Breaking of Strength" (Jeffares 1990:130) at
Phase 22, belong to the world of the "single point of view" and "the 'single vision' of
a mechanistic psychology" which Yeats equates "with Newton's sleep'" (Kiberd
1996:317). This is a world in which the empirical Locke may submit "all to the test of
reason" and claim that "under standard conditions, each person would see 'the same
thing'" (1996:322). Thus the primary phases are characterised by census-like
conformity at the level of identity, emphasizing compliance with and service to
external circumstances and appearances (in the colonial context, dictated by the
English).
As Ellmann puts it, the primary group of moons tends towards "the sheering away of
personality and the assertion of undistinguished equality"; it "suppresses and husks"
(1964: 157) the individual. When the state of objectivity prevails every man "tries to
look like his neighbour and repress individuality and personality" (Ellmann
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1960:232). Therefore 'unity' in these phases is enforced homogeneity, and "moral"
(Jeffares 1990:131). Yeats writes, for instance, that in the primary Phase 25 "men
seek to master the multitude, not through expressing it, nor through surprising it, but
by imposing upon it a spiritual norm" (1990: 195). Ellmann notes that "the objective
phases are disparaged" (1964:158) in Yeats's didactic poem "The Phases ofthe
Moon". Yeats refers to the "coarseness ofthe drudge" of the primary phases, and
reinforces their association with imposed or passively received and imitative identities
by linking these phases with the 'moral and reasonable' job titles, labels and social
roles of the middle-class 'sentimentalists': "Reformer, merchant, statesmen, learned
man/Dutiful husband, honest wife by turn" (Collected Poems 1971: 187). Yeats clearly
associates colonial rule, bound up with modem Irish bourgeois society, with these
phases.
As this points to, the 'Celtic' antithetical phases are in line with "the psychological
bias" Yeats "learned from his father" to "minimize the importance of the external
world" (Ellmann 1960:226), a bias also evident in Berkeley's philosophy that "things
exist only in so far as we perceive them" (Kiberd 1996:322) and opposed to Locke's.
Heaney argues that "the whole force" of Yeats' s "thought" works "against those
philosophies" which regard "the mind's activity as something determined by
circumstance" (2000:xx). Accordingly, the antithetical phases tend towards "the
energetic personality" of the "Renaissance hero"; this group of moons "extols the
individual" and climaxes in "self-fulfilment" (Ellmann 1964: 157). The individual
progressing through these phases expresses "more and more" the "inner world of
desire and imagination" (Jeffares 1990: 123), such that, as I will demonstrate, these
phases in particular represent Yeats's envisioning of an imagined Irish community.
One can extrapolate from Per Arnica Silentia Lunae and A Vision, then, that informing
and incessantly reinforcing a modem Irish society governed by "images of good and
evil, crude allegories" is the political and cultural rule by the colonizer over more than
seven centuries, suppressing antithetical expression through primary domination. In
this context, the colonized Irish have, in line with Hamer's diagnosis outlined in
chapter two, been supposedly "passive and spoken for" and have not had "control" of
their own "representation", in "accordance with a hegemonic impulse" by which they
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have been "constructed as a stable and unitary entity" (Said 1993:273). As I have
shown, Yeats is acutely aware of exclusionary alterity predicated on the dualistic
'good' and 'evil', 'superior' and 'inferior' poles ofthe Manichaean binary. He also
realises, from bitter personal experience, that not only have the Irish been Othered by
the English, but that Othering also exists between, broadly, the two major cultural
traditions within Ireland: Catholics and Protestants.
Othering among the colonized, Fanon argues, is an outcome of colonial rule. As he
puts it regarding the colonies in Africa: "Inside a single nation, religion splits up the
people into different spiritual communities, all of them kept up and stiffened by
colonialism and its instruments" (2001: 129). Or, as Sartre argues more generally, in a
way that speaks directly to Yeats's Anglo-Irish Ascendancy background and Othered
identity within Ireland: " ... the mother country" has "planted" the colony with settlers
and exploited it; has "multiplied divisions and opposing groups, has fashioned classes
and sometimes even racial prejudices, and has endeavoured by every means to bring
about and intensify the stratification of colonized societies" (2001: 10). The "different
tribes" therefore "fight between themselves since they cannot face the real enemy,"
and, Sartre adds, "you can count on colonial policy to keep up their rivalries" under
"the amused eye" (2001 :16) ofthe colonizer.
Yeats delineates the psychological ramifications of imposed negative identity for the
Othered in "A Dialogue of Self and Soul" in The Winding Stair and Other Poems
(1933): "How in the name of Heaven can he escape/That defiling and disfigured
shape/The mirror ofmalicious eyes/Casts upon his eyes until at last/He thinks that
shape must be his shape?" (Collected Poems 1971 :266). The imposition through
Othering of what Yeats calls a "disfigured shape" or self-image, and the
psychological violence of this, is also underlined by Fanon. He argues that colonial
domination "is total and tends to oversimplify" in the mode of negation, and every
"effort is made to bring the colonized person to admit the inferiority of his culture ...
to recognize the unreality of his 'nation', and, in the last extreme, the confused and
imperfect character of his own biological structure" (2001: 190).
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The Other's problem, as Yeats knows, centres emphatically on resisting what Fanon
describes as the threat or grip of an "inferiority complex", with its concomitant
"despair and inaction" (Fanon 2001 :74). As Sartre argues, referring like Yeats to the
experience of 'the mirror', the "only violence" is the colonizer's and this is "thrown
back" by the "reflection" that "comes forward" from "a mirror" (2001: 15). Fanon's
description of the various mental disorders arising from the colonial war in Algeria
highlights the destructiveness of the resultant 'identity crisis'. He writes: "Because it
is a systematic negation of the other person and a furious determination to deny the
other person all attributes of humanity, colonialism forces the people it dominates to
ask themselves the question constantly: 'In reality, who am I?'" (2001 :200). What is
at issue and stake, then, is not only the Other's sanity but the espousal of positive
identity in the colonial context, before as well as after political 'liberation'.
The concept of the mirror in relation to identity-formation is, of course, a pervasive
trope in occult material and the field of psychology. Lacan, for instance, locates "the
source of the human imaginary in the so-called 'mirror stage', whereby the child
develops its identity (its ego) via an identification with the twin image reflected by the
mirror or, in the absence of reflective surfaces, by a similar other" (Nobus 2002:63).
Fanon notes that this type of "mirror" is deeply embedded in identity-formation in the
colonial context. Analysing racism against "the Negro" in Black Skin White Masks, he
argues that "once one has grasped the mechanism" described by Lacan one cannot
doubt that "the real Other" for the colonizer ("the white man") will "continue to be"
the colonized ("the black man") (1967:161). Nobus writes that Lacan, defining the
ego "as an agency that 'is constructed like an onion" which can be peeled to "discover
the successive identifications which have constituted it'" (2002:63), holds that "the
human imaginary has nothing to do with the installation and regulation of difference"
but that "it is fundamentally geared towards the advancement of similarity and instead
of a symbolic truce, it induces jealousy, rivalry, competition and aggression"
(2002:63/64). The tendency is toward the Same, towards conformity and hostility - in
Yeats's terminology, a primary or objective state of mind informing and informed by
stable, fixed identity.
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Given that the "colonial world is a Manichaean world" (Fanon 2001:31) of 'self-
other', of' good' colonizer and'evil' colonized, the question for Yeats is how the
individual may "recognize" himself "in the midst of strife caused by the illusion of
dualism" (Graf 2000: I05) and keep his head "among images of good and evil, crude
allegories" at the level of identity. Kiberd states that the "only answer known to Yeats
was that of Mohini Chatterjee," who "taught that all we perceive exists in the external
world - this is a stream which is out of human control, and we but a mirror, and our
deliverance consists in turning the mirror away so that it reflects nothing' (1996:352).
In part VI of "Anima Hominis", Yeats names Saint Francis and Caesar Borgia as
examples of historical figures who "made themselves overmastering, creative persons
by turning from the mirror to meditation upon a mask", and adds: "When I had this
thought I could see nothing else in life" (Jeffares 1990:41). Ellmann points out that
Yeats, like Nietzsche before him, describes '''the objective man' ... as 'a mirror"', as
opposed to the individual who "wears a mask he has designed for himself' (1964:93).
Accordingly, the first step of his doctrine is to turn "from the mirror". Graf adds that
intentionally "turning from the mirror" was "Yeats's metaphor for withdrawing
perception from dualistic, external reality and becoming introspective" (2000: 107) or
antithetical.
As Yeats writes, "mirror on mirror mirrored is all the show," and by 'turning from the
mirror' he points to and away from the "manifold illusion" (Ellmann 1964:xvii) of a
colonial context and middle-class society governed by a limited and limiting
conception of selfhood. The mirror that Yeats advocates turning from is what
Whitaker, quoted by Kiberd, refers to as "the objective mirror" (1996:324). That it is
'objective' aligns it with the 'Anglo' gyre. Graf explains that the image projected in
the mirror is "one assumed without intention" and that it is "simply who the
individual happened to become due to circumstance" (2000: 107). It is also, Kiberd
indicates, "a distorting mirror" (1990:325), presenting a superficial self-image such as
the "defiling and disfigured shape" referred to by Yeats. This is a mirror, then, that
reflects all externally imposed or passively received and imitative identity, including
the unchosen, "defiled and disfigured" self-image or Other-ness imposed on the
colonized, and by the colonized amongst themselves, in the primary, external world.
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The colonized or Other, Sartre argues, can "only become what we are by the radical
and deep-seated refusal of that which others have made of us" (2001: 15). Yeats' s
prescription to turn from the 'objective mirror' represents exactly this refusal. Indeed,
"turning from the mirror" of essentialism and exc1usionary alterity is an act of
decolonization. It exposes the colonized Other's identity as a construct produced by
the colonizer or Othering Self. This has the effect of highlighting that, as Pieterse puts
it in Alterity, Identity, Image, "Images of 'others' do not circulate on account of their
truthfulness" but "because they reflect the concerns of the image producers and
consumers" (Corbey/Leerssen 1991:200). Therefore, at the same time, Yeats exposes
the constructedness ofthe Othering SeWs identity and the underlying Manichaean
binary. On this basis, Yeats proposes the construction of identity anew by the
colonized, 'outside' the binary.
* * * * *
To enable submersion in the anti-self, and attract the daimon, Yeats prescribes in Per
Arnica Si/entia Lunae a conscious act of imagination - "meditation upon a mask"
(Jeffares 1990:41). The imagining of a mask is, as Seiden and Graf explain, an
elementary Golden Dawn practice in which one "identifies with and seeks to become"
the "invoked angel or deity" (Graf 2000: 110). As I will demonstrate, this practice is
reframed by Yeats in his doctrine in terms of 'identity', in line with his synthesis of
literary, national and occult preoccupations.
Ellmann argues that even in the early stages of its development, Yeats's Mask has
"multiple meanings" and is "a variable concept" (1960: 175). He confirms that in these
early stages Yeats is already "coming at the problem of identity" and "puzzling over
such questions as: Can we discuss a man apart from his dreams and aspirations? Can a
man think of himself without thinking of how he appears to others? Is not every man
an actor? Who does not wear a mask?" (1960: 177). From the wide-ranging functions
and meanings of the Mask explained by Ellmann, three key features can be identified:
that it is an imaginative construct; that it may serve strategic purposes; and that it may
serve as a guiding, inspiring, ideal self-image that the individual tries 'to live up to'
and become.
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Firstly, as Ellmann explains, the Mask "is the social self," with a "closely-related
meaning" being that "the mask includes all the differences between one's own and
other people's conception of one's personality" (1960: 176). Ellmann adds that the
Mask offers a sense of detachment "from experience like actors from a play," for to
be "conscious of the discrepancy which makes a mask of this sort is to look at oneself
as if one were somebody else" (1960: 176). This "detachment" and "discrepancy"
indicates Yeats's awareness that the individual's Mask or self-image, i.e. the
individual's identity, is a complex construct central to social interaction. Such
detachment allows the 'modernist' Yeats, in Per Amica Silentia Lunae, to analyse his
"social self' as though he were "somebody else", in having regard for "other people's
conception" of his "personality". Clearly, Yeats is aware that identity is accounted for
by internal (antithetical) factors like "one's own conception of one's personality" and
external (primary) factors like "other people's conception of one's personality".
Social interaction thus implies a need for impression and image management by the
individual.
Secondly, as Ellmann points out in reference to Yeats's public battles with his
detractors, the Mask offers in public a "severance of the hero from the mob" or
Yeats's "base-blooded middle-class" (1960:181) enemies, with a two-fold effect: the
"mob" is "protected" from "open-faced candour" and "too much reality," while the
"hero", to whom the Mask offers "isolation" and "disguise", is protected from
"debasement" but is also able to "reveal himself' (1964:93/94) when appropriate. In
this way, the Mask serves as "defensive armour" that can be worn to "keep from
being hurt," and yet is also "a weapon of attack" (1960:176). Again, Yeats clearly
recognises that identity is a construct owing to the detachment implied by "isolation"
and "disguise". However, in this case its strategic value in social interaction is also
underlined. On one hand, it may be harnessed to confront enemies in the (primary)
external world, and thereby assist the individual in exerting an influence on and even
determining worldly events and others' perceptions. On the other, it may serve as a
necessary front that protects and preserves the individual's inner (antithetical) world
of thought and imagination from external scrutiny and exposure, assisting the
individual to examine and determine his or her own perceptions and experience in a
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free rather than enforced manner. In this way, it resembles lung's "'full-blooded'"
and "properly fitting ... persona," which "serves as an effective regulator of the
exchange between the inner and outer worlds" so that "the demands" of the
environment can be "met successfully" (lacobi 1968:30).
Thirdly, the Mask is worn "to keep up a noble conception of ourselves," for "it is a
heroic ideal which we try to live up to" (Ellmann 1960: 176). The Mask "may be an
image of himself which the heroic spirit sets up as his goal" and "proceeds to
become" (1964:94). The Mask thus serves as "a weapon in an internal war, with
heroic minds imposing the masks and heroic hearts rejecting it" as a "form of
discipline and struggle" (1964:94). As an image of what the individual dreams of
'becoming', the Mask throws into stark relief what the individual 'is' or is deemed to
be at the level of identity. Its desirability generates the inner conflict necessary to
continually incite the striving to become it. Yeats therefore holds that the Mask, as an
imaginative construct and ideal self-image, may serve as both the inspiration for and
goal of a 'modern' self-determination.
Indeed, the notion of becoming one's 'ideal self reflects Yeats' s ratification of and
involvement in what Pippin calls the "modern attempt at a genuine self-
determination" in society and daily life "in a sweeping historical and an individual
sense" (Pippin 1991 :30). Yeats's Mask is evidence that for him, as "it seemed to so
many," only "one form of such self-determination, a radical act of imagination, or a
complete, aesthetic self-definition" would "fully realize the otherwise discredited
notion of a 'free life'" (1991 :30). In this light, Yeats's 'modernist' and Nietzschean
subscription to the tenet that "the individual creates his own world" (Ellmann
1964:94) must be emphasized.
Kiberd explains that Yeats, opposing Locke's' single point of view', "went further"
than Berkeley "to assert that each man or woman creates a purely personal world"
(1996:322). Accordingly, as Ellmann points out, the Mask "shuttles between the
unblemished dream image and the actual face, and assumes that the former is more
real as well as more prepossessing than the latter" (1964:94). The individual's ideal
self-image, as part of a self-created "personal world", is in Yeats's doctrine deemed
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so compelling and powerful as to "surpass and control" external or 'objective'
"reality" (1960:292), effectively destabilizing that 'reality' and the psychological
dominance it purports to exert. Yeats's insistence upon "a relation between reality and
the dream which makes the latter no mere capitalized abstraction but a driving force
in life" (1960: 176) means that the Mask takes imaginative possession of the
individual and gives full expression to the "subjective" or antithetical self.
Encompassing these features, the Mask can be defined as an imagined, ideal self-
image that, while it is "most unlike" (Jeffares 1990:35) the individual, is what the
individual most desires to be at the level of identity. As Yeats defines it in A Vision,
the Mask is the "direct opposite" ofthe individual's "normal ego" (Jeffares
1990: 132). It is "that object of desire or moral ideal which is of all possible things the
most difficult" (1990: 132) to become, or that "object of desire or idea of good" that is
"created by passion to unite us to ourselves" (1990:206). The Mask, as an ideal
'image of ourselves', or rather an ideal image of our 'difference from ourselves', is
therefore what Yeats proposes may serve as a self-chosen and self-fashioned identity.
The potent combination of image, inference and evocation, Yeats holds, paradoxically
serves to define an individual in terms of the self-image, through the struggle and
determination to 'become' that imagined self.
The Mask can be seen to be not in itselfthe individual's 'identity'; rather, the
individual's identity encompasses the Mask as the desired ideal in relation to the
"normal ego", including the passionate self-identification that the image elicits. The
cultivation of, and internecine relationship with, this ideal self-image or "alter ego that
will be masterful and heroic" (Foster 2003 :76), Yeats maintains, constitutes a method
of intense, impassioned self-definition. 'Identity itself', then, is conceived of as a
Blakean 'contrary' that works through "Attraction and Repulsion" (Butter 1989:47).
Identity is thus for Yeats, like much of his verse, "founded on a necessary
contradiction" (Kiberd 1996: 128): it marks the celebration and possession of a self-
image that is free of 'primary' or external domination while at the same time being an
insistence that its possessor is yet to be 'made' in the likeness of that self-image by
living up to it. The individual is therefore "not so much the creator ofthe Image" as
"its inferred content" and "its outcome" (Kiberd 1996:124).
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From this, it can be seen that Yeats conceives of two forms of Mask. As he states in a
footnote to "Hodos Chameliontos" in his Autobiographies: "There is a form of Mask
or Image that comes from life and is feted, but there is a form that is chosen"
(O'Donnell/Archibald 1999:469). These two forms of Mask are underlined by Graf,
although she quotes "fated" (2000:107). Nevertheless, Yeats's attitude encompasses
the bourgeois social approval implied by the former and externally imposed
'choicelessness' by the latter. For Yeats, the 'mirror' image described earlier in this
chapter is the 'primary' identity "that comes from life" in the 'daily, social world'. As
Graf argues, it is "assumed without intention" and "simply who the individual
happened to become due to circumstance" (2000:107). However, the Mask that is the
individual's ideal self is the "chosen" or antithetical Mask, and it is this self-derived
identity that Yeats advocates be assumed by the individual. Kiberd argues that the
Yeatsian Mask, precisely because it is chosen, is "truer than any face" (1996: 125).
Indeed, Yeats's prioritisation of the "chosen" Mask that the individual has "designed
for himself' (Ellmann 1964:93) over the 'mirror' one must not only be situated in the
general 'modem' attempt at self-determination "in a sweeping historical and an
individual sense" (Pippin 1991 :30), but also - given the backdrop of Arnold's
Othering of the Irish - firmly and specifically in the Irish colonial context of Yeats's
times.
The image in what Whitaker calls "the objective mirror" (1996:324), or of what Yeats
describes as "'the objective man'" who is in fact himself such "'a mirror'" (Ellmann
1964:93), can also be seen to be that of the "disfigured" Other portrayed by the
colonizer, and it is this externally imposed negative identity that Yeats advocates
turning from. Whereas the colonial or Othering Self sets up seemingly stable, unified
identities in negative terms by way of simplistic Manichaean "opposites" of good-
superior/evil-inferior, and thereby promotes an exclusionary alterity in which the
'opposition' is merely the domination of one pole by the other, Yeats's "chosen"
Mask clearly enables an encounter with alterity within the colonized individual in
positive terms. In a radical act of psychological decolonization, Yeats's Mask
minimizes the external Manichaean negation of the colonized at the level of identity
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and prioritises an internal, inclusionary Blakean opposition or contrary that permits, at
this level of identity, progression towards self-determination.
Championing the 'simplicity' of the Blakean contrary by promoting an inclusionary,
positive alterity within the Irish individual, Yeats proposes that from this tension of
opposites "a greatness might be synthesized," and that "in the union of opposites"
(Unterecker 1963:31) what he calls a "new species of man" (O'Donnell/Archibald
1999:217), and what Unterecker calls a "new kind" of nation, "might be born"
(1963 :31). Ellmann concludes in Yeats: The Man and the Masks that just what Yeats
"hoped Ireland would become is hard to say," but speculates that "probably he wanted
to give his country what he also lacked, a liberated, unified personality, free of
uncertainty about power and principle, no longer struggling in the bonds of the past"
(1960:291). That this is indeed the case is confirmed when Yeats's Mask is situated
specifically and firmly in the historical context of the colonial Ireland of Yeats's
times.
As Fanon argues, "Decolonization is the veritable creation of new men" (2001 :28), or
"quite simply the replacing ofa certain 'species' of men by another 'species' of men"
without "any period of transition" - a "total, complete and absolute substitution"
(2001 :27). Likewise, Yeats is imagining a fully liberated, 'postcolonial' Ireland: the
creation of a 'new species' ofIrishman and 'new kind' ofIrish nation through
psychological decolonization at the level of identity. Indeed, articulated during the
"climactic insurrectionary" (Said 1993 :266) period after 1916 and anticipating Irish
self-rule after centuries of colonial oppression, Yeats's Doctrine of the Mask must be
viewed as his "prescription" for what Yeats calls, in Part XXIX of "Reveries Over
Childhood and Youth", sealing "with the right image the soft wax" of Ireland's
nation-ness "before it began to harden" (O'Donnell/Archibald 1999:104). That is, a
guiding and defining 'image' of the ideal Irish self - an ideal 'identity' - is what
Yeats believed could give shape to and unite a new but deeply divided Irish nation.
For Yeats, this 'new species' of individual and 'new kind' of nation would be
psychologically united to their ideal owing to the progressional effect of identity
conceived of as a contrary. As Yeats writes in "Four Years: 1887-1891": " ... nations,
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races, and individual men are unified by an image, or bundle of images ... because
only the greatest obstacle that can be contemplated without despair, rouses the will to
full intensity" (O'DonnelllArchibald 1999:167). Fanon, although not using the term
'contrary', apprehends its presence in the colonial context conceptually. In delineating
the colonized's "dream... not of becoming" but of "substituting himself' for the
colonizer, he remarks that "in certain emotional circumstances the presence of an
obstacle accentuates the tendency towards motion" (2001 :41). What Yeats is
imagining is a community united in its subscription to an imagined ideal at the level
of identity. He envisages that this ideal or Mask - displacing the colonizer as the
"greatest obstacle" because it is "of all possible things the most difficult" to achieve -
will "accentuate" the colonized's "tendency towards motion" in the direction of self-
creation and self-determination.
In Per Amica Si/entia Lunae, Yeats portrays the starting-point for "meditation upon a
mask," and thus for 'becoming' the ideal self, as a negative and despairing one.
Hamburger points out that Yeats "does not conceal the desperation and extremity" of
his own "starting-point" (1969:81). Describing the situation metaphorically in terms
of the archetypes of poet, hero and saint, Yeats writes that the "poet finds and makes
his mask in disappointment, the hero in defeat. .. For the hero loves the world till it
breaks him, and the poet till it has broken faith" (Jeffares 1990:44). The saint "has
turned away, and because he renounced experience itself, he will wear his mask as he
finds it..." (1990:44). All three figures are what Yeats calls "heterogeneous selves"
(1990:41), and the defeated hero in particular is "heterogeneous and confused" .
(1990:43). The common thread is the internal or psychological disunity of each figure
living in the 'primary' world, which as I have demonstrated includes for Yeats not
only the 'bourgeois world' but also, more specifically, the Irish colonial context.
The condition of defeat, broken-spiritedness, and psychological disunity in the
colonial context generally is underlined by Fanon, who states that colonial rule
"consisted of the pathological tearing apart" of the colonized individual's "functions
and the crumbling away of his unity" (2001 :254). The dehumanization ofthe
colonized individual, as Sartre also argues, ensures that "shame and fear will split up
his character and make his inmost self fall to pieces" (2001:13). For Yeats, such inner
141
disunity reflects that "All life" is "a struggle" (Jeffares 1990:308) or quest by
individuals for unified selfhood, including and especially in the Irish colonial context.
This is a "struggle towards harmony" or what he calls "Unity of Being" (1990:222) -
a desired state of "true unified being" (Graf 2000: 103) in which the individual has
"overcome fragmentation and abstraction" (Foster 2003: 179). In light of this struggle
to 'become' unified, Yeats defines "passion" as "unfulfilled desire" (Jeffares 1990:46)
and holds that "Passion is conflict, consciousness is conflict" (1990:312). On this
basis, he argues that "the passions, when we know that they cannot find fulfilment,
become vision" (1990:46).
Hamburger wryly points out that "psychologists know" that unfulfilled desires "can
also become something very different" (1969:81). This observation is borne out by
Fanon's accounts of the colonized's "autodestruction" in a "fraternal blood-bath"
(2001:42); the susceptibility of "young people" in "under-developed countries" to
"disintegrating influences" like "pornographic literature" and "above all alcohol"
(2001:157) imported from the colonizer's "Western culture" (2001:158); and the
catalogue of "Mental Disorders" arising from "Colonial War" (2001 :200). Regarding
the "fraternal blood-bath," Fanon explains that the colonized Other who is struck and
made to "crawl" by the colonizer will not brook "the slightest hostile ... glance cast on
him," for "the last resort" of the colonized individual "is to defend his personality vis-
a-vis his brother" (2001 :42). At stake is the remaining vestige of dignity at the level of
identity. Such fighting and "suicidal behaviour" is, Fanon points out, proof to the
colonizer that the colonized "are not reasonable human beings" (2001 :42).
However, as Hamburger concedes, "vision" is what the passions "did become in
Yeats's case" (1969:81). Yeats's emphasis on vision as opposed to self-destruction
cannot be overemphasized in terms of decolonization. Not only does his 'modernist'
prioritisation of the imagination and Image bypass the problematic articulation of
identity in the colonizer's 'rational', 'reasonable' and denigratingly dualistic discourse
of 'facts' in the first instance, it also constructively serves to confirm the alternative of
imaginative self-determination by the colonized, stressing unity rather than
differences. Clearly, "vision" works against conflicts among the colonized by
channelling and internalising within the individual the violent struggle for dignity at
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the level of identity. Vision, then, is the choice to decolonize. For Yeats, the
transmuting of unfulfilled desires into vision, into an imaged ideal, helps the
individual "to purify his intent" and become "single-minded and contemplative
instead of 'heterogeneous and confused'" (Graf 2000: 123). The mind, Yeats indicates,
"needs an image for remaining focused" (2000: 124). As Graf argues, the mask being
meditated upon serves as a kind of "magical talisman" that helps the individual "to
quiet and focus his mind" so that he can, in Yeats's terminology, "become the anti-
self and attract his daimon" (2000: 124).
The Doctrine ofthe Mask, as articulated in Per Amica Silentia Lunae, requires that
the individual meditate on a mask "whose lineaments permit the expression of all" the
individual "most lacks, and it may be dreads, and of that only" (Jeffares 1990:43).
Given the defeat, 'fragmentation and abstraction' of the 'heterogeneous and confused'
individual at the start, it follows that the Mask - "whose lineaments" must "permit the
expression of all" that the individual "most lacks" - is what Yeats in part XXI of
"Four Years: 1887-1891" defines as "an emotional antithesis to all that comes out of. ..
internal nature" (O'Donnell/Archibald 1999:163). It is therefore an image of heroic
fortitude and what Yeats calls in the same section "victory" over "fate" (1999: 163); a
vision of full liberation and unity at the level of identity. Kiberd explains that it is
envisaged that "a full man" might "be inferred" from the Mask "and, in due course-
such was the enormity of' Yeats's "ambition - a nation" (1996:117).
According to Yeats's doctrine, the Mask must "be developed with conscious
intention" and its design must be "a wilful act" (Graf 2000: 107), so that it is tailor-
made to fit the individual's "purpose and taste" (2000:113). In part VII of "Anima
Hominis", Yeats describes the cultivating of a Mask or "alter ego that will be
masterful and heroic" (Foster 2003:76). Probably drawing on the "Egyptian
symbolism" popular in the Golden Dawn "temples" (Roland 1995:113), Yeats
indicates that the Mask the hero has found "hanging upon some oak" at Dodona is an
archetypal image: it is "ancient", and the hero changes "to his fancy" whatever
"lingered... of Egypt" (Jeffares 1990:42). The hero touches the Mask "a little here
and there, gilding the eyebrows or putting a gilt line where the cheek-bone comes"
(1990:42). The introduction of gold is "solar" (Ellmann 1964: 159) symbolism, which
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Yeats writes in part VI of "The Stirring ofthe Bones" means "elaborate, full of
artifice, rich, all that resembles the work of a goldsmith" (O'Donnell/Archibald
1999:279). Because Yeats's self-fashioned Mask brings the individual back from deep
subjectivity "to the mass where we begin" (Jeffares 1990: 122), its stable, fixed
appearance and relation to the objective or solar (gold) gyre is clear. The Mask is a
bridge that allows the individual to "connect" and "reassociate" his antithetical world
of emotion and imagination "with 'the normal active man'" (Ellmann 1960: 179) in
the primary or "social world" (Coote 1997:385).
In this process of cultivating and identifying him or herself fully with the chosen
Mask, the individual enters and becomes the anti-self. While the anti-self is "not
explained systematically" (Graf 2000:99), Yeats reveals that it allows the individual
to experience "no reaction, action only" in the process of artistic creation. That there
is "no reaction" indicates that the Mask, as a product of artistic creation, will not
replicate the Manichaean binary and be marginalized in 'talking back' at the
colonizer. The individual, in Yeats's Blakean approach, realizes: "I must Create a
System, or be enslaved by another Man's" (Nurrni 1975:51), including and especially
enslavement under the colonizer's system in the Irish context. The individual
therefore, again in Blake's words from "Jerusalem", "will not Reason and Compare,"
for his or her "business is to Create" (Nurmi 1975 :51) him or herself anew. In
addition, Yeats discloses that it permits him the experience of ceasing "to hate"
(Jeffares 1990:62). The Mask, as a new, positive identity created in this visionary
state, is therefore not a counter-identity underwritten with hatred for the colonizer.
Yeats, like Fanon, recognises that "hatred alone cannot draw up a programme" of
decolonization, and that "Racialism and hatred and resentment - 'a legitimate desire
for revenge' - cannot sustain a war of liberation" (2001: 111). Instead, Yeats reveals,
he is able to experience the "joy" of psychological unity: "all my thoughts have ease
and joy, I am all virtue and confidence" (Jeffares 1990:36).
In this "completely subjective" (Graf 2000: 105) state of inner harmony, the
'modernist' Yeats experiences a 'flight out of time'. The Mask and images seen in
this visionary state, Yeats writes, "bum up time" (Jeffares 1990:62). This 'reality' is,
Hamburger confirms, "a timeless, absolute one" (1969:81). Graf explains that the
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anti-self is "an alternative reality" that differs from "normal, consensual reality"
(2000: 104). It is "akin to the unconscious mind in Jungian psychological terms, or the
subconscious mind in Freudian terms" (2000:102) - a state of mind which, as I've
explained in chapter two, was held by many modernists to be 'outside of time'. In this
state, Yeats indicates, the individual experiences an "heroic condition" (Jeffares
1990:36) or Blakean "innocence" (1990:62). This "innocence" is "not inexperience,
but its opposite" (Kiberd 1996: 112), at root an "openness to the injuries risked in a
full life" (1996:103). While the anti-self makes Yeats "love", he points out it is more
like "innocence" because "we may love unhappily" (Jeffares 1990:62) and love may
even be "enforced" (1990: 137). The Mask, in exemplifying a heroism and harmony
that Yeats associates with the unconscious, can be seen as the psychological
'gateway' through which the artist 'enters' the unconscious.
In identifying with and becoming creatively absorbed in the Mask during its
cultivation, the individual's "conscious self' merges with the creative unconscious
and the individual ceases to identify with his 'normal ego'. The anti-self can therefore
also be seen as "the opposite of the self' - The Mask - as well as "the complete
absence of the self - egolessness" (Graf 2000: 102). As Yeats writes in A Vision,
Shelley discovered his "true self' or anti-self "at the moment when he first created a
passionate image which made him forgetful of himself' (Jeffares 1990: 189). Yeats
describes this merging in part IX of "Hodos Chameliontos", referring to the anti-self
as "that age-long memoried self' (0'DonnelllArchibald 1999:216) and "that buried
self' (1999:217). He writes: "I know now that revelation is from the self. .. that
shapes the elaborate shell of the mollusc and the child in the womb, that teaches the
birds to make their nest" (1999:216). This "self' is the subconscious or unconscious
mind. Yeats propounds that artistic "genius is a crisis that joins that buried self for
certain moments to our trivial daily mind" (1999:217), resulting in "true unified
being" (Graf 2000: 103). The Mask therefore permits this merging and enables the
individual to experience artistic 'genius'.
From this, it can be seen that Yeats equates the unconscious mind with Nature. Like
Jung, he holds that the unconscious "is impervious to the critical and ordering activity
of consciousness; in it we hear the voice ofuninfluenced primal nature" (Jacobi
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1968:35). It operates "for the most part in ways that are beyond our understanding,"
with "a purposiveness of its own, directed toward the completeness and wholeness of
the psyche" (1968:35). Ellmann writes that symbolism was for Yeats "an effort to
restore the unity of mind and nature," and he hoped to bring "the modem fragmentary
man" and "nature into harmony again" (1964:24). In this light, the Mask can be seen
as an effort to "pull the external world back into the mind by establishing a
correspondence between nature and mental states" (1964:24). As a symbol of the
individual's unity, the Mask "would make the connections among the personal,
national, and natural worlds" (1964:24).
This is in stark contradistinction to the negative view of the colonized's unconscious
held by the colonizer. As I've demonstrated in chapters one and two, the colonized are
deemed to possess a refractory unconscious, and therefore to be deviant and
demoniacal. In the colonizer's eyes, the colonized's unconscious is synonymous with
wild Nature in negative terms, justifying the 'taming' of the colonized. This biological
essentialism is reflected in Amold's feminization of the Irish in terms of a closeness
to nature, with 'taming' to be achieved through 'marital' appropriation. However, it
can be seen that Yeats's 'consent' to Arnold's definition of the Irish as having a
"special affinity with 'the wild magic of nature''', and as being "in a special way"
attracted by and "close to" the "secret... of natural beauty and natural magic" (Castle
2001 :49), is deeply subversive. For Yeats, the unconscious is Nature, and its 'wild' or
'natural magic' is its artistic creativity.
Imploding the notion of the homogeneous Other, Yeats holds that Nature "never does
the same thing twice, or makes one man like another" (Foster 1997:419). The
unconscious or "buried self' is therefore associated with artistic genius, to such an
extent that Yeats's 'consent' to Arnold's definition of the Irish as having a
"'reverence and enthusiasm for genius ... and things of the mind'" (Castle 2001:49)
also becomes deeply subversive. Already, it can be seen that Yeats is reconstructing
lrishness in terms of a 'modem' psychology compatible with his occult or 'magical'
preoccupations. Indeed, his 'modernist' emphasis on the unconscious as a positive
phenomenon, as purposively bent on psychological unity, constitutes an act of
decolonization. It exposes the English notion of the unconscious as solely a repository
146
of 'evil' to be, in light of the 'modem' findings of Freud and lung, highly
questionable and outdated. It also reveals the English repression of the Irish Other at
the level of identity, based on the notion of an 'evil' unconscious or 'essence', to be
equally fallacious - and fundamentally 'unnatural'. The basis of colonial rule, with its
'primary' emphasis on Reason and 'fact', is therefore in its entirety called into
question.
Fanon points out that in decolonization there is "the need of a complete calling in
question of the colonial situation" (2001 :28). By reifying the unconscious, Yeats
shows that, as Fanon argues, the colonized's "challenge to the colonial world is not a
rational confrontation of points of view" (2001 :31), for "no agreement" is "possible
on the level of reason" (1967: 123). Instead, Yeats's is a 'modernist' but also Irish
nationalist call for the unconscious to be embraced rather than tamed, to be harnessed
by the colonized in imaginatively recreating themselves at the level of identity, as a
united community. His statement that individuals and nations are unified by "an
image ... symbolical or evocative of the state of mind which is, of all states of mind
not impossible, the most difficult" (O'DonnelllArchibald 1999: 167) therefore refers
specifically to the unity-seeking unconscious 'state of mind'.
Yeats describes the merging of the "trivial daily mind" and "buried self' by reference
to writers like Dante and Villon. He writes that "through passion" they become
"conjoint to their buried selves"; that the "two halves of their nature are so completely
joined that they seem to labour for their objects, and yet to desire whatever happens,
being at the same instant predestinate and free, creation's very self'
(0'DonnelllArchibald 1999:217). In this psychological state or "innocence", chance
and choice, necessity and freedom, become one. Such men, Yeats adds, command our
awe "because we gaze not at a work of art, but at the re-creation of the man through
that art, the birth of a new species of man, and, it may even seem that the hairs of our
heads stand up, because that birth, that re-creation, is from terror" (1999:217). This
"new species of man", as I will explain in examining the phases of the moon in A
Vision, is Yeats's ideal 'postcolonial' Irishman, recreated at the level of identity
through the Mask.
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That this recreation is "from terror" is owing to the loss of "the conscious self' or
"ego" (Graf2000:103) that the 'sentimentalists' take for reality. Cultivating a Mask
is, as Graf argues, "an exercise calculated to expose" identity "as a temporal, artificial
construct, a means of abolishing the ego" (2000: 114). This is why the "knowledge of
reality" beyond the 'primary' world is for Yeats "a kind of death" (2000: 103). In
"Anima Hominis", he states that "the anti-self or antithetical self' comes not to
'sentimentalists' but "to those who are no longer deceived, whose passion is reality ...
for the vision, for the revelation of reality, tradition offers us a different word-
ecstasy" (Jeffares 1990:40). Ecstasy, he writes, is the "end of art": a "sudden sense of
power and of peace, that comes when we have before our mind's eye" an image or "a
group of images, which obeys us, which leaves us free, and which satisfies the need of
our soul" (Foster 2003 :72). This is akin to the "Ecstasy" of Plotinus: the "liberation"
of the "mind" by "entering a state in which you are your finite self no longer" (Roland
1995:29).
Plotinus's "ecstasy" is for Yeats, as Ellmann explains, "the supreme experience"
(1960:251/2), and it is associated by Yeats with the imagination and unconscious.
Such images before the "mind's eye", Yeats reveals, exist in the "general vehicle of
Anima Mundi," which he also calls "'The Soul of the World'" (Jeffares 1990:54) and
describes as the world's "Great Memory passing on from generation to generation"
(1990:50). Devastating even further the colonizer's notion of the unconscious as the
storehouse of 'evil', Anima Mundi "bears a strong resemblance to lung's Collective
Unconscious" (Larissy 1997:xvii). Yeats writes that, in order to "liberate" his mind
from the 'primary' world, he has "always sought" to immerse his mind "in the general
mind where that mind is scarce separable from what we have begun to call 'the
subconscious'" (Jeffares 1990:48). He holds that the archetypal images and symbols
of Anima Mundi may be accessed by the individual in order to create not only poetry,
but for the purposes of re-creation at the level of identity through an Image or Mask.
As Unterecker argues, "because mythology and history, reducing men to types, mere
images, simpler figures than flesh and blood, does offer us patterns," Yeats posits that
the individual may "choose" a Mask "from those stored up by the past" (1963:30).
Yeats writes that if the individual "can suspend will and intellect," he or she can
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"bring up from the 'subconscious' anything" he or she already possesses "a fragment
of' (Jeffares 1990:49). By meditation on "some great master," for instance, the
"conscious self' can be reduced to "humility... leaving the unconscious free to work"
(Foster 2003:71), evoking in the individual the very qualities represented by the
archetypal image. In this way, underlining the power of the imagination, a Mask can
be chosen and fashioned by the individual, and the fusion of the individual with the
Mask in the anti-self produces 'a new species of man.'
The decolonizing effect of this is to demonstrate that, given the power of the
imagination in creating a "purely personal world" (Kiberd 1996:322), i.e. in
determining an individual's experience and 'reality' despite circumstances, the Irish
cannot convincingly be reduced to an 'evil' and/or inferior 'essence'. Because the
Mask may evoke the positive qualities desired by the individual, 'essence' can be seen
to be the effect of identity - not the other way round, as proponents of Aristotlean
logic (like Arnold) would have it. For instance, if the individual were to have a
negative essence that determined negative identity, the evocation of the desired
positive qualities through the 'contrary' effect of the 'opposite' Mask-as-identity
would serve to prove the co-existence of another 'opposite' essence. The individual
would have two competing essences, not one fixed and immutable (negative) essence.
The unconscious, as a kind of non-essentialist "essence" which may yield "anything
you already possess a fragment of' (Jeffares 1990:49), is shown to be too
encompassing to be limited to anyone set of characteristics without the knowledge
that other alternatives are possible.
In Yeats's view, the individual may possess multiple self-determined identities,
strategically adopted from among the multiplicity of images of Anima Mundi in the
mode of a 'contrary', for a range of contexts. Unterecker explains that for Yeats
"ultimate reality" is not "in anyone" of an individual's Masks but "in their
interaction" (1963 :30). The Mask-as-identity is therefore necessarily non-essentialist.
It is designed to evoke the exact opposite effect of essentialism, showing that a self-
determined alternative is always possible, and that 'chosen' identity supersedes
'objective' identity. The Mask is strategically adopted with the conscious awareness
that stable, unified identity is a construct. 'Identity itself, then, is not "an immutable
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graven image"; it is always-already multiple and multifaceted: a "protean and
fabulous beast" (Foster 2001 :55). While analyzing Yeats in regard to 'gender' is
beyond the scope of this thesis, it is worth noting that his insights regarding the
constructedness and multiplicity of 'identity itself resemble a number of those of
thinkers like Kristeva, Butler and Fuss in the fields of feminist and queer theory. For
instance, Fuss argues that "identity is rarely identical to itself but instead has multiple
and sometimes contradictory meanings" (1990: 136), and this is a view compatible
with Yeats's Mask. Parallels between Yeats and such theorists are, of course,
unsurprising given the feminization of the Irish by Arnold, and Young's argument
that the Self-Other opposition itself allows the colonial "constitution of the other as
'other'" to be set "alongside racism and sexism" (1990:4).
Hamburger writes that Yeats's "high degree of consciousness" of the constructedness
of the Mask "saved" him "from being taken in by his masks, or from substituting
them for his own face" (1969:82). Indeed, Yeats situates his Mask in the practice of
'active virtue'. He writes in Per Arnica Si/entia Lunae: "If we cannot imagine
ourselves as different from what we are, and try to assume that second self, we cannot
impose a discipline upon ourselves though we may accept one from others" (Jeffares
1990:42). Active virtue, "as distinguished from the passive acceptance of a code, is
therefore theatrical, consciously dramatic, the wearing of a mask... " (1990:42).
Kiberd argues that, while "a necessary fakery," the Mask is "not vulnerable to the
charge of bad faith" because it is "consciously and confessedly manipulated"
(1996:308) through active virtue. Virtue - to be active - must in fact "be an endless,
theatrical playing with such masks" (1996: 121). The Mask thus offers "not the truth,
but a way towards it," and is "not to be slavishly imitated" but rather "awakens each
man and woman to the hero in themselves" (1996:309). As Hamburger indicates, the
utility of adopting a Mask is to go "against the grain ofthe empirical self," creating an
opposition that provides the individual with the "tension and intensity" (1969:82)
necessary for artistic creativity and heroic self-determination.
The multiplicity ofthe Mask therefore does not decontextualize and separate 'identity
itself from what Butler calls in Gender Trouble "the constitution of class, race,
ethnicity and other axes of power that both constitute 'identity' and make the singular
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notion of identity a misnomer" (1990: 117). However, it also means that the individual
is not limited to a passive acceptance of "code", which is the externally imposed,
'objective' identity-as-social-construct. Ellmann indicates that, because choosing "a
single mask" may "be too serious an arrest ofthe changing world and mind," Yeats
permits that individuals may "strip the masks" they "have created" for themselves"
(1964: 12) in favour of other masks, depending on the individual's inclinations,
objectives and circumstances. This is to say that a Mask is strategically chosen or
rejected to suit the individual's ends, for the "urge to destruction, like the urge to
creation, is a defiance oflimits" (1964: 12). The "end of such practice", Graf argues, is
"not multiple-personality disorder" but a reinforcement of the awareness that identity
is an imaginative, "temporaL .. construct" (2000: 114). Active virtue is therefore a
conscious, strategic exploitation of the constructedness, provisionality, and protean
nature of 'identity itself.
Lastly, the creative absorption in the Mask attracts the Daimon, which can be defined
as the spiritual "force of genius" (Graf 2000: 125) or "the occult power of artistic
inspiration" (Foster 1998:30). As Graf explains, "Yeats always insisted... that the
daimon is the source of all creative work" (2000:125). Yeats's conception of the
Daimon derives from 'traditional' sources, namely Plato, Platonism's middle period,
and "late antiquity" (Graf 2000: 126). He conceives of the Daimon "as a tutelary
spirit" that descends "to a chosen man, becoming his intuitive, inner voice" and
bestowing "visions" (Graf2000:126). In this way, Yeats's Daimon resembles the
"Genius" of Roman mythology, which was also a "tutelary spirit" that "attended a
man from cradle to grave, governed his fortunes, determined his character"
(Kirkpatrick 2000:426).
The Daimon is also closely associated with the occult. As both Roland and Graf
highlight, the Golden Dawn's "most theatrical ritual was a re-enactment of the
crucifixion in a room said to be a replica of Christian Rosenkreuz's funeral vault"
(Roland 1995: 113). The initiate was "apparently tied to a cross and swore an oath of
loyalty which began: 'I will from this day forward, apply myselfto the Great Work-
which is, to purify and exalt my Spiritual Nature so that with the Divine Aid I may at
length attain to be more than human, and thus gradually raise and unite myself to my
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higher and Divine Genius, and that in this event I will not abuse the great power
entrusted to me'" (1995:113). The pursuit of unity with one's "higher and Divine
Genius" is therefore an occult practice informing Yeats's conception of the Daimon as
"the force of genius," and Yeats reframes this notion of "genius" in terms of
'identity' .
Again, Yeats's 'assent' to Arnold's stereotyping of the Irish as having a "creative
receptivity - a 'reverence and enthusiasm for genius, learning and things of the
mind'" (Castle 2001 :49) can be seen to be far removed from Arnold's intended
feminization of the Irish, and deeply subversive. On the 'contrary', the Daimon
represents the exacting strain and violence of psychological decolonization at the
level of identity, and the ultimate uniting of the' self-possessed' Irish 'to themselves' .
Yeats proceeds to define the Daimon in A Vision as the "ultimate self' (Jeffares
1990: 132). As Graf points out, the Mask has to be "the opposite of man's internal
nature, because such a mask would be an image of the Daimon" (2000:124). The idea
is that the Daimon or "spiritual alter ego" can be "psychically established" through
meditation upon a mask, and the "opposite qualities and identifications" of the
Daimon complete the individual's "own personality" (Foster 2003:72). As Yeats
writes, the "ghost is simple, the man heterogeneous and confused," and they are "but
knit together when the man has found a mask whose lineaments permit the expression
of all the man most lacks" (Jeffares 1990:43).
The "force of genius" or Daimon thus brings about the "true unified being" (Graf
2000: 103) of the individual; it is the force of artistic genius that constitutes the "crisis
that joins that buried self for certain moments to our trivial daily mind," resulting in
the birth of "a new species of man." This 'knitting together' is the culmination of deep
antagonism in the mode of the gyres. Yeats describes the relationship between the
individual and Daimon as "warfare" (Jeffares 1990:43), and calls the Daimon the
"enemy (1990:45). He writes that the "more insatiable all desire, the more resolute to
refuse deception or an easy victory, the more close will be the bond, the more violent
and definite the antipathy" (1990:43). In a sense, the individual is 'terrorised' by the
Daimon, adding to the "terror" that'births' the "new species of man" recreated
through art.
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This, then, is the individual's deco10nizing "combat with himself' (1990:75), or rather
with his ideal or "ultimate self', in order to achieve unity with that self and be "self-
possessed." As Sartre puts it, "to thrust out colonialism" the "irrepressible violence is
neither sound and fury, nor the resurrection of savage instincts, nor even the effect of
resentment: it is man re-creating himself' (2001: 18). When the colonized's "rage
boils over, he rediscovers his lost innocence and he comes to know himself in that he
himself creates his self' (2001: 18). Such innocence is for Yeats Blakean, and the
thrusting out of colonialism and Otherness is for Yeats an internal, psychological
violence. The Daimon, he writes, is "part of our being... " (Jeffares 1990:41), for man
and Daimon "meet always in the deep of the mind" (1990:43). The Daimon, Yeats
argues (quoting Heraclitus), is "our destiny", and as Yeats declares in A Vis ion,
destiny is "that which comes to us from within" (1990:134).
This conflict, Yeats reveals, sterns not merely from man's passionate desire to become
his "ultimate self', but is "a struggle with the Daimon who would ever set us to the
hardest work among those not impossible" (1990:43). Artistic genius thus has a
purposive 'mind of its own', and Yeats confides that he does not believe the Daimon
is with him until he starts "to make a new personality" (1990:62) - a chosen Mask or
identity. He notes that, choosing from "among images" of the subconscious, he is
"full of uncertainty, not knowing" when he is "the finger, when the clay" (1990:62).
The supercharged 'nature' ofthe struggle with the Daimon is symbolised by
lightning. Yeats writes that the Daimon's "descending power is neither the winding
nor the straight line but zigzag" (1990:59). He likens the Daimon to "sudden
lightning, for all" the Daimon's "acts of power are instantaneous" and the individual
perceives "in a pulsation of the artery, and after slow decline" (1990:60).
The extreme difficulty of the struggle, Yeats argues, explains "why there is a deep
enmity between a man and his destiny, and why a man loves nothing but his destiny"
(1990:43). That which comes easily, Yeats holds, "can never be a portion of our
being: 'soon got, soon gone'" (1990:41). The Daimon is therefore also "of all things
not impossible the most difficult" to attain. It can be seen that this combat is an
internal 'contrary' that instigates and incites self-determination, inducing a mindset
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aimed at the achievement of a psychological unity that is craved by the individual.
This unity, once achieved, is to have been so hard-won as to not be 'soon gone'.
Sartre's description of the decolonized individual encapsulates Yeats's envisaged
result of combat with the Daimon. The individual who "makes himself man" at the
expense of the coIonizer, Sartre writes, emerges "a different man; of higher quality"
(2001:20). For Yeats, this is a "new species of man," recreated at the level of identity
or "personality". For Yeats, personality is, as Ellmann points out, "the whole man, the
great totality, an army, not a guerilla force" (1960:20), i.e. the full 'self-possessed'
identity of the decolonized individual.
Artistic genius, whether in poetry or in the recreation of selfhood, is thus achieved via
the individual's 'contrary' fusion with a Mask. This fusion is exactly what Yeats notes
in the style of his poetry. He writes in "Hodos Chameliontos": " ... as I look backward
upon my own writing, I take pleasure alone in those verses where it seems to me I
have found something hard and cold, some articulation of the Image which is the
opposite of all that I am in my daily life, and all that my country is"
(O'Donnell/Archibald 1999:218). The words "all that my country is" indicate the
national dimension of Yeats's Mask. As Unterecker explains, Yeats "speculated that
perhaps his doctrine of the Mask might be extended from person to country and so
give direction not only to an individual but a people" (1963 :31), not only in Ireland
but elsewhere too.
Indeed, Kiberd points to Yeats's "essay on Matthew Arnold in the Celtic element in
literature," in which "Yeats had endorsed the basic outlines of the Celticist analysis,
but for the word 'Celtic' had repeatedly substituted 'ancient'" (1996:318). "As early
as 1897," Kiberd adds, Yeats "was expanding the meanings of 'Celtic' to global
dimensions, sensing that the ancient was due for a return" (1996:318). Although
without reference to Ireland's colonial context, Unterecker points to Yeats's
disclosure that he had "half-planned" a "new method" and a "new culture" that his
"native scenery might find imaginary inhabitants" (1963 :31). This is, of course, a
disingenuous claim by Yeats given the obvious extent of his planning in formulating
his doctrine, but it serves to confirm that the Mask is his proposed method or fulcrum
for "imagining" a united nation into being. Again, as Yeats argues in "Four Years:
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1887-1891": " ... nations ... and individual men are unified by an image, or bundle of
related images, symbolical or evocative of the state of mind which is, of all states of
mind not impossible, the most difficult to that man... or nation"
(0'DonnelllArchibald 1999: 167).
While one may easily grant the choosing and adoption of a Mask in the case of the
individual, exactly how a particular unifying image "or bundle of related images" is to
gain mass purchase among "a people", and how collective consensus is to be reached
as to exactly which image or images should constitute an ideal national identity, is not
clear in Yeats's Doctrine ofthe Mask or System. As Unterecker points out, Yeats's
"hope for an Ireland united in the contemplation of a heroic mask" was not and "has
not been realized" (1963: 31). This brings me back to the issue of Yeats' s conflation of
self and nation in his System, raised in chapter two. The words "opposite of all that I
am in my daily life, and all that my country is" bear out Kiberd's observation that
Yeats "substitutes" himself "as a shorthand" for his country" (1996: 119). Kiberd, as
I've outlined in chapter two, argues that this is owing to the artist in the Irish colonial
context having to turn to his "own private world ... to fill the cultural vacuum, as a
promissory note for a yet-to-be-implemented nation" (1996: 119). The emphasis
therefore falls on the artist's ideal of "the achieved individual, the person with the
courage to become his or her full self' (1996:119) - which is clearly the 'modernist'
and nationalist ideal of Yeats's doctrine. The "Irish self' therefore becomes "a
project", with the reader "invited" to become "a co-creator with the author"
(1996: 120).
This, I have argued, explains to some extent why Per Arnica Si/entia Lunae and A
Vision are abstruse texts that constitute "a process, unfinished, fragmenting," refusing
"to exact a merely passive admiration for the completed work of art" (1996: 120) and
seemingly requiring their completion through the reader. As I have argued, they are
an invitation to the reader to become "a co-creator with the author," of the ideal "Irish
self'. In proferring his Doctrine ofthe Mask as a 'prescription' for creating such a
self, and in actually (as I will proceed to demonstrate) constructing himself in A
Vision as his own ideal "Irish self', the Daimonic Man of Phase 17, Yeats' s System
becomes an invitation to individual Irish readers to actively follow suit - with Yeats
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and his Mask the "exemplar of the nation" (1996:308). As Fanon notes in general
terms, the colonized artist through his works "invites participation in an organized
movement" (2001: 195) of revolution and decolonization.
While the relationship between the individual and nation is not clarified or 'solved' in
Yeats's System and remains problematic, Yeats certainly does see a correlation
between, and likeness in, the decolonization of the individual and that of a
collectivity. This is expressed metaphorically in that the gyres represent "every man's,
nation's, and era's nature" (Unterecker 1959:25), while the 'being' moving around the
Great Wheel of his phases of the moon, a scheme which I will proceed to examine
more closely, may be both an individual or a nation. As he reveals in A Vision,
"Nations ... may have their Daimons" (Jeffares 1990:218). This conflation of
individual and nation in Yeats's System could be explained by his linking, as I have
indicated in discussing the anti-self, of an individual unconscious with a collective
unconscious or what Yeats calls "the general mind" (Jeffares 1990:48). As Tratner
puts it, Yeats knows "the basis of any new civilization will arise from the' general
mass'" (1995: 163), and the "birth of a new species of man" is for Yeats also "the birth
of a new mass" (1995: 152).
Tratner explains that Yeats "sought all his life to write a poetry that would express or
create a national mind," and around "the time ofthe Easter 1916 massacre" he
"became convinced that certain political acts, particularly violent ones, could be
sufficient, if timed properly, to bring about radical change in everything, including the
mind of the artist" (1995: 135). Tratner adds that Yeats became deeply concerned with
"the shifting currents deep in the nation's soul, the shifting spirit of the masses"
(1995: 136). The "only way to create the nation," Yeats sensed, would be "to disrupt
the individual mind" (1995: 135) through violence. Tratner argues that Yeats was
therefore "faced with the problem that generated his poetry: how to allow his mind to
join with the shifting tides, how to generate the myth that would make violence
revolutionary and passionate, not merely chaotic" (1995: 148). The "emotions released
by violence," Yeats suspected, could through myth be made to "cohere" and be turned
"into passion, into a collective emotion that unites the masses in something like love"
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(1995: 149). Such emotion is, as I have outlined in this chapter, described in Yeats' s
doctrine as a B1akean "innocence".
Tratner notes that Yeats's "goal" throughout "all his later poems," shadowing the
material violence of historical upheavals like the Easter Uprising, is "to find that
particular conjunction of image and cataclysm, of myth and terror, that would unite
and mutate the Irish people" (1995: 152). An instance of this attempt, Tratner argues,
is "Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen", in which Yeats faces "the images in his mind
that frighten him" and "begins to create a terrorist poetry, a poetry that is truly
postcolonial because it goes beyond the entire colonial world that formed the mind of
Yeats himself' (1995:152). As Tratner also notes, quoting Blackmur, Yeats's "goal in
many of his later poems was to create a sense of terror in his readers," for only "out of
such violence directed against the self, Yeats believed, can the images emerge that
will transform the world" (1995:163). What would thereby be created would be
"something neither the artist nor anyone else can understand" (1995: 154).
While Tratner does not identify the Mask specifically (or Per Amica Silentia Lunae
and A Vision) as being part of Yeats's efforts to create a 'new kind' of Ireland, I have
shown that it is the ideal image of what the individual wishes to become that Yeats
believed could turn violent emotions into coherent passion and unite the individual 'to
himself through this 'contrary'. Again, as Unterecker argues, Yeats was convinced
that "every passionate man... is, as it were, linked with another age, historical or
imaginary, where alone he finds images that rouse his energy" (1963 :30/31). Drawing
on the images "stored up by the past" in mythology and history, the Doctrine of the
Mask "erects" on the individual's "personality" a "kind of private mythology in which
the individual struggles to become that which is most unlike himself' (1963:30).
However, owing to a perceived link between the individual and collective
unconscious, Yeats holds that this struggle may be extended to 'national' proportions
in terms of collective imagining. He speculates in Part III of "Hodos Chameliontos":
Is there nation-wide multiform reverie, every mind passing
through a stream of suggestion, and all streams acting and
reacting upon one another, no matter how distant the minds...
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Was not a nation, as distinguished from a crowd of chance
corners, bound together by this interchange among streams
or shadows; that Unity of Image, which I sought in national
literature, being but an originating symbol? (O'Donnell/
Archibald 1999:210).
Of course, this sense of a collective unconscious and imagining - of an imagined
community - is informed by the 'modernist' Yeats's occult precepts: that the "borders
of our mind are ever shifting" and "our memories are part of one great memory, the
memory of Nature herself'; that "many minds can flow into one another ... and create
or reveal a single mind, a single energy"; and that this "great mind and great memory
can be evoked by symbols" (Graf2000:34). Yeats's Doctrine ofthe Mask is therefore
not limited to the individual. A 'nation' as a collectivity can, in Yeats's estimation, be
evoked and unified by a Mask or bundle of related Masks because of a shared
unconscious or shared capacity to imagine; to be inspired in terms of shared ideals
and aspirations of self-determination. As Ellmann explains, Yeats would after 1927
portray "Ireland's eighteenth century as a Renaissance delayed by special historical
conditions" (1960:269) and include Swift, Berkeley, Burke, and Goldsmith "in his
image to give it mass and solidity" (1960:270). In the earlier "Four Years: 1887-
1891", however, it is the purposive movement ofa 'general mind' in Ireland that
Yeats espies and hopes will coalesce into a 'single-minded' search for national unity.
He writes in part XXIV: "I had seen Ireland in my own time turn from the bragging
rhetoric and gregarious humour ofO'Connell's generation and school, and offer
herself to the solitary and proud Parnell as to her anti-self, buskin following hard on
sock, and I had begun to hope, or to half hope, that we might be the first in Europe to
seek unity as deliberately as it had been sought by theologian, poet, sculptor,
architect, from the eleventh to the thirteenth century" (O'Donnell/Archibald
1999: 167/168). He adds, promoting his doctrine and System: "Doubtless we must
seek it differently ... but find it we well might could we first find philosophy and a
little passion" (1999: 168).
It is because of the deep "shifting currents" and "shifting spirit" ofthe collectivity that
Yeats avoids offering any explanation of how mass agreement on adopting a specific
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Mask, or bundle of related Masks, to 'define' the Irish nation would be reached.
However, he conceives of the probability of his Doctrine of the Mask working for the
collectivity in a process similar to that followed by the individual. His belief is that
the collectivity may achieve a 'mind of their own' owing to violent or cataclysmic
events like Easter 1916, a 'mass mind' and imagining which hold the possibility of
'nation-making' and national unity. As Ellmann explains, the Easter 1916 rebels had
seemed to Yeats "ordinary people" who had "suddenly found their heroic opposites,
not like Yeats by effort and discipline, but by the sudden violence of a great action"
(1960:220/21). Yeats, Tratner argues, perceived that out of "violence directed against
the self' images may "emerge that will transform the world" (Tratner 1995: 163).
Such images of decolonization could be used as revolutionary inspiration by the
collectivity, and unite them. What would be created, Tratner argues, would be
"something neither the artist nor anyone else can understand" (1995: 154).
Yeats therefore does not, as Said claims he does, stop "short of imagining full
political liberation" (Said 1993:287/88) in Ireland. While Yeats does not know exactly
what the unprecedented 'postcolonial' Ireland or who the 'postcolonial' Irish would
turn out to be on a mass scale, he envisions personal decolonization and liberation at
the level of identity through the 'terror' or violence of an individual's 'combat with
himself' , and its aftermath of impassioned psychological unity. Yeats's intention is
that from the individual's Mask or style "a full man" might "be inferred" and "in due
course - such was the enormity of his ambition - a nation" (Kiberd 1996: 11 7). As I
have indicated, Foster argues that Yeats sought to shape "the present and future
consciousness of 'the nation' - whoever they were" (2001 :xix/x). This is to say that
national recovery is for Yeats to be the result of a chain reaction of liberation that
starts and ends with each individual, as part of the collectivity - giving birth to a
united nation of 'true' or antithetical (i.e. self-determined) individuals. His Doctrine
of the Mask and System therefore focus on the individual in the first instance, in order
to set this chain reaction in motion.
The effect of Yeats's conflation ofthe individual and nation in terms of a 'being'
revolving around the Great Wheel is to indicate that the individual must fully
associate him or herself with the 'nation' in order for decolonization, in terms of both
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identity and political self-rule, to be fully realized. This conflation of self and nation
informs the process of "national construction" (2001:162) described by Fanon. Each
individual, Fanon argues, "ought to continue in his real, everyday activity to associate
himself with the whole of the nation, to incarnate the continuous dialectical truth of
the nation and to will the triumph of man in his completeness here and now"
(2001: 162). When this occurs, "Individual experience, because it is national and
because it is a link in a chain of national existence, ceases to be individual, limited
and shrunken and is enabled to open out into the truth of the nation and of the world"
(2001: 161). When the "imagination" is fed by colonial atrocities and "the nation stirs
as a whole," Fanon argues, the decolonized individual is "not an a posteriori product
of that nation; rather, he coexists with it and triumphs with it" (2001:250).
* * * * *
In the context of Arnold' s "binomial racial and cultural typing" (Castle 2001 :51) of
the Irish, and reflecting Yeats's deep concern with 'identity' in the colonial setting,
Yeats's phases of the moon map the process of Irish psychological decolonization at
the level of identity, culminating in the adoption by the individual (and by extension,
nation) of a 'postcolonial' Irish national identity. The "being" (Jeffares 1990: 137) or
"human mind" (Ellmann 1964: 162) is split into what Yeats calls the Four Faculties
moving within the gyres. These Faculties, resembling Blake's Zoas and comprising
two pairs of contraries, are Will and Mask, and Creative Mind and Body of Fate. Will
and Mask are indicative of the aspirations of the colonized at the level of identity:
they are "the will and its object, or the Is and the Ought (or that which should be)"
(Jeffares 1990:124). The Will is an individual's "normal ego" (1990:132) and the
Mask is the Will's "opposite or anti-self' (Ellmann 1960:229). The Will constitutes
"the basic choice which determines the individual's phase" (1960:229) in the Great
Wheel, while the Mask is the "object of desire or idea of good" (Jeffares 1990:132) or
the form "created by passion to unite us to ourselves" (1990:206). Aligned with the
subjective 'Celtic' gyre, Mask and Will "are lunar or antithetical or natural"
(1990: 124).
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The colonial dimension and incorporation of the Doctrine of the Mask into A Vision is
therefore clear. As Yeats puts it in part VI of "A Packet for Ezra Pound", "all gains of
man come from conflict" (1990:79) with his opposite. The Mask or "opposite" alone,
as Yeats puts it in "Ego Dominus Tuus", may "disclose" (1990:35) all that the
individual seeks to be. Accordingly, Yeats has it that the individual seeks his or her
"opposite or the opposite of' his or her "condition", and "attains" his or her Mask or
"object so far as it is attainable, at Phase 15" (1990: 131) - the Full Moon phase. It is
owing to this phase that Yeats's 'new species' ofIrishman and 'new kind' ofIrish
nation are born into 'postcoloniality'. The "self so sought", Yeats explains, is "that
Unity of Being compared by Dante in the Convito to that of 'a perfectly proportioned
human body'" (1990: 131), a 'self' that is a coherent and unified whole. Yeats
elaborates on such unity in "Four Years:1887-1891", writing that Unity of Being can
be likened "to a musical instrument so strung that if we touch a string all the strings
murmur faintly" (O'Donnell/Archibald 1999:164). InA Vision, Yeats holds that "the
sole activity and the sole unity is natural or lunar" and all unity "is from the Mask"
(Jeffares 1990: 131) - and this includes national unity. That the "condition" referred to
is colonial suppression becomes clear in Yeats's definitions of the opposites of
Creative Mind and Body of Fate.
These are "thought and its object, or the Knower and the Known" (1990:124).
Creative Mind is the "intellect" (1990: 133), "all the mind that is consciously
constructive" and "that part of the mind which acts on external events" (Ellmann
1960:229). Invoking Arnold's stereotyping of the Irish in terms of a "reaction against
the despotism of fact," and bespeaking colonial subjugation, Body of Fate is "the sum,
not the unity, of fact, fact as it affects a particular man" (Jeffares 1990: 131), or "the
series of events forced upon him from without" (1990: 132), or the external "physical
and mental environment" (Ellmann 1960:229). Aligned with the objective' Anglo'
gyre, Body of Fate and Creative Mind are "solar or primary or reasonable" (Jeffares
1990:124). The association of Body of Fate with colonial rule is apparent in that Body
of Fate "is always primary" and it is "in sympathy with the primary phase while it
opposes the antithetical phase" (1990: 138). Opposing the colonized's aspirations at
the level of identity, Body of Fate is "the reverse of the Mask, which is sympathetic to
an antithetical phase but opposes a primary" (1990: 138). At the same time, the Body
161
of Fate is "the source of antithetical energy" (1990: 140): its opposition to the Mask
fuels the colonized's intense desire for the Mask.
Primary and antithetical aspects are therefore internalised in the human mind, which
is "a kind of resolution of the energies of these Four Faculties" (Ellmann 1960:230).
As Ellmann argues, the Four Faculties "may roughly be translated as Imagination and
the Image of what we wish to become, and Intellect and the Environment"
(1964: 160). This Environment, I have shown, especially includes the colonial
environment. As Yeats presents it, only "by the pursuit or acceptance of its direct
opposite" or Mask and "by forcing that form upon the Body of Fate" can Will "attain
self-knowledge and expression" (Jeffares 1990:132). Only by the (ex)colonized Irish
adopting a national identity in spite of the cOlonizer-imposed physical and mental
environment can they imaginatively 'become' themselves (i.e. imagine themselves as
a community and become that community) and express their unity. Yeats therefore
grounds the phases of the moon firmly in terms of decolonization at the level of
identity, with the battle of the faculties basically "between what we" (the colonized)
"are and what we" (the colonized) "dream of becoming" (Ellmann 1964:160).
The individual's 'unfulfilled desire' or intense passion, as described in Per Arnica
Silentia Lunae, in seeking to become united to his or her "object of desire or idea of
good" or "ultimate self' (Jeffares 1990: 132), is exactly what, in A Vision, leads an
individual to engage with 'identity' and what propels the colonized individual or
nation towards Phase 15. As Fanon puts it, "the experience of desire" is "the first
milestone on the road that leads to the dignity of the spirit" (1967:218) of the
colonized. Yeats reimagines passion as "continual Discord through Deception," with
another word for Deception being "desire", without which, Yeats argues, there would
be "no conscience, no activity" (Jeffares 1990: 139). As Yeats explains, a Discord "is
always the enforced understanding of the unlikeness of Will and Mask or of Creative
Mind and Body of Fate" (1990:139). The relations between Will and Creative Mind,
Mask and Body of Fate, he later explains, are "discords" (1990: 147).
This means that desire of the "Is" or "normal ego" (1990: 132) to become the "Ought
(or that which should be)" (1990: 124) at the level of identity is informed by the
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unlikeness of the "Ought (or that which should be)" and Body of Fate. This is the
unlikeness of imagined 'postcolonial' political freedom/national identity and colonial
oppressionlOthering. The former is the colonized united to themselves at the level of
identity through a "form created by passion" (1990: 131), and the latter the colonizer's
imposition "from without" (1990: 132) of a denigrating physical and mental
environment, including Othemess at the level of identity. This is why, in the
antithetical phases, "the being seeks by the help ofthe Creative Mind to deliver the
Mask from Body of Fate" (1990: 137). The antithetical phases, it is clear, are the
phases of decolonization at the level of identity.
Against this liberationist backdrop, Yeats again draws his distinction between his
ideal, 'new species' ofIrish individual and the 'fated', conforming colonial individual
(whether the colonizer or submissive and/or imitative 'bourgeois' colonized). In
aligning each individual with the gyres, Yeats again invokes and subverts Arnold' s
imposition of negative Irish identity. Yeats calls his ideal Irishman "antithetical man"
and disparages what he calls "primary" man (1990: 132). Yeats explains that in the
case of antithetical man, the "stage-manager" or Daimon "offers his actor an inherited
scenario, the Body of Fate, and a Mask or role as unlike as possible to his natural ego
or Will, and leaves him to improvise through his Creative Mind the dialogue and
details of the plot" (1990: 132). He must "discover or reveal a being which only exists
with extreme effort, when his muscles are as it were all taut and all his energies
active" (1990: 132). Clearly, this is the individual who has entered the anti-self and
fashioned his Mask, becoming through violent inner or psychological combat united
with his "ultimate self' or Daimon, and emerging a "new species of man" from
"terror". This is the decolonized or 'postcolonial' individual recreated at the level of
identity, through his Mask.
In part XXI of "Four Years: 1887-1891", Yeats extols such decolonized individuals,
and counts himself among them. Thoughts, he explains, can "sustain us in defeat, or
give us victory, whether over ourselves or others" (O'Donnell/Archibald 1999:163).
These "thoughts, tested by passion," he adds, may be called "convictions" (1999: 163).
Antithetical man is, then, liberated from colonial rule and its mindset. As Yeats puts
it: "Among subjective men (in all those, that is, who must spin a web out of their own
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bowels) the victory is an intellectual daily re-creation of all that exterior fate snatches
away, and so that fate's antithesis" (2003:179). Fanon refers, in Black Skin White
Masks, to such 'daily re-creation' regarding the decolonized "Negro": "In the world
through which I travel, I am endlessly creating myself" (1967:229).
Yeats therefore imagines the antithesis of external "fate" or colonial oppression: full
liberation of the Irish at the level of identity, in terms of a "constantly renewed
choice" (Jeffares 1990: 133) of self-ere)creation that triumphs in the face and wake of
colonial circumstances. Clearly, Yeats is imagining full political liberation in Ireland
through a chain reaction of "personal liberation" in the first instance. Antithetical man
represents the achievement, through a "radical act of imagination, or a complete,
aesthetic self-definition," of a 'modem' self-determination that fully realizes "the
otherwise discredited notion of a 'free life'" (Pippin 1991 :30). Fanon, again,
underlines this 'self-deriving' and self-dependence of the decolonized individual:
"The body of history does not determine a single one of my actions. I am my own
foundation" (1967:231).
In the case of "primary man", Yeats explains disparagingly, the "Will is weak and
cannot create a role, and so, if it transform itself, does so after an accepted pattern,
some traditional clown or pantaloon" (Jeffares 1990: 132). It is submissive and
subservient primary man who "must cease to desire Mask and Image by ceasing from
self-expression, and substitute a motive of service for that of self-expression"
(1990: 132). Thus the "primary is that which serves, the antithetical is that which
creates" (1990:133). Instead of "the created Mask", primary man has "an imitative
Mask", and "when he recognizes this his Mask may become the historical norm"
(1990:132). The Mask of primary man, whether of 'superior' colonizer or 'inferior'
Other, is therefore that reflected in the objective mirror. His Mask or identity is not
self-determined or "chosen" like that of antithetical man. It is instead externally
imposed, passively received or imitative. His identity is "simply who the individual
happened to become due to circumstance" (Graf2000:107), specifically colonial
circumstance.
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On this basis, Yeats again draws his crucial distinction in terms of 'identity itself,
between what he now calls "free" (voluntary) and "enforced" (imposed or imitative)
Masks. The "antithetical Mask and Will are free," he explains, while "the primary
Mask and Will are enforced" (Jeffares 1990: 133). The "free" Mask and Will, Yeats
reveals, are "personality" (1990:133), and this can be seen to constitute a 'contrary'.
However, the enforced Mask and Will are "code" or "character" (1990: 133), and this
can be seen to operate in terms of 'negation'. Yeats therefore frames 'identity itself
in terms of "personality" and "character". "Personality", Yeats confirms in A Vision,
is "self-dependent" (1990:155) and "always assumed" (1990:181), while "character"
or "code" arises because "when the primary phases begin man is moulded more and
more from without" (1990: 133).
Within this Systematic framework, and from within his 'endorsement' of "the basic
outlines" of Arnold's "Celticist analysis" (Kiberd 1996:318), Yeats plots the
trajectory ofIrish psychological revolution: decolonization at the level of identity, and
thereby the emergence of a 'new species' ofIrishman and 'new kind' ofIrish nation.
Phase 8, Yeats explains, marks "the beginning of the antithetical phases ("those where
the bright part of the moon is greater than the dark" - Jeffares 1990: 128) and the
'Beginning of Strength'" (1990: 133). The Irish individual begins to free himself from
colonial Othering, for here the "imitation that held it to the enforced Mask, the norm
of the race now a hated convention, has ceased and its own norm has not begun"
(1990:133). The individual has 'turned from the mirror' to his own imagination, for
the phases between Phase 8 and Phase 15 are associated "with elemental water,
because there the image-making power is at its height" (1990:138). As Fanon notes,
"on the eve of the decisive conflict for national freedom" there is "the rebirth of the
imagination" (2001: 197), and this is opposed to the colonizer's 'primary' Reason. The
colonized's "challenge to the colonial world is not a rational confrontation of points
of view" (2001 :31).
At Phase 8, the "struggle" is "to find personality" (Jeffares 1990: 132). Primary and
antithetical "are equal and fight for mastery" (1990: 133), but because Will can
"conceive of a Mask separate from or predominant over Creative Mind and Body of
Fate", i.e. over the colonial physical and mental environment, "there is personality not
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character" (1990: 181). When "this fight is ended through the conviction of weakness
and the preparation for rage," Yeats explains, "the Mask becomes once more
voluntary" (1990: 133). Decolonization is under way; identity is for the antithetical
individual now increasingly within the realm of choice and self-determination. This
"struggle" and "fight" for antithetical "personality", and ensuing "rage", is indicative
of the "violence which has ruled over the ordering of the colonial world" being
"claimed and taken over" by the colonized individual "at the moment when, deciding
to embody history in his own person, he surges into forbidden quarters" (Fanon
2001 :31). As Fanon argues, to "wreck the colonial world is henceforward a mental
picture of action which is very clear, very easy to understand and which may be
assumed by each one of the individuals which constitute the colonized people"
(2001 :31).
For Yeats, this mental picture of "action only" (Jeffares 1990:36) is the chosen or
"free" Mask or "personality", fashioned in the "forbidden quarters" of the mind: in the
unconscious or imagination, denounced and rigorously controlled by the colonizer as
the site of 'evil'. The wrecking of the colonial world is for Yeats the action, rather, of
Blakean "Evil", the "active springing from Energy" (Butter 1989:53). As Yeats
explains, when the "old primary becomes the new antithetical" the "old realisation of
an objective moral law is changed into a subconscious turbulent instinct" (1990: 148).
This is in line with Fanon's argument that in the "colonialist context" the "good is
quite simply that which is evil for 'them'" (2001 :39). Yeats's is a "mental picture" or
vision of individual and collective unity which he believes may "be assumed by each"
Irish individual in imagining and actively forging an inclusive, non-essentialist,
'postcolonial' Irish nation.
Arnold's essentialist, racial stereotyping of the typical Irishman "as 'undisciplinable,
anarchical, and turbulent by nature"; as having a "special affinity with 'the wild magic
of nature"'; and as having a sensibility that can be defined "as a 'passionate, turbulent,
indomitable reaction against the despotism of fact" is therefore appropriated and
mobilised by Yeats in order to call for the exact opposite of Amold's 'marriage'
proposal: a violent, 'modem' revolution of the mind in which the "world of rigid
custom and law" - i.e. the colonial world - is "broken up by the 'uncontrollable
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mystery upon the bestial floor'" (Jeffares 1990: 148) or unconscious/imagination. As
Fanon puts it, "decolonization is always a violent phenomenon," and because it "sets
out to change the order of the world, is ... a programme of complete disorder"
(2001 :27). For Yeats, this is a purposive 'disorder' bent on unity and liberation,
whereby the "disappearance of colonialism" means "the disappearance of the
colonized man" (Fanon 2001: 198).
Antithetical men, Yeats explains, are "violent in themselves because they hate all that
impedes their personality, but are in their intellect (Creative Mind) gentle" (Jeffares
1990:133). The "being of antithetical man" is "full of rage before Phase 12, against all
in the world that hinders its expression, after Phase 12, but before Phase 15, the rage
is a knife turned against itself' (1990:133). At Phase 12, Yeats explains, the "phases
of hatred for some external fate are giving way to phases of self-hatred" (1990: 161).
The "nature is conscious of the most extreme degree of deception" and "is wrought to
a frenzy of desire for truth of self" (1990: 163). There is, Yeats adds, "now the greatest
possible belief in all values created by personality" (1990:163). The phases where the
individual "defines himself mainly through an image of the mind" have "begun" or
are "beginning" (1990: 162).
This is the violence of psychological decolonization, at the level of identity, described
by Fanon. He argues that "Total liberation is that which concerns all sectors of the
personality," and that the "objective" of the colonized individual "who fights against
himself is to bring about the end of domination" (2001 :250). This necessitates also
paying "attention to the liquidation of all untruths implanted in his being by
oppression" (2001 :250). This means turning against internalised Other-ness and
division. At "the level of individuals," Fanon explains, the phenomenon of violence
"is a cleansing force" (2001 :74). It "frees" the colonized individual "from his
inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and
restores his self-respect" (2001 :74).The violence of decolonization, Fanon also
argues, "is in action all-inclusive and national" (2001 :74), investing the colonized
with "positive and creative qualities" which bind them "together as a whole, since
each individual forms a violent link in the great chain" (2001 :73).
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In this vein, in the second quarter of the wheel the Mask "is strongest" (Jeffares
1990: 138) of the Four Faculties. At Phase 12, "true personality begins" (1990: 158)
and "is strongest near Phase 15" (1990:134) or Full Moon. The deep subjectivity of
the individual increases from Phase 12. There is now "the reflection inward of the
Four Faculties," for "all are as it were mirrored in personality" and "Unity of Being
becomes possible" (1990: 135) in "the four phases closest to full moon" (Ellmann
1964: 158). The individual has found and is fashioning his free Mask in the anti-self:
"Hitherto we have been part of something else," Yeats writes, "but now discover
everything within our own nature" (Jeffares 1990:135), meaning the individual has
accessed the unconscious and Anima Mundi. In these phases, the antipathy of the
individual's 'combat with himself is intensified, for he is at war with his 'ultimate
self or Daimon: the force of 'Genius' that Yeats associates with 'Unity'.
As Yeats explains, it is precisely because the "double mind" of visionary experience
"is created at full moon" or Phase 15 "that the antithetical phases are but, at the best,
phases of a momentary illumination like that of a lightning flash" (1990:270). The
"lightning flash", of course, indicates the attraction of the Daimon, symbolized in Per
Arnica Si/entia Lunae as "sudden lightning" (1990:60). The antithetical phases, and
Phase 15 in particular, can clearly be related to the pictorial key and meanings of The
Tower card of the Tarot. The card, among the Major Arcana, depicts lightning striking
the top of a tower and two bodies "plummeting earthward" (Echols, Mueller,
Thomson 1996:84) - significantly, at full moon. Traditionally, The Tower represents
"reorganizing the personality" (1996:84). The tower is the limited and limiting "ego
structure" and "outer fa<;:ade" the individual has "constructed", and the card suggests
the ego can "'move in only two directions (i.e. think only in dualities)" (1996:85).
This is the dualistic thinking Yeats bemoans in Per Arnica Si/entia Lunae. The "flash
of clear vision" or lightning shatters "existing modes of thinking" (1996:84).
Furthermore, the falling bodies reflect "a mixture of conscious and unconscious"
(1996:84), indicative of Yeats's description of the merging of the 'daily trivial mind'
with the 'buried self. Their fall symbolizes "a clean break from the past" (1996:84),
and the lightning therefore overthrows entrenched "rigidity and delusion" (1996:84).
The lightning represents "the spiritual force" - Yeats's Daimon - that violently
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"releases the imprisoned inner self to go on to higher fulfilment," for being suddenly
"thrust into an alternate awareness can be a liberating experience" (1996:84). Indeed,
the "full moon holds the promise of a new cycle," and overall the card is "linked to
"victory and a new direction for the future" (1996:85). In its "most positive sense,"
the card "reflects the ability to go our own way, follow our own direction, possibly
even defy social conventions or other organized traditions, and make it work for us"
(1996:85).
Yeats's occult knowledge is therefore reframed in terms of a 'postcolonial' Irish
national identity that he believes will enable the Irish nation to attain "victory and a
new direction for the future". Grafhighlights that the concept of the "tower" has not
only autobiographical resonance in Yeats' s Thoor Ballylee residence (purchased in
1917), but that in the 1920s the tower replaces the mask as Yeats's main "working
symbol" just as the mask "replaced rose" (Graf 2000: 187). The nationalist dimension,
at the level of identity, ofYeats's Doctrine of the Mask and phases ofthe moon grows
even clearer in that, in Yeats's later poems, the tower signifies "not only a single soul,
but also the collective, national soul of a country" (Graf 2000: 197) - specifically,
Ireland.
In the antithetical phases of the moon, the lightning symbolises not only the 'force of
genius' relating to the successful fashioning of a Mask that permits the full expression
of personality; it also symbolises the charged ferocity - the "deep enmity" (Jeffares
1990:43) and "intense emotion" (Fanon 2001: 111) - informing the decolonizing
individual's combat with himself. The individual experiences what Fanon calls
"Those lightning flashes of consciousness which fling the body into stormy paths or
which throw it into an almost pathological trance where the face of the other beckons
me on to giddiness, where my blood calls for the blood of the other, where by sheer
inertia my death calls for the death of the other... " (2001: 111). This "death" of the
colonized individual, whose "rage is a knife turned against itself," is recorded by
Yeats in "The Phases of the Moon": the "soul", under "the frenzy of the fourteenth
moon" begins "to tremble into stillness/To die into the labyrinth of itself!" (Collected
Poems 1971:185). This is the "terror" described earlier in this chapter, the "death" of
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the individual's "normal ego" through the merging of the unconscious and conscious
'halves' of the individual's nature.
Indeed, the individual enters complete subjectivity - what Yeats calls an "immovable
trance" (Jeffares 1990:168) and "profound reverie" (1990:270) - at Phase 15 or Full
Moon, where the antithetical phases "come to a climax" (1990:128) and the individual
"attains his object" or Mask "so far as it is attainable" (1990: 131). As Ellmann notes,
Phase 15 is "the link" between A Vision "and Yeats's poetic method" (1960:288) or
Doctrine of the Mask delineated in Per Amica Silentia Lunae. Ellmann writes that
while Yeats "does not explicitly say so," it is "clear that to this phase belong the
symbols of poetry, caught up into reconcilement" (1960:228). However, this is also
clearly the phase of complete immersion in the anti-self and imagination, replete with
the archetypal images and symbols of Anima Mundi - the psychological state in
which identity has been remade through the fashioning of a Mask.
At Phase 15, Yeats confirms, the individual has "reached the end of that elaboration
of itself which has for its climax an absorption in time, where space can be but
symbols or images in the mind" (Jeffares 1990: 167). This "elaboration of itself' is the
creation of the Mask or personality, with the assistance of the taskmaster Daimon,
while the "absorption in time" indicates complete subjectivity in an unconscious
"trance" or imaginative "reverie". While Yeats initially associates "time with
subjectivity" because thoughts and emotions have "duration and quality" (1990: 122),
he later states that the Mask or form "created by passion to unite us to ourselves" is
actually "apparently the timeless" (1990:206). The chosen Mask is therefore linked to
the "timeless, absolute" (Hamburger 1969:81) subconscious 'reality' or anti-self, in
which images of Anima Mundi "burn up time" (Jeffares 1990:62) during a modernist
'flight out of time'.
The individual's psychological or gyring 'movement', through "meditation upon a
mask", to the 'still point' of complete immersion in the unconscious or anti-self, can
therefore be traced visually by the progression of the antithetical phases of the moon
to Phase 15. As Yeats writes, Phase 15 is "the consummation of a slow process," for
since Phase 12 "all images, and cadences of the mind, have been satisfying to that
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mind just in so far as they have expressed this converging of will and thought, effort
and attainment" (1990: 168). Clearly, the individual has been shaping and perfecting
his Mask, has "selected, moulded and remoulded, narrowed its circle of living, been
more and more the artist, grown more and more'distinguished' in all preference"
(1990:168). However, at Phase 15, "nothing is apparent but dreaming Will and the
Image" or free Mask "that it dreams" (1990: 168). This Mask is "beauty" (1990:206),
and this is the phase of "greatest possible beauty" (1990:169) where contemplation
and desire are "united into one" (1990: 168). Quoting Plotinus, Yeats writes that
"things that are of one kind are unconscious" (1990: 131).
In this psychological state, "all effort has ceased" (1990: 168), "strife" (1990: 129) is
absent, and "All thought becomes an image" (Collected Poems 1971: 185) or Mask.
The individual has imaginatively fused with the Mask, which is "consumed in Will"
(Jeffares 1990: 131). Thought and Will, as well as "effort and attainment", are
"indistinguishable" (1990: 168), while "Chance and Choice have become
interchangeable without losing their identity" (Ellmann 1960:228). This state is,
clearly, the liberating "Ecstasy" of Plotinus described earlier in this chapter, what
Yeats calls the "end of art": a "sudden sense of power and of peace, that comes when
we have before our mind's eye" an image" which obeys us, which leaves us free, and
which satisfies the need of our soul" (Foster 2003:72).
Above all, this is the psychological state in which the "trivial daily mind" and "buried
self' have merged, permitting the "birth of a new species of man"
(O'Donnell/Archibald 1999:217) through his self-fashioned Mask or personality. As
Fanon puts it, "Decolonization is the veritable creation of new men" (2001 :28), the
"replacing of a certain' species' of men by another' species' of men" (2001:27). This
"new species of man" is, as I have explained, Yeats's ideal 'postcolonial' Irishman,
antithetical man. The words "Chance and Choice have become interchangeable"
indicate that antithetical men, like Dante and Villon, are "predestinate and free,
creation's very self' (O'Donnell/Archibald 1999:217). Arnold's essentialist, racial
stereotyping of the typical Irishman as having "an 'indomitable personality'" (Castle
2001:49) is therefore appropriated and subversively transformed by Yeats into an
unequivocal validation of a separate 'Irish' identity that is the exact opposite of the
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Other, i.e. Amold's 'inferior' and 'sentimental' Celt. This "new" Irishman, in light of
the 'primary' (facts) and 'antithetical' (imagining) aspects ofYeats's phases of the
moon, can be seen to arise from within the very framework of Amold's "binomial
racial and cultural typing" (2001 :51) of the Irish. This "new" Irishman eschews the
conjugal subordination 'humanely' offered by Arnold, and instead welds his own
ideal Image of himself, to himself. This subversion and self-validation informs
Yeats's reference in "Under Ben Bulben" to "the indomitable Irishry" (Collected
Poems 1971 :400).
Ellmann explains that the ideal phase "where Unity of Being is more possible than at
any other phase" is "shortly after the full moon, phase 17" (1960:240). While Yeats
does not name himself, he clearly constructs himself (as a number of critics have
noted) as an exemplary figure or archetype of this phase, along with Dante, Shelley
and Landor. Foster points out that Yeats saw himself and Dante as being "destined by
astrology to be superpoets" (2003:286). Dante's presence at Phase 17, however, also
confirms that this is the phase of the "new species of man". Yeats's antithetical man
or ideal Irishman is in this phase called "Daimonic Man" (Jeffares 1990: 171). In this
phase, Yeats explains, "expression of Daimonic thought, is now more easy than at any
other phase" (1990: 172). Daimonic Man's Mask, he reveals, is one "of simplicity that
is also intensity" (1990: 172).
"He who attains Unity of Being," Yeats writes, "is some man, who, while struggling
with his fate and his destiny until every energy of his being has been roused, is
content that he should so struggle with no final conquest" (Jeffares 1990:285). For the
individual who enjoys Unity of Being, "fate and freedom are not to be distinguished;
he is no longer bitter, he may even love tragedy like those 'who love the gods and
withstand them'" (1990:285). Again, that "fate and freedom are not to be
distinguished" underlines that the individual of this phase is Yeats' s "new species" of
Irishman, decolonized at the level of identity and "no longer bitter" about the colonial
past. As Ellmann also explains, the individual finds himself in "such unity" to be
"closest" to the Blakean '''radical innocence'" (1964: 158) described earlier in this
chapter. No longer struggling in the bonds of the Manichaean colonial world,
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Daimonic Man is also Blakean in being "content to see both good and evil" (leffares
1990: 174), having surpassed 'negation' through a 'contrary' at the level of identity.
Yeats's construction of himself as his own ideal Irishman confirms his overall
concern with 'identity itself, a concern all the more evident in that, on the whole, the
table of the 28 phases of the moon focuses on how an individual "defines himself'
(1990:162) in his circumstances, on the patterns that emerge in how an individual
might answer the question "Who am I?" (1990: 175), and on actually constructing the
mindsets and identities of his chosen specimens as case studies. Foster describes A
Vision, with its "idea of defining a personality, especially by adopting or creating a
Mask in a 'free' rather than an 'enforced' manner," as "the work of a mind that tries
to see people as constructs" (2003:284). Indeed, the Great Wheel, complete with
exemplary figure(s) at most of the phases, constitutes a modernist lumping together of
poets and personages, some personally known to Yeats, of divergent historical periods
and contexts, in such manner as to generate, by the movement of the 'being' around
the Wheel, a sense of the constructedness, multiplicity and instability of 'identity
itself .
Thus Yeats's table of exemplary figures, who take on the air of archetypes rather than
flesh-and-blood people, reads like a 'Who's Who' ofYeats's 'constructs': WaIt
Whitman at Phase 6; George Borrow, Alexandre Dumas, Thomas Carlyle, and lames
Macpherson at Phase 7; Parnell at Phase 10; Spinoza and Savonarola at Phase 11;
Baudelaire, Beardsley, and Ernest Dowson at Phase 13; Keats and Giorgione at Phase
14; William Blake, Rabelais, Aretino, and Paracelsus at Phase 16; Dante, Shelley, and
Landor at Phase 17; Goethe at Phase 18; Gabriele d'Annunzio "perhaps", Oscar
Wilde and Byron at Phase 19; Shakespeare, Balzac, and Napoleon at Phase 20;
Lamarck, Bernard Shaw, Wells, and George Moore at Phase 21; Flaubert, Herbert
Spencer, Swedenborg, Dostoieffsky, and Darwin at Phase 22; Rembrandt and Synge
at Phase 23; Galsworthy and Lady Gregory at Phase 24; Cardinal Newman, Luther,
Calvin, George Herbert, and George Russell (A.E.) at Phase 25; Socrates and Pascal
at Phase 27.
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This "formulaic approach" (Foster 2003:284) to analysing people, whether in terms of
'personality' or 'character' , in itself reflects Yeats's prioritisation of the antithetical or
imaginative dimension of 'identity itself over primary 'fact'. As Foster describes it,
"economies of the imagination are made: the definition of certain 'phases' seems to
rely almost entirely on choosing a specimen personality and analysing it" (2003:285).
He points out that Dowson, "as described in 'The Trembling of the Veil', apparently
dictates the formulation of Phase Thirteen" (2003:285). 'Fact' therefore gives way to
Yeats's own imagination, with Yeats interspersing among this panoply of constructed
figures other 'types' of 'people' that are either complete fiction or left to the reader's
imagination. These include "The Idiot of Dostoieffsky perhaps" at Phase 8; "An
unnamed artist" at Phase 9; "many beautiful women" at Phase 14; "some beautiful
women" at Phase 16; "a certain actress" at Phase 19, the "Hunchback" at Phase 26,
and the "Fool" at Phase 28. In all, the relation of his list oflargely illustrious and
artistic individuals to nations and 'nation-making' is not explicitly explained or
clarified. Rather, Yeats includes himself in this list by constructing himself as artist-
exemplar of the most desirable of the phases: as the ideal 'type' of (Irish)man, with
this phase therefore also that of the ideal 'type' of (Irish) nation. Collectively, these
individuals - matched with their respective phases, through which the 'being' (an
individual or nation) proceeds 'in turn' around the Great Wheel - serve Yeats in
portraying 'identity itself as multiple and protean, as an unstable, imaginary construct
that, when chosen as a 'personality' in the mode of the antithetical man, nonetheless
has genuine material currency in terms of self-determination in the face of an
opposing external physical and mental environment and its 'facts'.
Significantly, Yeats places Queen Victoria in the 'primary' Phase 24, which is
characterised by "self-righteousness and scorn of others" (Jeffares 1990: 191). In this
phase, the individual is "flooded with mercy ... for those over whom the code can
have no rights, children and the nameless multitude" (1990: 191), and the enforced
Mask "holds together a... social order" (1990: 192). Most notably, Amold is
subversively placed in the 'primary' Phase 18, where Unity of Being is no longer
possible. The man who insisted "the 'Celtic nature' was inherently 'sentimental "', a
term which meant above all "a desire 'to aspire ardently after life, light, and emotion"
(Castle 2001:47), is cast by Yeats as "The Emotional Man" (Jeffares 1990:174). Yeats
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explains that, with the antithetical tincture closing in this phase, the "being" turns to
"emotional philosophy" (1990: 175). The tincture "begins to attain... its active form,"
which is either "love" as "the union of emotion and instinct" (1990: 175) or, in light of
"Enforced lure" (1990: 174) or "artificial choice" (1990: 176), "sentimentality"
(1990: 175).
Foster points out that "the parallels" between the Irish mythic hero Cuchulain and
Yeats's "own perceived personality" had long "been clear", and during question-and-
answer sessions with his medium-wife at Stone Cottage in December 1917 "the idea
of the mythic hero as his own alter ego was specifically established" (2003: 112).
Cuchulain, though too not named, is "established as WBY's own mask, or solar
opposite" and installed "in the heroic Phase Twelve" of the "archetypal System ofA
Vision" (2003: 112). As Unterecker argues, Yeats felt that the Mask of a "modem"
country like Ireland would "resemble that which is most unlike modem Ireland, the
Ireland of priest, merchant, and politician," and that such an opposite would
"resemble 'an Ireland/The poets have imagined, terrible and gay''', specifically
"Cuchulain's Ireland, a land of reckless heroes" (1963:31). Unterecker refers to a
much-quoted passage from part XXIII of "Four Years: 1887-1891 ":
"Have not all races had their first unity from a mythology,
that marries them to rock and hill? We had in Ireland imaginative
stories, which the uneducated classes knew and even sang, and
might we not make those stories current among the educated classes ...
it might ... so deepen the political passion of the nation that all,
artist and poet, craftsman and day-labourer would accept a common
design?" (O'Donnell/Archibald 1999:167)
Unterecker adds that this "common design - this great image - was the myth-founded
Mask of Ireland which, being opposite to the modem world, was the Mask for the
modem world, 'of all states of mind not impossible, the most difficult to that man...
or nation'" (1963 :31). Yet "if the modem Yeats, the modem Irishman, or modem
Ireland" chooses "to put it on, from that Hegelian tension of opposites a greatness
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might be synthesized, in the union of opposites a new kind of nation might be born"
(1963 :31). Yeats' s proffering of Cuchulain as the Mask for Ireland, to marry the Irish
to "rock and hill", of course raises the same question posed by Castle in regard to
Yeats's subtle reversal of "Amold's call for Celtic submission to the British Empire":
Does it "generate an anti-colonialist discourse capable of resisting the discriminatory
effects of primitivism, or does it in fact fail to avoid a remysification of the Celt, thus
reinscribing Amold' s strategies of binomial racial and cultural typing?" (2001 :51).
The answer to this lies in the telling line quoted by Unterecker: "an Ireland/The poets
have imagined, terrible and gay" (1963:31). Far from an unreflectively 'primitive' or
'nativist' Irish Mask, the Mask Yeats proffers is not only somewhat Blakean but is a
specifically 'modem', Nietzschean Cuchulain. As Ellmann puts it, the "man who
emerges from" Yeats's "poetry is a modern man though his name be Cuchulain"
(1960:298).
Indeed, the only exemplary figure named in the heroic Phase 12, the phase of "The
Forerunner" (Jeffares 1990: 162), is Nietzsche. In this "phase of the hero" the
individual "overcomes himself, and so no longer needs ... the submission of others,
or... conviction of others to prove his victory" (1990: 163). It is therefore unsurprising
that the personal liberation of Yeats's ideal Irishman, the Daimonic Man of Phase 17,
is via a Nietzschean Mask of 'tragic joy', evoking the "heroic ecstasy" or "heroic
mood" that is "Bitter and gay" (Hamburger 1969:83). The Nietzschean Mask is why
the decolonized or psychologically liberated individual of Phase 17 "is content that he
should so struggle with no final conquest" (Jeffares 1990:285). Again, it is evident
that "victory" for Yeats, as he indicates in his Autobiographies, is a Nietzschean
"intellectual daily re-creation of all that exterior fate snatches away, and so that fate's
antithesis" (O'Donnell/Archibald 1999: 163), as outlined earlier in this chapter in
regard to the psychology of antithetical man. As I've mentioned in chapter two,
Ellmann underlines Yeats's framing of "the Nietzschean lines" (1964:93) in a poem
like "Lapis Lazuli": "All things fall and are built again,/And those that build them
again are gay" (Collected Poems 1971 :339). This specifically Nietzschean attitude is
therefore also framed by Yeats in terms ofIrish national identity. The Daimonic or
ideal Irish individual, Yeats holds, may be inferred and evoked by the Nietzschean
Mask of Cuchulain. Such a Mask would be "The Forerunner" of and evoke Unity of
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Being. As Ellmann highlights, Yeats wrote "as early as 1919" that, were he 24 instead
of 54 years old, he "would propose to the nation his new doctrine" of the Mask and
"Unity of Being" (1960:245).
Clearly, Yeats has not "stopped short of imagining full political liberation" (Said
1993 :287/88) in Ireland. As Fanon puts it, after "national liberation" the "people
realize that life is an unending contest" (2001 :74). The "struggle... goes on"
(2001 :74). Yeats's Nietzschean personal liberation therefore not only precedes the
strictly political "triumph" and "liberation" in Ireland which his 'occult' works and
Autobiographies clearly anticipated, but fully inhabits and moves through Said's
"second more openly liberationist moment" (1993 :271) into the 'postcolonial': into a
liberated future grounded in everyday 'reality' or uncompromising actuality, made
possible by the prior psychological decolonization of the Irish at the level of identity.
Yeats writes in A Vision that "All life is ... a struggle" (Jeffares 1990:308), and
national liberation, he therefore warns, is ongoing and 'work-a-day' rather than
forever guaranteed or immune to the tragedy and limitations of everyday existence.
Postcolonial self-determination and nation-building must, he advocates, be the heroic
"victory" of the Nietzschean antithetical man, "an intellectual daily re-creation of all
that exterior fate snatches away." This necessarily applies, too, at the level of national
identity or 'personality'. Yeats plainly states in A Vision that 'personality' ranges
"from an individual charm... to a hard objective dramatization" (Jeffares 1990: 133),
the latter indicative of national identity - and that personality "no matter how
habitual, is a constantly renewed choice" (Jeffares 1990:133).
His imagining of full political liberation in Ireland also takes the form in A Vision of
applying Phase 15 as the ideal 'phase of complete beauty' to historical cycles. He
writes that "If I were left to myself! would make Phase 15 coincide with Justinian's
reign, that great age of building in which one may conclude Byzantine art was
perfected" (Jeffares 1990:269) as "the vision of the whole people" (1990:268). This
idea of imaginative, artistic "building" by a united collectivity informs Yeats's later
poetic construction of his ideal 'state', psychological and political, in "Sailing to
Byzantium" (1928) and "Byzantium" (1933). These poems, as Bradford points out in
his essay "Yeats's Byzantium Poems: A Study of Their Development", "are deeply
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concerned with the achievement of Unity of Being through art" (Unterecker
1963:130). In "Sailing to Byzantium", Bradford explains, Justinian's city becomes
Yeats's "golden city of the imagination," an "imagined land where Unity of Being has
permeated an entire culture" (1963:94). As Foster puts it, Byzantium is for Yeats "a
gleaming personal emblem" of the unity of "religious, aesthetic and practical life"
(2003 :288) - what Yeats calls the "concrete and sensuous unity of phase IS" (Jeffares
1990:251). In light of the colonial dimension ofA Vision explicated in chapter two
and this chapter, the Byzantium of Phase 15 constitutes a thinly veiled poetic
imagining of and encouragement towards Yeats's ideal Irish community united in
common purpose or design by a shared Mask or identity representing that design. This
is a community endlessly and artistically nation-building through the natural and
purposive creativity of the unconscious or imagination. As Ellmann puts it, although
"the poet has sailed to Byzantium" his "heart, 'sick with desire', is full of Ireland"
(1960:260).
Furthermore, Yeats's imagining of full psychological and political liberation in
Ireland in terms of unity is evident in the very construction of himself as a model
figure or archetype of Phase 17. As Kiberd speculates, Yeats's gyres may be seen in
terms of "the spiritual hyphenation of the Anglo-Irish, forever seen as English in
Ireland, and always Irish in England" (1996:317). He argues that the gyres "may well
be a version, in world-historical terms, ofthe Anglo-Irish antithesis out of which
Yeats and the Irish revival came," and adds that "if so, they are also part of his
attempt to transcend it" (1996:318). Applying the gyres to Yeats's specific historical
context and System at the level of identity, Kiberd holds that the primary gyre may be
associated with "Anglo" and therefore with "democratic, scientific, factual, objective,
Christian, realistic, God over one soul" (1996:318). The antithetical gyre, he adds,
may be associated with "Celtic" and therefore with "hierarchical, aesthetic, visionary,
subjective, pagan, idealistic, multiple self' (1996:318). Yeats's "guile", Kiberd
argues, prompts "him to expose the limitations of either term by fusing both" and
thereby dismantling the binary opposition, in "the conviction that while it takes talent
to discern differences, only genius can establish the underlying unity" (1996:317).
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This decolonizing fusion of the gyres not only functions at a 'macro-level' in
subverting Amold's essentialism and the English Othering of the Irish, but also at the
'medium-level' in subverting the reciprocal Othering by the Catholic and Protestant
factions within Ireland. As Kiberd also argues, the gyres take on the overtones of "the
two major religious traditions" (1996:451) within Ireland. Kiberd states that the
primary gyre "might loosely be termed Protestant, in its sponsorship of democratic,
rational, Anglicized thought, as against the antithetical or Catholic gyre, which is
hierarchical, aesthetic, visionary and subjective" (1996:451). The "underlying desire"
ofA Vision is therefore "to render those labels meaningless by reaching that point at
which each gyre is interpenetrated by its own opposite," and "so to write a kind of
constitution for the infant state" (1996:451). This 'constitution', as I have shown,
would be based on an inclusive unity forged through a shared national identity.
In addition, the gyres' subversion of Othering applies at the 'micro-level', within
Yeats himself. As Kiberd puts it, Yeats is, despite "a reputation for dreaminess," as
"'Anglo' (cautious, analytic, even cunning) as he is 'Irish' (passionate, careless,
emotional)" (1996:317). Yeats's placement of himself at Phase 17, Kiberd argues,
shows that he "has elements of the Primary about him, and hints of the Anglophone"
but "is predominantly Antithetical or Celtic" (1996:318). The "interpenetration of
cones" thus "perfectly captures" Yeats's "dual inheritance" (1996:318) as Anglo-
Irish. However, while the Othemess of both 'Anglo' and 'Irish', and of the
hyphenated 'Anglo-Irish' , is subverted by the interpenetration of the gyres and the
"varying proportions" (Ellmann 1960:229) of primary and antithetical qualities within
all individuals, it remains that Yeats's System is "so manipulated as to favour the
antithetical Celtic over the primary English elements" (1996:325). As I have shown,
Yeats charts and advocates the decolonization and therefore re-creation of the Irish
individual and nation at the level of identity, a process that culminates in the'birth' of
a unified 'new species' ofIrishman and 'new kind' ofIrish nation through the
application of his Doctrine of the Mask.
Yeats thus emerges at Phase 17 as his own ideal, archetypal Irishman and Irish
national 'superpoet', as the antithetical or Daimonic Man whose Mask is the
"exemplar of the nation" (Kiberd 1996:308). In so 'manipulating' his System to
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favour the Irish, as I have shown, he strategically appropriates and subverts the very
same terms used in Arnold's Othering of the Irish. The essentialist, racial stereotyping
of the typical Irishman "as 'undisciplinable, anarchical, and turbulent by nature"'; as
having a "special affinity with 'the wild magic of nature"'; as having "an 'indomitable
personality'" and "a 'reverence and enthusiasm for genius, learning and things of the
mind'" (Castle 2001:49); as being "sentimental" (Castle 2001:47); and as having a
sensibility that can be defined "as a 'passionate, turbulent, indomitable reaction
against the despotism of fact'" (Castle 2001 :50) is not just deliberately unhooked by
Yeats from a racial basis, but is, to use Yeats's words from "Easter 1916", "changed
utterly" (Collected Poems 1971:203). Yeats commandeers and transforms Arnold's
terms and their meanings in order to seditiously underwrite his conception of Irish
'personality' or national identity. That Yeats does so reveals that his 'failure' to
"seriously" question "Arnold's primitivist assumptions" is not "a blind spot" but
indeed "a subtle strategy" (Castle 2001 :50).
That these terms are "changed utterly" is, of course, consistent with the 'modernist'
Yeats's intent to "'make it new'" by "violating accepted conventions and decorums,"
to "shock the sensibilities of the conventional reader" and "challenge the norms and
pieties of bourgeois culture" (Abrahams 1981: 11 0). It is also in line with the Irish
bardic tradition, in which the bard "similarly fashioned and refashioned traditional
materials in the creation of new traditional texts" (Castle 2001 :68). Yeats's
'modernist' or 'bardic' authority and making of 'new originals' therefore addresses
Castle's argument, outlined earlier in this chapter, that Yeats's "subversion" of
Arnold's Celticism "is by no means complete" (2001:51). As I've explained earlier in
this chapter, Castle claims that a "residual reliance on primitivist discourse in Yeats's
appeal to an 'ancient worship ofNature' " and "surfacing more explicitly in his
folklore projects" blocks Yeats "from offering a decisive critique of imperialist
Celticism and its anthropological assumptions about the Irish 'race'" (2001:51).
However, Yeats's Doctrine of the Mask, as I have demonstrated, reveals any "residual
reliance on primitivist discourse" or folk 'tradition' to strategically form part of a
modernist discourse that mobilises distinctly Yeatsian conceptions of Nature, Celt and
myth which prioritise the unconscious, imagination, occult and psychology over 'the
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primitive'. As I have shown, Yeats's recourse to 'modem' psychology and
esotericism does, in fact, decisively critique Amoldean primitivism and Celticism by
debunking it (and Amold) altogether. Yeats's understanding of primitivism in relation
to Irish identity is, as I've argued in chapter two, acute owing to his problematic
Anglo-Irish background in the Irish nationalist context. As Yeats writes in A Vision,
his "instructors certainly expect neither a 'primitive state' nor a return to barbarism as
primitivism and barbarism are ordinarily understood" (Jeffares 1990:255). Rather,
"antithetical revelation is an intellectual influx neither from beyond mankind nor born
of a virgin, but begotten from our spirit and history" (1990:255). His concept of the
antithetical does not, therefore, rely on or translate into primitivism. It is a 'modern'
concept, applied to 'modem' Ireland, in order to make Irishness newly original.
In light of the interpenetration of the gyres, then, the 'modem' and 'postcolonial'
Ireland that Yeats imagines is one free of Othering and negation at the level of
identity. Yeats envisages the Irish as an inclusive, imagined community united
through a 'contrary' in the adoption and espousal of an heroic, ideal Mask: a freely
chosen and self-fashioned national identity or 'personality' that permits self-
determination and the full expression of psychological unity by the decolonized Irish
individual and nation. Such a Mask, Yeats tells us, is "beauty" (Jeffares 1990:206). It
is the Mask that "in the crisis of creation" causes "a person to fuse with the opposite,
buried self' (Kiberd 1996: 123). The resultant "birth of a new species of man," Yeats
also tells us, "is from terror" (O'Donnell/Archibald 1999:217). This is a familiar
formulation by Yeats of the birth of the new Irish nation, a nation "changed utterly".
In arguably his most famous line, from "Easter 1916": "A terrible beauty is born"
(Collected Poems 1971:203).
* * * * *
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Chapter Four: Mediations and Implications of Yeats for South Africa
I wish to conclude with a brief consideration ofYeats's Doctrine ofthe Mask and
conception of Irish national identity in relation to the issues of national identity and
national unity in postcolonial, postapartheid South Africa. Such a consideration is
invited by Said's statement that "we should think ofYeats ... as an Irish poet with
more than strictly local Irish meaning and applications" (1993 :281). Elaborating on
his point that Yeats "rises out of his national environment and gains universal
significance," Said draws attention to the fact that Neruda "accepted" Yeats "as a
national poet representing the Irish nation in its war against tyranny" (1993 :281). Said
adds that "according to Neruda, Yeats responded positively to that unmistakably anti-
fascist call" for support of a writers' congress in Madrid in 1937 "in defence of the
Republic" (1993 :281). In light also of how "Neruda saw no difficulty in thinking of
himself as a poet who dealt with internal colonialism in Chile and with external
imperialism throughout Latin America" (1993 :281), Yeats and his concerns, Said
argues, should similarly be seen to transcend "his national environment".
This is to say that Yeats must inevitably be situated in what Kiberd calls the
"international theme", whereby Yeats saw himself as having exactly such wider
"meaning and applications" outside ofIreland, 'internationally' among those
belonging to other nations. As Kiberd indicates, the "Irishman" Yeats considered
himself "the heir of all the ages, creating not just a national poetic" but "a new species
of man," and became a role model for poets and colonized peoples "in other places"
(1996: 129). That Yeats subscribed to and cultivated this "theme" is, of course,
unsurprising given the "tremendously heightened role" (Pippin 1991 :41) assumed by
the 'modernist' artist" in general as "the 'antennae of the race'" and "especially the
'unacknowledged legislator' for mankind" (1991 :30). This "heightened role" informs
Eliot's argument, outlined in chapter two, that Yeats "in becoming more Irish...
became at the same time universal" (Unterecker 1963:58) and could "speak for every
man, or for men very different from himself' (1963 :59). It is also unsurprising given
Yeats's occult belief in a Collective Unconscious, accessible to people within and
across national borders. Furthermore, Anderson' s stressing of mass print-literacy is
apposite in this regard: there is ample evidence in Yeats's biography and works
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indicating he was influenced and inspired by poets 'in other places', whom he sought
to emulate and surpass in poetic achievement.
Kiberd underlines that Yeats was, for instance, able to construct himself as a 'national
poet with international significance' by drawing on the example of Whitman. As
Kiberd explains, Yeats used the American as a "test-case" or "sort of sounding
board," even "devoting his analysis of Phase Six in A Vision to Whitman's attempt to
reconcile individualism with communal ideals" (1996: 128). Kiberd points out that
both Yeats and Whitman, "experiencing themselves as media for unseen forces which
spoke through them," actively "staked their claim" as "representative men" or "types
of a nation" (1996: 129). However, the "traditions which they pioneered were also
international," Kiberd argues, in that both poets "were certain that the conditions
which produced them and their poems could be repeated in other places" (1996:129).
Yeats was, Kiberd points out, "indeed an exemplar to Indian poets like Rabindranath
Tagore, as Whitman was to many Latin Americans including Pablo Neruda"
(1996:129).
The notion of Yeats as an international "exemplar" informs and is informed by the
perception, far from limited to Neruda and in fact widespread "in other places"
outside of Ireland, of Yeats "as a national poet representing the Irish nation in its war
against tyranny." The "conditions" of colonial oppression and "tyranny" in Ireland,
which in many ways produced Yeats and his poems, have of course their parallels
with such "conditions" (marked by their own historical specificities) outside of
Ireland, which have produced other poets (like Neruda) and poems. The result is that,
given the inseparability of mass print-literacy from 'international' history and politics,
Yeats has emerged in the 20th and early 21 st centuries as an inspirational anti-colonial
figure in the eyes of nationalist intellectuals and statesmen' in other places' outside
Ireland. Indeed, Yeats's work has resonated deeply with his readers in particularly the
former colonies, who have deemed his nationalist, liberationist verse to be of great
relevance and importance to themselves and their concerns in their own national
contexts.
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This South Africans well know, given President Thabo Mbeki's predeliction for
quoting Yeats in his speeches and writings (a prime example of this will be examined
below). Nigerian Chinua Achebe's novel Things Fall Apart (1959), taking its title
from the apocalyptic line in "The Second Coming" and relating the "disorder" of the
"inflamed colonial situation" to the "colonial intervention in the first place" (Said
1993:283/4), has also added to Yeats's enduring political and intellectual currency-
and popularity - in Africa. This popularity may to some extent also be ascribed to
long familiarity, thanks to Yeats's assimilation "into the canon... of modem English
literature" (Said 1993 :265) and the teaching of his works in what Anderson calls
"colonial school-systems" (1991:120). Yeats may therefore be one example of how,
as Anderson argues, colonial education ironically helped to promote "colonial
nationalisms" (1991: 120). In the context of decolonization and nation-building in
Africa, Eliot's claim that Yeats can "speak for every man, or for men very different
from himself' appears to have been borne out.
This is not, however, without its complications. There is a danger of decontextualising
Yeats from the specificities of the Ireland of his times, inviting the "blanket wishful
thinking" informing "so many untested generalizations" and "assumptions" -
including those "behind comparative post-colonial studies" - about "the Platonic
solidarity between struggling Irish nationalists and their supposedly analogous victims
elsewhere" (Foster 2001 :xiv). As I've argued in chapter two, it remains an unpalatable
part of history that racial attitudes in Ireland during Yeats's lifetime were "not
radically different from those held elsewhere in Europe at the time" (McCracken
2003 :xviii). Far from a concordance of Irish and black South African liberationist
aspirations, the Irish considered it "an affront to be denied home rule, let alone nation
statehood," on the basis that they were" ... 'white men'" (McCracken 2003 :pxviii).
McCracken points out that it "was the Boers" or Afrikaners - the later architects of
apartheid - whom the Irish saw and supported as "the downtrodden and the
underdog" in the South African colonial context, not the oppressed black population.
With "a few notable exceptions," McCracken remarks, "minds were closed to any
other interpretation of the South African situation" (2003 :xviii/xix).
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In this light, despite later Irish "sympathy with the liberation movement in South
Africa" (McCracken 2003:xviii), the 'importing' of nationalist, liberationist poetic
inspiration to South Africa from a pro-"white" Ireland largely unsympathetic to
"black" self-determination, could be deemed highly disquieting. As Young points out,
it is "still an open question... whether an African pastoralist shares the same
existential 'bestial floor' with an Irish poet and his readers" (1990: 131). Again,
Young's unsatisfactory reference to "pastoralist" rather than intellectual aside, the
point is that appropriating Ireland's national poet to 'speak for' decolonization,
liberation, and nation-building in (South) Africa risks subtly casting the Ireland of his
times as pro-black (South) African, at the expense of what Foster calls the "mesh of
nuance, complexity and contradiction involved when the stories of nations intersect
with those of supposedly emblematic individuals" (2001 :xvii) like Yeats.
In his eulogy "Apartheid is dead! Hail the Spirit of Anton Rupert!" in ANC Today,
Mbeki himself overlooks Irish pro-white racism during Yeats's lifetime, and argues:
"Because of its own struggle against British imperialism, for the liberation of the Irish
and all colonized nations, the IRB actively supported the struggle of the Boers against
the British during the South African (Anglo-Boer) War" (2006:2). Having quoted at
length from Yeats's "Easter 1916", he points to the "striking irony" that the "progeny
of the IRB Boer supporters ended up as militant supporters of the ANC fighters
against apartheid rule" (2006:3). "Thus the Irish descendants of John MacBride,"
Mbeki writes, "turned into opponents of the Boer descendants of John MacBride's
former comrades-in-arms" (2006:3). Mbeki then relates "these changing alliances"
(2006:3) to the Afrikaner Rupert's life, praising him for advocating "a partnership that
had to be extended to the black population as well" (2006:4).
Mbeki writes that Rupert "was sufficiently inspired by the spirit of righteousness and
justice... to end his life as a celebrated South African and African patriot, a prophet of
an inclusive future for the children of our country and continent" (2006:5). Mbeki
concludes that Rupert therefore "did not disappoint the expectations of John
MacBride's Irish Brigade" and, adapting Yeats's verse, comments: "Our people are
blessed that too long a sacrifice did not make a stone" (2006:5) of Rupert's heart.
While the conciliatory spirit of Mbeki's essay is laudable, the association of black
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South African emancipation with Irish anti-colonial expectations, and with Yeats' s
"Easter 1916", is erroneous. Clearly, what Mbeki calls the Irish "struggle" for the
liberation of "all colonized nations" did in fact not include the freeing of the black
population in South Africa.
Of course, pro-white sentiment in Ireland can by no means be said to be a direct or
indirect reflection on Yeats himself. As Yeats argued, "whenever a country produces
a man of genius he is never like that country's immediate idea of itself' (Kiberd
1996: 128). Indeed, the view of Yeats as a "national poet representing the Irish nation
in its war against tyranny" elides the fact that his relationship with the Irish was
largely adversarial. Yeats's "war on tyranny" and Othering, as I have demonstrated,
was waged not only against England, but against his countrymen and within himself.
In this light, it is to Mbeki's credit that his description ofYeats in his essay, as "the
outstanding Irish poet and patriot" (2006:2), grants Yeats the full Irish-ness many of
his countrymen sought to deny him before and after his death.
This recognition has been long in coming in Ireland. According to Catherine Fahy,
one of the curators of a two-year Yeats exhibition which opened at Dublin's National
Library of Ireland in May 2006, Yeats has "67 years after his death... finally been
embraced into the nation's folk memory" (The Economist 2006:82). This was a
"process eased by the decline of strident nationalism" and by his "assimilation into
the Celtic Tiger's tourist trade" (2006:82). Fahy is quoted as saying: "Nationalist
Ireland has got over its crisis about Yeats" (2006:82). This recognition, at least
'officially', of Yeats's Irishness also follows the legalisation of divorce in Ireland in
1996.
Taking Said's cue, then, I wish to extract from Yeats's Doctrine ofthe Mask and
System what I hold to be the 'kernel' or principal value of his theorising for the
contemporary South African context, i.e. his inspired reframing of Blake's notion of
the 'contrary' in terms of an explicitly non-essentialist national identity. As Kiberd
points out, Yeats was "certain that the conditions which produced" him and his
"poems could be repeated in other places" (1996: 129). Such "conditions" in the Irish
colonial context ofYeats's lifetime are outlined by Lyons, who conceives of "several
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distinct 'cultures'" existing in Ireland, where 'culture' "stands for a system of beliefs,
attitudes and ways of thought, in a sense mediated and refined through an
understanding of history" (Foster 2001 :38). These cultures were "sometimes
overlapping, more often sealed into separate, self-justifying compartments"
(2001 :38). It "was not simply a 'Protestant' versus 'Catholic' tradition," but rather a
case of "varieties of identification" (2001 :38). While these "certainly took religious
labels," religious identification was "as often as not. .. simply a flag for a whole range
of attitudes and values" (2001:38). There were also 'identifications within
identifications', such as "the utterly distinct cultures of Ulster Presbyterianism and
Southern Ascendancy identity" (2001 :38) within Protestantism.
The "implicit friction" between such groupings "broke out again and again," and there
was little hope for "a 'solvent' ... which would meld or blend them into a less
confrontational whole" (2001:38). Irish diversity therefore consisted of "colliding
cultures" (2001 :39) within the relatively small geographical space of the island, and
this diversity was "a diversity of ways of life ... deeply embedded in the past and of
which the much advertised political differences" were "but the outward and visible
sign" (2001:38). Lyons explains that between 1890 and 1939, from the "fall ofPamell
to the death of Yeats," it was not a case of "an anarchy ofviolence in the streets, of
contempt for law and order" that might make "the island, or any part of it,
permanently ungovernable" (2001 :38). It was instead "an anarchy of the mind and in
the heart," an anarchy "which forbade not just unity of territories but also 'unity of
being"', which "sprang from the collision.... of seemingly irreconcilable cultures,
unable to live together or to live apart, caught inextricably in the web of their tragic
history" (2001 :38).
Lyons stresses "the depths and intensity ofthe feelings by which ... men were divided
rather than united" (2001 :40) during Yeats' s lifetime. As I have explained in chapter
two, the enmity between, broadly, the major, rival traditions of 'Catholic' and
'Protestant' informed and was informed by essentialism or Othering. This was evident
in what Foster calls the "vehemence" with which Yeats was from very early in his
poetical career "assailed by literary and political enemies who were prepared to
impeach him on the grounds of Protestant Ascendancy background, as well as moral
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and political unsoundness" (2001 :47). It was precisely Yeats's Othered Anglo-lrish
Protestant identity, the counterpart of Catholic Otherness imposed by the Protestant
Ascendancy class, which was cited by his detractors before and after his death as
grounds for denying him Irishness. The "conditions" which produced Yeats were,
therefore, in large part colonialism and its offspring within the colony: division owing
to essentialism at the level of identity.
While South Africa and Ireland have both suffered colonial oppression, it remains that
South Africa is a significantly larger territory, and its historical, cultural and social
circumstances are vastly different from those in Ireland. Nevertheless, I wish to
submit that the basic "conditions" of essentialism and division in the Ireland of
Yeats's lifetime comprise a striking parallel with "conditions" in South Africa. Like
Ireland, South Africa has been riven by essentialism and division between "colliding
cultures" within its territory, compartmentalized under colonialism and apartheid in
terms of skin colour: whites, blacks, coloureds, Indians. South Africans know all too
well how the "implicit friction" between and within these 'separate' groupings has
broken out "again and again," particularly along lines of race and political affiliation.
Cultural diversity in South Africa, constructed through the mechanism of Othering,
remains "deeply embedded in the past." Indeed, South African history, marked by
racial segregation and conflicts bred by colonialism and apartheid, could also be
described as one "of seemingly irreconcilable cultures, unable to live together or to
live apart, caught inextricably in the web of their tragic history."
I have emphasized that the "conditions" of Othering and division deeply inform the
positing by Yeats of a specifically non-essentialist, inclusive Mask: an "idea of good"
that was "most unlike" (Jeffares 1990:35) his countrymen, and "of all possible things
the most difficult" (1990: 132) for his countrymen to choose, adopt and bring into
being. In doing so, as I have demonstrated, Yeats imagined Ireland as a community
whose identity or personality would be "created by passion" (1990:206) to inclusively
unite the Irish 'to themselves', in the mode of a Blakean contrary. It is this explicitly
non-essentialist, non-exclusionary ambition and conception of national identity, then,
that makes the postcolonial, postapartheid South African context so, so to speak,
'Yeatsian'. It is with a high degree of conscious awareness and purposiveness, like
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that typical of subscription to Yeats's seemingly stable and unified Mask, that South
Africans are constructing a national identity and building 'their' nation without any of
the objective criteria or essentialist categories (race, language, religion, etc) that have
conventionally been invoked by nationalists worldwide as the basis for nationhood
and national unity. As Erasmus puts it: "In light of its history of divisions, post-
apartheid South African nationalism focuses particularly on building a unified South
African national identity" (DaniellSouthall/Lutchman 2005: 18).
Non-essentialism, expressly, is the hallmark of what Daniel, Southall and Lutchman
refer to as the "'new South Africa'" (2005: xxx). In this postcolonial, postapartheid
context, the 'national' emphasis continues to be on "reconciliation between
oppressors and oppressed" - broadly, the white minority and black majority - "in a
land where race had historically been the primary criterion for allocating wealth,
power and life-chances" (2005:xxxiv). Rapprochement between Ireland's rival
religious traditions, which were deeply divided in large part owing to Anglo-Irish
Protestant minority privilege and oppression of the Irish Catholic majority under
colonialism, was, of course, what Yeats had intended in positing his postcolonial
Mask. For Yeats, as it is for South Africa, construction of a non-essentialist national
identity was to serve as a "solvent" in order to "meld or blend" the rival factions at the
level of identity "into a less confrontational whole" (Foster 2001 :38).
In this 'Yeatsian' sense, to strive for inclusive and unifying non-essentialism is to
seek imaginatively and creatively the 'anti-self or opposite of essentialist, divisive
group characterisation. In the South African context, one might speculate, the 'Mask'
or archetypal Image serving unification most has been postapartheid South Africa's
first president and the champion of non-essentialism, Nelson Mandela, to whom
apartheid South Africa, with what might be called non-essentialist or 'Yeatsian'
intent, chose collectively to "offer herself to ... as to her anti-self, buskin following
hard on sock" (Unterecker 1963:31) in the first 'multiracial' democratic elections in
1994. As Daniel, Southall, and Lutchman describe South Africa's non-essentialist or
postcoloniallpostapartheid aspiration: "The elections of 1994 marked the most
significant juncture ever in South African history, away from a society which
employed race as its fundamental organising principle and which condemned the
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majority of people to poverty and oppression on grounds of colour, to one which
aspires to the abolition of race as a criterion of status, class and wealth, to political
equality and to 'a better life for all'" (2005:xix). It must be added that non-sexism,
among a range of anti-discrimination policies, forms part of this national ideal,
informing the broader project that Mbeki calls the "African Renaissance".
The non-essentialist or 'Yeatsian' complexion of contemporary South Africa is
'doubled up' in that the national identity under construction is evidently taking effect
in the mode of a contrary. According to a Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC)
study in 2005, a "sense of national identity was found to be 'in the process of
formation"', with most of the 2500 South Africans surveyed combining "their racial
identification with a strong national identity in what is known as 'dual identity'"
(Kassiem 2005). It found that, "while nation-building was still growing," it "appeared
to be 'bearing fruit'" (Kassiem 2005). The "majority of black, white, coloured and
Indians," the report states, "do feel strong ties with the nation and show patriotism"
(Kassiem 2005). A total of 83% of respondents were "happy to be South African
citizens," which indicated this sentiment "was 'widely shared' within the nation"
(Kassiem 2005). The study also found that "over two-thirds of whites and four-fifths
of blacks said they would rather be South African citizens than citizens of any other
country" (Kassiem 2005).
These findings appear to confirm Daniel, Southall, and Lutchman's assertion that "it
is generally acknowledged ... considerable progress towards a common sense of
citizenship and nationhood has been made since 1994" (2005:xxxiv). South Africans'
subscription to, and progress towards, what might in Yeatsian terms be called the
country's "object of desire or moral ideal which is of all possible things the most
difficult" (Jeffares 1990: 132) to achieve, appears to be owing to the evocation and
inference pennitted by a non-essentialist or 'Yeats-like' Mask. Daniel, Southall, and
Lutchman argue that South Africa is "a fundamentally better and morally far superior
place" (2005 :xix) than in 1994, with the government and citizens working towards
fulfilling "a common vision of identity, growth and development for the 'new South
Africa'" (2005:xxx). The intended effect of such a "common vision of identity" or, in
Yeats's terminology, a Mask, is of course a non-essentialist and inclusive national
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unity. This, in light of the HSRC's findings, appears to be tentatively emerging, with
widespread patriotism perhaps an early sign of the imagined community taking shape.
Indeed, according to Daniel, Southall, and Lutchman, South Africa is "more united,
more peaceful, more optimistic, more self-confident and more ambitious" (2005 :xix)
than in 1994.
However, this somewhat rosy outlook is severely undermined by the continuation of
essentialist thinking and crude forms of racial imposition at the level of identity,
which threatens the coming into being of a truly inclusive postcolonial, postapartheid
society. Despite its progress towards fulfilling its non-essentialist aspiration, post-
1994 South Africa remains beset with Othering - the very problem that in post-1922
Ireland "forbade... unity of being" and scuppered Yeats's vision of a united Irish
nation. What Daniel, Southall, and Lutchman call "a lack of national coherence," or
of what Yeats called Unity of Being, is evident in that "fault lines based upon race
continue to shape opportunity and attitudes" (2005:xxxiv). As Erasmus explains, these
fault lines extend across society, from education to labour and politics, according to
the essentialist, seemingly stable and fixed "apartheid racial categories" of "white,
Indian, coloured and black" (Daniel/Southall/Lutchman 2005: 13).
According to the HSRC study, the "different race groups equivocally think people
from other race groups are racist" (Kassiem 2005). "Especially among black and
white South Africans," the report states, "racism is reciprocal, with blacks thinking
whites are racist and whites thinking blacks are racist" (Kassiem 2005). The report
also states that the "historical African-white schism is confirmed by the mirroring
pattern that most whites regard blacks as racist" (Kassiem 2005). Co10ureds and
Indians, the report adds, are "generally regarded as less racist than the other race
groups," while whites are considered the most racist group: by 80% of blacks, 65% of
Indians, and 37% of coloureds (Kassiem 2005). In all, the report stresses, there is
"'still a definite need for improvement in race relations'" (Kassiem 2005).
Clearly, as Erasmus argues, despite "the implementation of legislation to end
exclusionary practices based on race," race "continues to be a site of division and
exclusion amongst South Africans" (Daniel/Southall/Lutchman 2005 :7). Of course,
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race is not the only site of division and exclusion. Other such sites include gender,
sexuality, class, age, and the urban/rural dwellers gap, which intersect with race and
each other in a range of ways. Race, however, constitutes the primary site of division
and exclusion, given its prioritization as the criterion of classification under apartheid.
This legacy has meant that, in postapartheid South Africa, increased "racial
heterogeneity in everyday life" has not translated into "the disappearance of racial
antagonisms and exclusionary practices based on race" (2005 :20). Whereas "racial
divisions" were "legally and socially enforced during apartheid" (2005: 14), Erasmus
argues, they appear in contemporary South Africa "to be self-imposed" (2005:7).
Thus "underlying racialised divisions" (2005 :20) and "racial exclusions" (2005 :7) can
be "so subtle they are very often hard to recognise and identify" (2005:14), and are
frequently "based on unspoken racial antagonisms" (2005 :20).
Essentialism, or what Erasmus calls "race thinking", therefore persists "even in 'non-
racial' South Africa''', where "racialised scripts of reality and behaviour" are in fact
"norms rather than exceptions" (2005:8). Race thinking, Erasmus explains, comprises
building-block "ideas that race and racialised identities are fixed and definitive"
(2005:24), and that they are "ways of being" that "should determine one's political
actions and right to belong" (2005:27). This conception of stable, fixed identity is, of
course, akin to and a legacy of the 'colonial' identity' outlined in chapter one. Such
identity, constructed in the mode of the census and based on Aristotlean essentialism,
epitomises "completeness and unambiguity" on the basis that "everyone" has "one -
and only one - extremely clear place" (Anderson 1991: 166) at the level of identity.
Unsurprisingly, then, Erasmus argues that race thinking in South Africa has been
perpetuated by "the national census," as well as by political parties' election
campaigns and "post-apartheid programmes for affirmative action, equity, and black
empowerment" (2005:21).
Erasmus adds that race thinking is also manifesting by way of using race as "cultural
and political armour" (2005:27), and in terms of an essentialist "familialism" that
assumes "one can read someone's politics and belonging from the colour of their
skin" (2005:24). The former takes such forms as: advocating "colour-blindness"
(2005:22) to "protect privilege" (2005:22); playing the proverbial 'race card' as "a
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defence against criticism" and "intra-racial and national difference" (2005 :22); and
invoking the "double standards" (2005:25) of victimage in claims of racism and
"reverse discrimination" (2005 :27). In the last case in particular, "blackness and
whiteness" are often presented as "polar opposites", equating "the 'Self with
suffering, authenticity and innocence, and the 'Other' with oppression, in-authenticity
and guilt" (2005:27).
Such Self-Other victimage at the level of identity, in accordance with Aristotlean
'same-other' logic and operating as per the Hegelian dialectic, was of course deplored
by Yeats. This is evident in his description of Phase 22 - the beginning of the phases
'primarily' marked by enforced 'character' or 'code'. Yeats reveals that the "mind
that has shown a predominantly emotional character" has been called "that of the
Victim" (Jeffares 1990: 184). Disparagingly, he associates the mental "interchange"
involving "Victimage" with "the gusts of sentimentality that overtake violent men, the
gusts of cruelty that overtake the sentimental" (1990: 184). Interestingly, Foster
remarks that "it is hard to avoid the feeling that the new, modernized, liberated Irish
consciousness feels a sneaking nostalgia for the verities of the old victim-culture"
(Foster 2001 :xv). "Victimhood" or "victim-culture" is, he notes, "in its way, a culture
of superiority" (200l:xv). The 'liberated' South Africa, too, is clearly not immune to
such emotional 'gusts' of victimage and 'superiority' on either side of the racial
divide.
In South Africa, Erasmus points out, such 'mirroring' modes of race scripting are
often accompanied by a hegemonic and "common idea that racism is a disease to be
cured and/or an evil to be eradicated" (2005 :9). Erasmus argues that this locks South
Africans into "a discourse of legal and bureaucratic remedies on the one hand," and
into "a moralising discourse dividing 'good' and 'bad' South Africans on the other"
(2005:9). Dualistic thinking - informing and informed by pervasive "images of good
and evil, crude allegories," and bemoaned by Yeats in Per Amica Silentia Lunae -
therefore remains part and parcel of the 'new South Africa'. Rather than racism being
about "the prejudices of particular individuals," it constitutes a dualistic discourse that
"permeates ... our society" (2005:10), including and especially at the level of identity.
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Such "racial disjunction" is, as Daniel, Southall, and Lutchrnan reiterate, "of course,
one ofthe most notorious outcomes of apartheid, and its elimination constitutes one of
the government's most pressing priorities" (2005:xxxiii). Nevertheless, despite
continuing efforts at "elimination", the fact that people have been 'divided rather than
united' throughout South African history has meant that an emphatic and genuine
national unity continues to elude the 'postcolonial, postapartheid' South Africa. In
regard to this, the meaning and application of Yeats's conception of a non-essentialist
national identity or Mask in the Irish context, framed specifically in terms of his
distinction between a contrary and a negation, is illuminating when weighed against
the South African context, according to Said's assertion that Yeats should be thought
of as having "more than strictly local Irish meaning and applications" (1993 :281).
As I've mentioned earlier in this chapter, the HSRC study indicates that South
Africans appear to be combining "their racial identification with a strong national
identity in what is known as 'dual identity'" (Kassiem 2005). However, the report
states, "strong national identity" does "not stop people from associating with a strong
racial identity" (Kassiem 2005). Among "the racial minorities," the report states,
"national identity is more contested, especially when combined with a strong group
identity," and "this tends to result in more negative perceptions of racism among other
'fellow' minority groups" (Kassiem 2005). The report adds that, on the other hand,
among "blacks, a combination of racial identity and national identity, or what we call
dual identity, coincides with more positive views of other race groups" (Kassiem
2005). On this basis, the report argues, it appeared that "strong national identity was
the answer to bridging the gap among some racial groups," and that "national identity
might 'contribute to unifying, rather than excluding and dividing the various
population groups'" (Kassiem 2005).
Clearly, 'dual identity' in South Africa is acting as a contrary in the manner Yeats
argued a Mask would in Ireland, i.e. a "common vision of identity," particularly when
strongly identified with, is serving to infer and evoke the South African 'nation'. This
appears to be "bearing fruit" in that the "majority of black, white, coloured and
Indians do feel strong ties with the nation and show patriotism." That 83% of
respondents were "happy to be South African citizens," and most indicated "they
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would rather be South African citizens than citizens of any other country," appears to
confirm Yeats's Blakean principle that "'Contraries are positive'" (Jeffares
1990:123).
Significantly, however, the contrary is strongest among those whose claim to national
identity is 'less contested', namely "blacks", who consequently have "more positive
views of other race groups," but is not as strong among those whose claim to national
identity is 'more contested', namely the "racial minorities", who consequently have
"more negative perceptions." Questions arise, then, as to why the minorities do not
identify as strongly as "blacks" with the nation's celebrated non-essentialist national
identity, why in their case "national identity" continues to be "more contested", and
why their strong group identification persists in a way that gives rise to "more
negative perceptions". A range of answers could be posited, but it suffices to state that
essentialist negation or Othering clearly continues to divide South Africans according
to racial allegiances and perceptions.
This is despite the ideal of an inclusive, non-essentialist South Africa having come
about with the realization that essentialist or objective criteria for 'nation' status,
particularly the criterion of race, would not be viable in a postapartheid context.
Evidently, the widespread awareness that the non-essentialist national identity is a
construct has not translated into a widespread awareness of the constructedness of
race. As Erasmus stresses, "race has no inherently biological or cultural basis"
(DaniellSouthall/Lutchman 2005:7); it is "a socio-historical and political construct"
(2005 :9) and in the South African context "intersects with other axes of inequality and
identity such as class, gender, sexuality, culture, nationality, ethnicity and religion"
(2005: 10). While race is also "not an illusion" and racial "meanings have real effects
on people's lives" (2005:10), it is still not "a fixed and tangible thing we can find in
our blood or DNA; nor is it something we are born with because of our culture" - its
meanings are learnt and taught "to our children" (2005: 10).
Therefore, in much the same way that "religious labels" and identifications were in
Yeats's lifetime "simply a flag for a whole range of attitudes and values" (Foster
2001 :38), racial labels in South Africa, such as "black(ness)" and "white(ness)", are
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flags for what Erasmus calls "hierarchical structures of meaning attached to skin
colour" (Daniel/SouthalllLutchman 2005: 10), and skin colour - like what Lyons calls
"the much advertised political differences" in Ireland - but the "outward and visible
sign" (Foster 2001 :38) of attached meanings. The result, as Lyons saw it in the Irish
context, is that 'cultures', while "sometimes overlapping," are "more often than not
sealed into separate, self-justifying compartments" (Foster 2001 :38). As Erasmus
indicates, racist "practices and ideas that race is fixed" remain in South Africa "not
exceptions to the norm" but in fact "the norm", reflecting a lack of awareness or
unwillingness to acknowledge that race "meanings" are in fact "not fixed" but
"change over time and from one context to another" as "people struggle over"
(Daniel, Southall, Lutchman 2005: 10) these meanings.
It can be seen, then, that the constructedness of South Africa's non-essentialist
national identity is generally recognized by the citizenry, and yet the "group" or
"racial identification" with which national identity (if not altogether rejected) is
combined, with varying degrees of success in what the HSRC calls 'dual identity',
remains attached to essentialist categories and notions of Other-ness. In Yeatsian
terms, the contrary is being sabotaged by negation, deferring the forging of a more
emphatic and genuine national unity. Therefore, while the "common vision" of a non-
essentialist national identity appears to be holding up well given that 83% of South
Africans across the races are "happy to be ... citizens," there remains a distinct "lack
of national coherence" or Unity of Being, and a sense that, as often as not, "Things"
like non-essentialism, reconciliation, inclusivity and nation-building continue to "fall
apart" (Collected Poems 1971 :211) according to inherited, persisting racial fractures.
As Erasmus describes it, the "dynamics of race in South Africa today are in a state
where for some there remains a remarkable continuity with everyday life under
apartheid, while alongside there are daily struggles with ways of breaking away from
this legacy" (Daniel/Southall/Lutchman 2005:30). Erasmus adds that the "euphoria of
the first years of freedom has long worn off," and argues that the "time has come for
citizens to ask themselves: What do I do to make a difference to the way in which
race works in this country... more importantly, what do I do to keep race working in
more or less the same way as it always has?" (2005:30). Clearly, the postcolonial
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visionary Yeats, in promoting an inclusive and non-essentialist alterity at the level of
identity, i.e. one resituated within individuals in positive terms in the mode of a
contrary, as an explicitly constructive alternative to the destructive, externalized "two
ends of the see-saw" (Jeffares 1990: 123) of essentialist and exclusionary Othering and
negation, assists South Africans in answering such crucial 'postcolonial,
postapartheid' questions. Yeats's theorizing regarding national identity in the Irish
colonial context offers a Blakean reminder to South Africans that "Without Contraries
is no progression" (Butter 1989:53).
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